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Glossary of Select Terms and Abbreviations 
AEF – American Expeditionary Force. 
Anlage – Annex/appendix.  
Armee/Armeen – Army/armies. 
Armee-Abteilung C – Army Detachment C, a German army-level command of H.G. Gallwitz. 
Armeeoberkommando (AOK) – Austro-Hungarian High Command. 
Divisionsausbildungsgruppe (DAG) – Divisional training group. 
Etappenstelle West (EstW) – the Austro-Hungarian logistical apparatus for the Western Front. 
Feldjägerbataillon (FJB) – Light infantry battalion. 
Feldmarschalleutnant (FML) – Equivalent of a major general in the US Army, normally a 
divisional commander. 
Gruppe – An ad-hoc, often temporary, and usually corps-level command. 
Hauptwiderstandslinie (HWL) – the primary line of defense of a trench system.  
Heeresgruppe (H.G.)  - Army group.  
Honvéd – the Hungarian home defense force; counterpart to the Austrian k.k. Landwehr.  
ID. – Infantry division.  
IR – Infantry regiment. 
Kaiserlich und königlich (k.u.k.) – “imperial (Austrian) and royal (Hungarian);” appellation for 
the Austro-Hungarian Common Army (k.u.k. Armee). 
Landsturm (Lst.) – Austro-Hungarian reserve/militia force.  
Maas – the river Meuse.  
Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL) – The Supreme Command of the German Army. 
Op.Nr.  – Operation file number. 
ÖULK – Austria-Hungary’s Last War, the official Austrian military history of the First World 
War.  
Sturmbataillon (StBaon) – specialized assault battalion.  






 On November 5th, 1918, two days after the formal capitulation of the Habsburg military 
at Villa Giusti, a battery of Field Artillery Regiment 101 of the k.u.k. 1st Infantry Division fired 
the final Austro-Hungarian shot of the First World War. Surprisingly, this belated, rather 
anticlimactic conclusion of Austria-Hungary’s last war did not occur in the hills of the Balkans 
or in the mountains of northern Italy, but around the small village of Vilosnes in the Meuse 
department of eastern France.1 From July 1918 until the end of the war in November, four 
infantry divisions and a number of artillery units of the Austro-Hungarian Army participated in 
the desperate, increasingly futile struggle of the German Army on the Western Front against the 
inexorable advance of the Allied Hundred Days Offensive. As the Habsburg Monarchy itself 
disintegrated and the main body of the Austro-Hungarian field army collapsed in Italy, the 
soldiers of the 1st, 35th, 37th Honvéd, and 106th Infantry Divisions labored and fought under close 
subordination to the German forces in northeastern France, sequestered hundreds of miles away 
from the seminal political and military events of the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. Indeed, by 
the time that k.u.k. troops withdrew from their positions in Lorraine at the beginning of 
November, the state that they fought for had de facto ceased to exist.  
Despite the centrality of Austria-Hungary in the outbreak and prosecution of the Great 
War, the Austro-Hungarian Army is a relatively obscure topic in the Anglosphere. However, 
even within the field of Habsburg military history, the presence of k.u.k. forces in the West is 
little-known. To be sure, the Habsburg military played a distinctively subordinate and mostly 
insignificant role on the Western Front. For one, the Western Front was never the primary theater 
                                                          
1 Maximilian Polatschek, “Österreichisch-ungarische Truppen an der Westfront 1914/1918” (Doctoral thesis, 




of operations for the k.u.k. Armee; in September 1918, only two Austro-Hungarian divisions 
stood in France, while fifty-seven were stationed in Italy.2  Likewise, even after the westward 
deployment of entire k.u.k. infantry divisions in July 1918, Habsburg troops constituted a 
minuscule proportion of the German Westheer; correspondingly, given that the military defeat of 
the Central Powers was a foregone conclusion by the summer of 1918, the contribution of these 
Austro-Hungarian divisions in military terms was negligible.  
Although k.u.k. units did not have any meaningful impact on the final battles of the 
Western Front, the phenomenon of Habsburg forces fighting in France is significant in other 
ways. Firstly, the deployment of k.u.k. infantry divisions to France in 1918 represented the final 
stage of Austria-Hungary’s intermittent but longstanding participation in the fighting in the 
West, a role largely forgotten in most histories of the Great War. Similarly, both the diplomatic 
and strategic background of the deployment of k.u.k. divisions to the West and their employment 
in northeastern France exemplified the culmination of the wartime relationship between the 
Austria-Hungary and Germany, specifically the political and military subordination of the 
Habsburg Monarchy to the German Reich. Lastly, the experience of the Austro-Hungarian 
divisions in France typified the wartime evolution of the k.u.k. Armee, exhibiting the progress 
made by the Austro-Hungarian military in organizational, technological, and tactical 
modernization. Yet, at the same time, the ultimate inability of the Habsburg forces in France to 
successfully resist the Franco-American onslaught demonstrated that the wartime adaptations of 
the Austro-Hungarian military could not overcome the immense superiority of the Entente forces 
or the progressive disintegration of the Habsburg military and state.  
                                                          




Note on Sources 
The primary basis of this thesis is the collection of Austro-Hungarian military records 
located at the US National Archives at College Park, Maryland. Officers from the US Army War 
College collected these documents from the German Reichsarchiv in Potsdam and the Austrian 
Kriegsarchiv in Vienna in 1929. The collection includes war diaries, operational reports, official 
communiques, and other administrative documents from multiple echelons of the German and 
Austro-Hungarian armies, namely from the high command, corps, divisional, brigade, and 
occasionally regimental levels.3  Given the relative obscurity of the subject, very little scholarly 
literature exists regarding the Austro-Hungarian divisions in the West in 1918, virtually none of 
which is in English. The principal secondary source for this thesis and for this subject is 
“Österreichisch-ungarische Truppen an der Westfront 1914/1918,” a 1974 doctoral dissertation 
written by Maximilian Polatschek at the University of Vienna. Polatschek utilized not only a 
variety of military and diplomatic documents from the Austrian State Archives, but also drew 
from the postwar memoirs of leading Austro-Hungarian and German military figures.4 
Therefore, given the breadth of primary sources incorporated by Polatschek and the largely 
descriptive nature of his work, this thesis often utilizes Polatschek’s dissertation in a manner 
similar to a primary source. However, it must be noted that Polatschek seemingly utilized only 
the operations files and weekly reports of the Armeeoberkommando for his dissertation; thus, to 
the knowledge of this author, previous works on this subject have not incorporated many of the 
divisional operations documents utilized by this thesis.  
  
                                                          
3 The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “Austro-Hungarian Military Records Relating to World 
War I, 1918 - 5/12/1947,” The National Archives Website, accessed February 25th, 2018, 
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/2544443.  
4 Polatschek, “Österreichisch-ungarische Truppen an der Westfront,” 1-2.  
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II. Austro-Hungarian Units on the Western Front Prior to July 1918 
Unlike the multinational character of the Entente forces in France and Belgium, the 
Western Front remained an overwhelmingly German affair for the Central Powers during the 
First World War. Basic geography, namely the great distance between France and the Habsburg 
Monarchy and the concomitant issues of supply and transportation played an important role in 
precluding the large-scale intervention of Habsburg forces in the West. Political and diplomatic 
considerations were also salient, as Austro-Hungarian leaders did not want to induce a greater 
Anglo-French intervention in the Monarchy’s other theaters. Still, the greatest barriers to a 
significant Habsburg military presence in the West were the limited military capacity of the 
Habsburg Monarchy and the prioritization of the Eastern and Southwestern Fronts. Already by 
1915, crippling losses in manpower and materiel had stretched the Habsburg state to the limit; 
given the existential threats posed by Russia and Italy, Austria-Hungary simply could not afford 
to commit large formations to the West.5 Nevertheless, the k.u.k. Armee did dispatch forces to the 
Western Front on four occasions from 1914 to 1918. The first Austro-Hungarian units to fight in 
the West arrived in August 1914, only weeks after the outbreak of the conflict.6 Thus, even 
before the deployment of entire Austro-Hungarian infantry divisions to France in summer 1918, 
there was a well-established precedent for the participation of k.u.k. units in the West. 
Austro-Hungarian Artillery in Belgium and France, 1914-1915 
 The first instance of Habsburg troops fighting on the Western Front occurred from 
August 1914 to May 1915, during which Austro-Hungarian heavy siege artillery of the half-
                                                          
5 Ibid., 3-4.  
6 Wolfgang Etschmann, “Österreich-Ungarn zwischen Engagement und Zurückhaltung. K.u.k. Truppen an der 
Westfront,” in Kriegsende 1918: Ereignis, Wirkung, Nachwirkung, ed. Jörg Doppler, Gerhard P. Groß, 97-105 




battalions “Krakau” and “Görz-Wippach” provided effective fire support for several important 
operations of the initial German campaigns in the West.7 The difficulties encountered by 
Germans in reducing the fortifications of Liège during their advance through Belgium were the 
original impetus for this first deployment. On August 6th, 1914, reflecting on the German 
shortage of modern siege artillery, the Chief of the German General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke 
the Younger, requested that his Austro-Hungarian counterpart, Chief of Staff of the k.u.k. 
Armeeoberkommando Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, dispatch any available Austro-Hungarian 
24cm and 30.5cm howitzers to the Western Front. Later that same day, the AOK responded that 
it could provide four batteries of 30.5cm siege howitzers along with 300 shells per gun.8  
In contrast to the prevailing obsolescence of the Austro-Hungarian artillery arm in 1914, 
the Skoda 30.5cm Mörser M.11 was one of the most advanced heavy artillery pieces in the world 
at the time. In addition to possessing an unusual degree of mobility, courtesy of its innovative 
motorized chassis designed by Ferdinand Porsche, the M.11 design provided significant 
firepower for its relatively small caliber. Tests in January 1913 demonstrated that its 380kg shell, 
effective up to a range of 10km, could overcome the thickest steel plates and concrete walls 
utilized in modern fortress designs.9 On August 9th, Moltke thanked Hötzendorf for this 
assistance and for his part promised to expedite the German supply of Mauser rifles, 
ammunition, and airplanes to the Dual Monarchy. Two days later, an AOK order directly 
subordinated the westward-bound artillery units to the German Oberste Heeresleitung, the first 
instance of direct German command of Austro-Hungarian troops during the war.10  
                                                          
7 Ibid., 98.  
8 Polatschek, “Österreichisch-ungarische Truppen an der Westfront,” 7-8. 
9 Ibid., 5-6.  
10 Ibid., 7-8.  
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From August 12-13, the 3rd and 4th Batteries of k.u.k. Festungsartillerieregiment No. 2 
(“Halbbataillon Krakau”) and the 7th and 8th Batteries of k.u.k. Festungsartillerieregiment No. 8 
(“Halbbataillon Görz-Wippach”) entrained for Belgium with a total of four howitzers per half-
battalion.11 Notably, the German, Polish, Czech, and Slovene artillerymen of these batteries 
reacted to their westward deployment with jubilation, decorating their field caps with the 
customary oak leaves, renewing their military oaths to the Emperor, and greeting the sight of the 
Belgian border with a resounding “hurrah;” similarly, as the Austro-Hungarian batteries travelled 
through Germany en route to Liège, German civilians greeted them with great enthusiasm. On 
August 19th, both half-battalions arrived in Liège, but the last fortifications of the city had fallen 
three days earlier.12 Instead, the k.u.k. siege artillery first saw action along the river Maas, 
shelling the forts of Namur from August 21-28. Interestingly, the k.u.k. artillery began to 
bombard Namur six days before the official Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Belgium.13  
Halbbataillon Görz-Wippach then proceeded to shell the fortifications of Maubeuge in France 
from August 29th to September 8th. Later, this unit participated in the siege of Antwerp from 
September 28th to October 9th and subsequently saw action at Ypres until January 1915; the 8th 
Battery was then transferred to East Prussia while the 7th Battery remained at Nieuwpoort until 
March 1915, when it finally returned to Austria. Halbbataillon Krakau bombarded the 
fortifications of Givet from August 28-31 and subsequently saw action at the Côtes Lorraines, 
shelling the forts of Troyon, Paroches, and Liouville until its removal in May 1915.14 
Ironically, despite the small size of the Austro-Hungarian contingent – only eight 
howitzers in total – the actions of the k.u.k. heavy siege artillery in the operations of 1914-1915 
                                                          
11 Peter Jung, The Austro-Hungarian Forces in World War I (2): 1916-18 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2003), 37.   
12 Polatschek, “Österreichisch-ungarische Truppen an der Westfront,” 8-9. 
13 Ibid., 21.  
14 Jung, The Austro-Hungarian Forces in World War I (2), 37-38.   
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were probably the most decisive contribution of Austro-Hungarian forces to the fighting on the 
Western Front. In stark contrast to their typically low opinion of the Habsburg military, the 
Germans were effusive in their praise of the k.u.k. howitzer batteries. A German Army report of 
September 4th commended the excellent mobility and accuracy of the Austro-Hungarian 
motorized howitzers at Namur and Givet. Likewise, in a November 14th letter, Moltke himself 
expressed “great joy” in the performance of the Austro-Hungarian artillerymen, whom he had 
personally observed twice; he asserted that the officers, men, and materiel of the artillery units 
were of the highest quality and deserved “unreserved praise,” while their esprit de corps and 
impeccable conduct demonstrated the “beautiful comradely spirit of our alliance.”15  
Indeed, the Skoda 30.5cm howitzers and their crews had shown the great efficacy of the 
Austro-Hungarian heavy siege artillery during their time in Belgium and France. French and 
Belgian fortresses, from the state-of-the-art fortifications of Antwerp to the sixteenth-century 
forts of Givet consistently proved no match for the M.11. At Fort Andoy along the Maas, the 
fortifications could not withstand the rapidity and power of the Austro-Hungarian bombardment 
and surrendered after less than a day of shelling; the aftermath was “a picture of the most 
thorough destruction” with thick iron bars “snapped like twigs”, heavy steel gates blasted off 
their hinges, thick armored cupolas penetrated deeply, and reinforced concrete walls reduced to 
heaps of rubble.16 The augmentation of firepower and flexibility afforded to the Germans by the 
k.u.k. siege howitzers was significant for expediting the course of German operations in 1914. 
The conquest of the fortresses of Namur freed the bulk of the German 1. and 2. Armeen to pursue 
and defeat the British at Mons, while the Austro-Hungarian bombardment of Maubeuge yielded 
                                                          
15 Polatschek, “Österreichisch-ungarische Truppen an der Westfront,” 20-22.  
16 Ibid., 10-11.  
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40,000 prisoners and 400 guns. Likewise the cooperation of k.u.k. M.11’s with the German 42cm 




The Battle of the Frontiers in northern France and Belgium, 1914.18 
 
 
                                                          
17 Ibid., 11-13.  
18 Department of History, USMA at West Point, “Battle of the Frontiers - Map,” Wikimedia Commons, accessed   




The Battle of the Frontiers in eastern France, 1914.19 
                                                          




           A Skoda 30.5cm M.11 siege howitzer in firing position.20 
                                                          




One of the destroyed fortresses at Maubeuge (Fort Sarts).21 
Austro-Hungarian Artillery at Verdun, 1916 
The second and most obscure instance of Austro-Hungarian troops on the Western Front 
occurred during the Battle of Verdun in the summer and autumn of 1916. On June 10th, nearly 
four months into the battle, Chief of the German General Staff Erich von Falkenhayn requested 
that the AOK send any heavy artillery units not in use in the Austro-Hungarian “Strafexpedition” 
offensive in Italy or preoccupied in Galicia to aid German units at Verdun. On June 16th, Conrad 
acquiesced and ordered the deployment of a heavy artillery group to the West; on June 21st, he 
notified Falkenhayn that the “Artilleriegruppe Nadherny,” consisting of three batteries of 30.5cm 
howitzers (Mörserbatterien 1, 2, and 14, each with two guns) and two batteries of 42cm coastal 
                                                          
21 Ibid.  
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howitzers (Küstenhaubitzenbatterien 2 and 3, each with one gun), would depart for France on 
June 23rd.  
Unfortunately, nothing is known about the operations of k.u.k. artillery at Verdun other 
than the fact that this artillery group departed for the West on the aforementioned date. 
According to Polatschek, neither the AOK operations files, which display great deficiencies 
concerning this matter, nor the secondary literature offer any more information on this 
phenomenon.22 Thus, with the exception of this possible deployment of artillery at Verdun, the 
presence of k.u.k. Armee personnel on the Western Front between 1915 and 1918 was limited to 
liaison officers, observers, and the participation of individual officers and soldiers in German 
training exercises.23 Nevertheless, given Falkenhayn’s request, the earlier intervention of k.u.k. 
troops on the Western front had not only impressed upon the Germans the utility of Austro-
Hungarian heavy artillery, but had also established a clear precedent for the employment of 
Habsburg forces in the West.  
Austro-Hungarian Artillery in the German Spring Offensive, 1918 
Until the dispatch of k.u.k. infantry divisions to France later that same year, the 
participation of Austro-Hungarian artillery formations in the German Spring Offensive of 1918 
constituted the largest deployment of Habsburg troops to the Western Front. On February 8th, the 
AOK consented to the request of Erich Ludendorff, First Quartermaster-General 
(Generalquartiermeister) of the OHL and de facto military dictator of Germany, for fifty Austro-
Hungarian artillery batteries to support the impending German offensive in France.24 In spite of 
                                                          
22 Ibid., 26-27.  
23 Etschmann, “Österreich-Ungarn zwischen Engagement und Zurückhaltung,” 98. 
24 Polatschek, “Österreichisch-ungarische Truppen an der Westfront,” 42-43.  
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the preparations for their own offensive in Italy, the AOK was anxious to bring the artillery units 
earmarked for the West up to their full complement of men, equipment, and ammunition in order 
to ensure their optimum performance in France; particular attention was given to the provision of 
gas masks in anticipation of the combat conditions there. However, the OHL insisted multiple 
times on the earliest possible deployment of the k.u.k. artillery and refused to extend the period 
of preparation beyond March 1st.  In total, the AOK allocated to the Western Front ten heavy 
field artillery regiments (schwere Feldartillerieregimenter 1, 2, 11, 25, 30, 45, 54, 59, 72, 206), 
each of which consisted of three four-gun 15cm howitzer batteries and one four-gun 10.4cm 
cannon battery. Additional batteries of 24cm cannons and 30.5cm, 38cm, and 42cm howitzers 
were also provided. 25 Altogether, 152 k.u.k. artillery pieces were deployed for the Spring 
Offensive. The first two regiments departed for France on March 2nd and arrived there on March 
11th, while the remainder departed after March 12th and had arrived by March 19th. 26  
Although Ludendorff had considered deploying all of the k.u.k. artillery as a single 
cohesive group at one section of the front, logistical concerns precluded this notion and the 
regiments and batteries were parceled out individually among four German armies. Interestingly, 
in order to maintain the combat effectiveness of the k.u.k. artillery and to offset probable materiel 
shortages, the OHL ordered that two of the k.u.k. artillery regiments relinquish their equipment 
and ammunition as a reserve for the other Austro-Hungarian units and rearm with German 
weapons. Thus, strangely enough, the artillerymen of schwere Feldartillerieregimenter 30 and 
59 merely served as crews for German artillery pieces during the Spring Offensive.27 Operation 
Michael, the first operation of the German Spring Offensive, began on March 21st. K.u.k. heavy 
                                                          
25 Ibid., 53.  
26 Ibid., 55-56.  
27 Ibid., 54-55.  
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and super artillery played a notable role in providing fire support both for the diversionary 
“demonstration” actions of Heeresgruppe Gallwitz as well as for the main thrust of the German 
attack; around half of all Austro-Hungarian artillery on the Western Front was allocated to the 
17. and 18. Armeen of the Heeresgruppen Kronprinz Rupprecht and Deutscher Kronprinz, which 
formed the focal point (Schwerpunkt) of the offensive. Because the artillery had to be moved 
forward to support the surprise infantry attacks, the Austro-Hungarian artillery units fought 
under very difficult conditions in exposed positions.28  
Despite these circumstances, the Austro-Hungarian heavy artillery once again accorded 
itself well, with German officers and infantrymen comparing the precision and coordination of 
the k.u.k. artillery units favorably with the German artillery. Both divisional reports and the 
statements of individuals highlighted the contributions of the k.u.k. artillery, often singling out 
individual batteries for praise. Generalfeldmarschall Paul von Hindenburg, the Chief of Staff of 
the German Army, likewise informed the AOK in a telegram of March 27th that that the Austro-
Hungarian artillery “have done their duty in full measure.” 29 The French were quite surprised to 
encounter Austro-Hungarian artillery during the Spring Offensive, as they believed that the 
Habsburg Monarchy was already defunct; they were similarly impressed by the skill of the 
Austro-Hungarian gun crews, particularly their ability to accurately adjust their artillery fire.30 
However, even while the fighting of the initial German offensive in the West still raged, a 
large proportion of the k.u.k. artillery had already expended their limited supply of ammunition 
and had to be withdrawn from the front on March 27th. After the failure of the German thrust 
towards Amiens and the cessation of Operation Michael on April 5th, almost all of the Austro-
                                                          
28 Ibid., 56-57.  
29 Ibid., 59-60.  
30 Ibid., 57.  
Jones 17 
 
Hungarian artillery on the Western Front departed France for the Habsburg Monarchy.31 At this 
point, the only k.u.k. artillery remaining in the West were three heavy howitzer batteries with 
Heeresgruppe Deutscher Kronprinz and one heavy field artillery regiment (schweres 
Feldartillerieregiment 11) along with two 30.5cm howitzer batteries with Heeresgruppe 
Kronprinz Rupprecht. Beginning on April 9th, during Operation Georgette, eighteen k.u.k. heavy 
and super-heavy guns supported the attack of the 6. Armee of H.G. Kronprinz Rupprecht 
between the La Bassée Canal and Armentières. Yet, even before the renewed German offensive 
ground to a halt on April 19th, all of the individual k.u.k. batteries had been withdrawn from the 
frontlines on April 15th on account of their lack of ammunition. As it still possessed 3500 shells 
on April 18th, schweres Feldartillerieregiment 11 remained at the front for the longest, only 
withdrawing on April 20th after it had completely expended its ammunition. On April 21st, all of 
the remaining Austro-Hungarian artillery units left France for the Italian Front.32  
 
                                                          
31 Ibid., 57-58.  




Austro-Hungarian artillerymen on the Western Front.33 
 
An Austro-Hungarian 38cm howitzer on the Western Front.34 
                                                          
33 Polatschek, “Österreichisch-ungarische Truppen an der Westfront.” 




III. The Political and Military Context for the k.u.k. Divisions in France  
1916-1918 
Thus, the utilization of Austro-Hungarian forces on the Western Front was by no means a 
new phenomenon by the summer of 1918. Although the involvement of k.u.k. artillery units in 
the fighting in France and Belgium was sporadic and relatively brief, Austro-Hungarian 
artillerymen played a notable role in at least two of the three major German offensives in the 
West. Yet, the deployment of the k.u.k. 1st and 35th Infantry Divisions to France in July/August 
1918 represented a distinct escalation of Austria-Hungary’s involvement on the Western Front. 
Hitherto, the Austro-Hungarian presence in the West was limited to individual artillery batteries 
and regiments dispersed ad hoc amongst different German armies to besiege important enemy 
strong points and lend additional firepower to German offensives. Now, entire Austro-Hungarian 
infantry divisions, comprised of thousands of riflemen supported by significant complements of 
machine guns, artillery, assault troops, and technical formations, arrived to occupy and defend 
sectors of the German frontlines. During the final two years of the Great War, particularly after 
the successful Austro-German offensive at Caporetto in October/November 1917, three 
prevailing and interconnected trends increasingly militated in favor of the deployment of Austro-
Hungarian infantry to the Western Front. Specifically, the progressive collapse of the Habsburg 
Monarchy and the changing strategic outlook of the Central Powers resulted in the culmination 
of Austro-Hungarian political and military subordination to Germany, which in turn made the 
commitment of k.u.k. infantry divisions to France almost unavoidable.   
Alliance Politics and Military Developments in 1916 
The notion of a greater role for the k.u.k. Armee on the Western Front first arose in 1916 
amidst the strategic discussions between the German and Austro-Hungarian military leadership. 
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In late 1915 and early 1916, as the realities of a protracted conflict against a superior enemy 
coalition became manifest, deliberations between the OHL and AOK increasingly dwelled upon 
the idea of concentrating the forces of the alliance to comprehensively defeat one of their 
opponents. In theory, the departure of one enemy nation from the hostile alliance would 
significantly reduce the overextension of the Central Powers’ forces; more importantly, thinning 
the ranks of the Entente could precipitate a decisive confrontation that would ideally result in a 
favorable peace settlement.35  
However, fundamental disagreements arose between the two Chiefs of Staff as to which 
enemy the Central Powers should eliminate.36 While Falkenhayn conceived of an attritional 
strategy and a limited offensive in the West directed towards exhausting the French army, 
Conrad envisioned a sweeping offensive in the Trentino to encircle and annihilate the forces of 
Italy.37 Interestingly, according to Falkenhayn’s memoirs, Conrad was the first to articulate the 
idea of an Austro-Hungarian intervention in the West, despite his great personal aversion to 
Falkenhayn and his determination to assert Habsburg military independence vis-à-vis Germany. 
Still, given his great confidence in an Austro-Hungarian victory over Italy at the time, Conrad 
apparently expressed his willingness to deploy 400,000 Habsburg troops for the final showdown 
in France.38 However, while Falkenhayn was skeptical of the potential success of the Austro-
Hungarian “Strafexpedition,” he was also contemptuous of the combat capabilities of the k.u.k. 
Armee and its utility on the Western Front. Thus, Falkenhayn initially dismissed the idea of a 
major joint action in the West. In a letter to Conrad on December 16th, 1915, he merely requested 
                                                          
35 Ibid., 23. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph, 194. 
38 Polatschek, “Österreichisch-ungarische Truppen an der Westfront,” 23.  
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that Austro-Hungarian units to take over certain sections of the Eastern Front to free up more 
German forces for his planned offensive in the West.39 
 Ultimately, the German and Austro-Hungarian armies failed to agree upon a common 
course of action. Just as the forces of the Entente began to coordinate their operations more 
closely, the Central Powers further dissipated their strength in the unsuccessful, uncoordinated 
offensives at Verdun and Asiago.40 However, as the German and Austro-Hungarian offensive 
plans began to encounter difficulties during the first half of 1916, the idea of greater Austro-
Hungarian participation on the Western Front gained further currency in the minds of German 
and even some Austro-Hungarian officers. The German offensive at Verdun began on February 
21st, but heavy snowfall in the mountains of northern Italy repeatedly postponed Conrad’s 
Asiago offensive. Consequently, the Strafexpedition did not actually begin until May 15th, by 
which point any element of surprise had been lost.41 Beginning in May, Falkenhayn seemingly 
changed his tune regarding Austro-Hungarian assistance in the West, a conversion likely induced 
not only by the repeated delays of the Austro-Hungarian operation, but also by the deteriorating 
situation at Verdun. Falkenhayn instructed August von Cramon, the OHL plenipotentiary 
assigned to the AOK, to carefully gage the willingness of the Austro-Hungarian high command 
to alternative operations if the Strafexpedition were cancelled.42  
Yet, when Cramon questioned Conrad on the feasibility of his operational plans and 
suggested that Austro-Hungarian forces should instead reinforce the German efforts in the West, 
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Conrad summarily and brusquely rebuffed the German plenipotentiary. However, somewhat 
surprisingly, Cramon noted that some of the younger staff officers of the AOK disagreed with 
their chief of staff and supported the German proposition.43 Thus, in his reply to Falkenhayn on 
May 4th, Cramon reported that the Austro-Hungarians were determined to go through with 
Conrad’s plan, but speculated that in the event of an Austro-Hungarian failure, k.u.k. units could 
be available for a common action.44 On May 12th, Falkenhayn expressed this notion more 
concretely in a letter to Cramon, noting that the continued delay of the Austro-Hungarian 
offensive seemed to increase the likelihood of small-scale Austro-Hungarian support in the West, 
specifically that of k.u.k. heavy artillery.45  
 After Cramon reported the beginning of the Asiago Offensive to Falkenhayn, the German 
Chief of Staff expressed his best wishes for the Habsburg operation while simultaneously 
instructing Cramon that in the event of an Austro-Hungarian failure, he should punctually 
suggest to the AOK a joint offensive in another theater, specifically the Western Front.46 
Nevertheless, during a meeting between Conrad and Falkenhayn on May 24th, at which point the 
Asiago Offensive had made some progress and the French attempts to recapture Fort Douaumont 
had failed, Falkenhayn did not raise the issue of deploying k.u.k. units to the West en masse. In 
light of the suspected imminent British offensive on the Somme and Russian activity in Galicia, 
the two chiefs of staff agreed to raise the issue of a joint offensive after the conclusion of 
operations against Italy.47 However, the momentous events of the summer of 1916 quickly 
overtook Austro-Hungarian and German planning. The Russian Brusilov Offensive in Galicia, 
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beginning on June 4th, not only precipitated the premature end of the stalled Austro-Hungarian 
operations in Italy, but also nearly shattered the Austro-Hungarian Army on the Eastern Front. 
Habsburg forces yielded significant territory in Galicia and Bukovina to the Tsarist advance and 
suffered an estimated 750,000 casualties in the process.48  
The consequences of the Brusilov Offensive in alliance-political terms were similarly 
disastrous for Austria-Hungary. The intensification of German involvement on the Eastern Front 
necessitated by the Russian onslaught and the failure of the Habsburg military leadership on all 
fronts resulted in the further subordination of the Habsburg Monarchy to its German ally. On 
September 6th, all Central Powers forces in the East were subordinated to the United Supreme 
Command (Oberste Kriegsleitung) under the formal leadership of Kaiser Wilhelm II. This 
measure, coupled with the appointment of German officers to Austro-Hungarian command 
positions and the proliferation of German advisors and liaison officers throughout the Habsburg 
army, exemplified a more cohesive, centralized alliance in which Austria-Hungary was clearly a 
junior partner.49  
 The exigencies of other fronts and the near collapse of the Habsburg military precluded 
any significant Austro-Hungarian involvement on the Western Front in 1916.Yet, the events of 
that year not only witnessed the first conception of an Austro-Hungarian intervention in the 
West, but also established the preconditions for such an event. For one, the apparent correlation 
between Falkenhayn’s opinion of utilizing Austro-Hungarian forces in the West and the fortunes 
of the German operations at Verdun suggest that the German military leadership were willing to 
set aside their disdain for the k.u.k. Armee when military necessity demanded as such. The 
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disagreements between the OHL and the AOK over strategic priorities in 1916 demonstrated that 
despite their many common enemies, neither the immediate nor the long-term interests of 
Austria-Hungary and Germany were identical. At the same time, Conrad’s acquiescence to 
Falkenhayn’s request for k.u.k. artillery at Verdun in June, concomitant with the failure of the 
Asiago Offensive and the catastrophe in Galicia, not only demonstrated Austria-Hungary’s 
increasing reliance on German military power, but also set a precedent in the Austro-German 
military relationship. The abortive Strafexpedition in Italy represented the last major independent 
Austro-Hungarian offensive until the June Offensive of 1918; other than its defense of Italy, 
Austria-Hungary conducted all subsequent campaigns, namely in Romania and Russia, with 
significant German support and under German leadership.50 Austro-Hungarian military failure 
critically undermined both the Monarchy’s capability for independent military action and the 
ability of the AOK to justify such independent operations.  
Therefore, after 1916, Austro-German military planning was heavily colored by alliance 
politics as the AOK struggled to assert its independence and interests vis-à-vis those of the 
OHL.51 Indeed, after 1916, the relationship between Austria-Hungary and Germany was 
increasingly characterized by a strange dialectic of dependence and dissension. On one hand, the 
military disasters and economic hardships of 1916 had placed Austria-Hungary in a state of 
unprecedented dependence on Germany.52 However, beginning in 1917, the interests of the 
Habsburg Monarchy were also increasingly at odds with those of the German Reich. Given 
Germany’s growing military and economic hegemony in central Europe and the widening 
asymmetry between Habsburg and Hohenzollern power, many figures in Austria-Hungary saw a 
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German victory as an existential threat to the Monarchy’s independence.53 The events of 1917 
and 1918 witnessed the progression of both of these trends; the eventual utilization of Austro-
Hungarian divisions in the West was one of the ultimate outcomes of Austria-Hungary’s inability 
to solve this paradox.  
Austro-Hungarian Internal and External Challenges, 1916-1917 
The figure of Emperor Karl I/IV, the last monarch of Austria-Hungary, looms large in the 
background of the Austro-Hungarian deployment to the Western Front. Ascending to the throne 
after the death of Franz Joseph on November 21st, 1916, the new monarch was young, idealistic, 
and determined to extricate his empire from both the ravages of the Great War and from 
Prussian-German domination. However, despite his best efforts, both the internal and the 
international status of Austria-Hungary declined from early 1917 to mid-1918; ironically, many 
of Karl’s actions directly contributed to this decline.54  
To be sure, the challenges that Karl faced were enormous, as the Habsburg Monarchy 
was in a state of unprecedented crisis. Deprivation, especially the lack of food, was perhaps the 
most serious problem facing the Monarchy. Labor and fertilizer shortages, the loss of valuable 
agricultural land in Galicia, the Allied blockade, extensive corruption, and the complicated 
federal structure of the Empire combined to yield critical food shortages in 1916, with Austria-
Hungary witnessing its first food riots in Vienna that May.55 Widespread deprivation in 1916 and 
1917 critically undermined both support for the war effort and imperial unity. Anger, mutual 
recrimination, and competition for scarce resources, when coupled with pre-existing political and 
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ethnic tensions, served to further fragment the Monarchy, shattering the already weak horizontal 
bonds linking Habsburg subjects; anti-Habsburg nationalists increasingly took advantage of these 
divisions to whip up support for separatism.56 At the same time, the heavy losses suffered by the 
k.u.k. Armee in the field and the continuing material shortages on the home front precipitated 
growing resentment towards a  Habsburg state that seemed capable of neither provisioning food 
nor concluding the war. Public discontent with the government was manifest in both the 
proliferation of riots and demonstrations in 1917 and, most alarmingly, in the assassination of 
Austrian prime minister Karl von Stürgkh by a radical socialist in October 1916.57  
While these developments were alarming enough in Austria-Hungary, a state long 
troubled by internal divisions, the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in March 1917 provided 
an added urgency for the Austro-Hungarian government to ameliorate the discontent of its 
subjects. The Revolution, coupled with the entry of the US into the war in April 1917, added a 
hitherto-absent ideological element to the war.58 Indeed, in contrast to the food riots one year 
earlier, the widespread strikes and protests in May 1917, while initially triggered by resource 
shortages, quickly assumed an overtly political character, colored by socialist and nationalist 
critiques of the government and war effort.59 Both external enemies and internal dissidents cast 
the divide between governments and people in the autocratic Central Powers in the framework of 
universal ideals, namely those of popular sovereignty and the self-determination of peoples. In 
Austria-Hungary, these appeals had a particularly receptive audience in the nationalities 
disadvantaged by the Austro-Hungarian Compromise (Ausgleich) of 1867, specifically the Poles, 
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Czechs, Slovaks, and South Slavs.60 Thus, the fundamental aim of Karl’s reforms in 1917 was to 
revitalize the Monarchy by giving its peoples a greater and more equitable stake in the future of 
the Habsburg state.61  
Unfortunately, Karl’s liberalizing reforms only served to further weaken imperial 
authority. The reconvocation of the Austrian parliament (Reichsrat) in May 1917, the relaxation 
of state repression, a general amnesty for political prisoners, and the regional devolution of many 
administrative responsibilities stimulated regional factionalism, emboldened anti-Habsburg 
nationalists, and discredited the Emperor in the eyes of the government bureaucracy and 
military.62 The growing political and economic crisis of the Habsburg Monarchy on the home 
front was accompanied by similarly deteriorating military situation. Although the outbreak of the 
March Revolution threw the Russian war effort into confusion, the k.u.k. Armee suffered heavy 
casualties in Italy during the Tenth and Eleventh Isonzo Battles. Consequently, the army 
experienced an increasing number of large-scale desertions in 1917, which were primarily a 
symptom of war-weariness and the deteriorating supply situation.63 Likewise, given the immense 
losses suffered by Austro-Hungarian forces since 1914, manpower shortages unsurprisingly 
developed over the course of 1917; of the approximately two million replacements needed by the 
k.u.k. Armee at the beginning of 1917,  the replacement apparatus could satisfy only two thirds of 
this requirement by the autumn of that year.64 Thus, it was clear to the Emperor that any 
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prolongation of the war constituted a grave threat not only to the military capabilities of the 
Habsburg Monarchy, but to its very existence.    
 Correspondingly, in the diplomatic sphere, both Karl and the Austro-Hungarian 
Common Foreign Minister, Ottokar von Czernin, were anxious to secure a peace deal with the 
Entente in 1917. For one, given the dire internal situation of Austria-Hungary, the continuation 
of the conflict obviously threatened to precipitate a collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy. At the 
same time, a German total victory as envisioned by the Third OHL under Hindenburg and 
Ludendorff essentially entailed the reduction of Austria-Hungary to a German satellite.65 Indeed, 
Karl’s deep ambivalence towards his German ally profoundly influenced Austro-Hungarian 
diplomacy in 1917 and 1918. Karl regarded the alliance with Germany as a wartime necessity 
and prioritized the integrity and independence of the Monarchy above all; his wife, Empress Zita 
of Bourbon-Parma, was also a firm opponent of German influence in Austria-Hungary.66 Thus, 
the desire in Austria-Hungary for a speedy, negotiated peace and the maintenance of Habsburg 
sovereignty conflicted with both the preoccupation of the Third OHL with a decisive “peace 
through victory” and the ever-increasing reliance of the Habsburg Monarchy on German military 
and economic aid. Already by 1916, the German Army had become the primary force propping 
up the Central Powers in the East and in the Balkans, both of which were formerly Austro-
Hungarian theaters.67 Likewise, the continued rule of the German and Magyar elites over their 
Slavic, Italian, and Romanian compatriots in Austria-Hungary largely depended on continued 
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food imports from Germany, without which Habsburg subjects would starve and most likely 
revolt.68  
At the same time, the peace feelers circulated by both the Germans and the Austro-
Hungarians in late 1916 were doomed to failure. For one, as previously mentioned, the military 
dictatorship of the Third OHL was not interested in a peace in which Germany would have to 
surrender all of its hard-won gains; at the same time, the Entente powers themselves were no 
more interested in a compromise settlement.69 Therefore, in late 1916, in an effort to circumvent 
the confines of the German alliance, Karl decided to attempt secret, direct negotiations with the 
Entente through the intermediary of his brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma, who 
was an officer in the Belgian army. This undertaking eventually proved to be one of Karl’s most 
fateful decisions of the entire war and exercised a decisive influence on the question of Austro-
Hungarian participation on the Western Front. By February 1917, Karl was engaging in indirect 
negotiations with French leaders concerning a possible separate peace between the Entente and 
the Habsburg Monarchy. In a letter of March 24th, Karl promised to support France’s claims to 
Alsace-Lorraine as well as Belgian and Serbian independence. Initially, French and British 
leaders were quite enthused, at one point even suggesting the cession of Silesia and Bavaria by a 
defeated Germany to the Habsburg Monarchy.70  
However, the realities of alliance politics quickly put an end to these deliberations. For 
one, considering the great disparity in power between Germany and Austria-Hungary, Karl had 
no means with which to compel his ally to accept these terms. Likewise, Karl’s basic aim of 
preserving the integrity of the Habsburg Monarchy conflicted with the interests of the Entente. In 
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particular, the Italians vehemently refused to compromise on the significant swathes of Austro-
Hungarian territory promised to them by the 1915 Treaty of London. Moreover, Britain and 
France ultimately did not value peace with Austria-Hungary more than their treaty-bound 
obligations to Italy, Romania, Serbia, and Russia. Hence, Austro-Hungarian efforts to obtain a 
desperately-needed peace with their opponents came to naught in the face of ultimate Austro-
Hungarian impotence on the world stage.71 Yet, the real consequences of what would eventually 
be known as the “Sixtus Affair” would not manifest for another year, after which the subjugation 
of the Monarchy to external forces reached its climax.  
Austro-German Strategy and Alliance Politics from Caporetto to the Spring Offensive 
 The Austro-German offensive on the Italian Front at Caporetto in October/November 
1917 and its aftermath simultaneously demonstrated the tremendous tension in the Dual Alliance 
and the Habsburg Monarchy’s reliance on German military power. At the same time, the 
employment of Austro-Hungarian infantry divisions on the Western Front first emerged during 
this period as a serious and recurring topic of deliberation. The negotiations leading up to the 
offensive were steeped in disagreement and mutual suspicion between the two allies. Although 
both the AOK and the OHL agreed that Italy was the weakest link in the enemy coalition after 
the collapse of Russia, the two staffs once again disputed the potential utility of its defeat. The 
Austro-Hungarians naturally saw Italy as their hereditary enemy and the last real opponent of the 
k.u.k. Armee, while Ludendorff initially dismissed the significance of an Italian defeat for the 
successful conclusion of the wider war.72 Ultimately, the German decision to support the k.u.k. 
Armee in Italy stemmed more from political considerations than strategic calculations. In 1917, 
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the ever-deteriorating internal situation of the Monarchy, Karl’s commitment to a moderate 
negotiated peace, and continuing Austro-Hungarian diplomatic ties to the now-hostile United 
States73 had raised serious German doubts as to the reliability of their ally. The OHL therefore 
reckoned that a joint Austro-German offensive against the hated enemy of the Habsburg 
Monarchy would revive Austro-Hungarian enthusiasm for the war and strengthen the Habsburg 
commitment to the Dual Alliance.74 
 In contrast, the OHL believed that an independent Austro-Hungarian offensive was 
unlikely to succeed on account of the perceived incompetence of the k.u.k. Armee. Similarly, 
even if the Austro-Hungarians were somehow successful, the defeat of Italy could allow the 
Habsburg Monarchy to quit the alliance.75  Ludendorff  also seemingly hoped that Austro-
Hungarian gratitude for German assistance in Italy would translate into concrete support for the 
German forces on the Western Front.76 Thus, after agreeing to the joint offensive in Italy, 
Ludendorff gloated in the crown council of September 11th that “Austria-Hungary would be quite 
shackled to us for the next few months.”77  Notably, this German conception of ensuring the 
continued allegiance of Austria-Hungary through joint military operations remained one of the 
primary German motivations for seeking the deployment of k.u.k. divisions to France.  
For his part, Karl also nurtured major reservations regarding a joint Austro-German 
offensive in Italy. On the grounds of prestige, the Emperor worried that German support in Italy 
would eclipse the accomplishments of the k.u.k. Armee and place a hitherto Austrian-dominated 
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theater under German control. Likewise, Karl also feared inducing an Anglo-French intervention 
on the Italian Front. However, Generaloberst Arthur Arz von Straussenburg, Conrad’s successor 
as Chief of Staff of the AOK, eventually convinced the Emperor that German support was 
necessary for the operation.78 The Central Powers’ subsequent offensive at Caporetto, 
incorporating innovative German artillery and infiltration tactics and the prodigious use of 
poison gas, yielded tremendous success, inflicting over 300,000 casualties on the Italians and 
driving them back in disarray to the Piave river.79  
The close cooperation of Austro-Hungarian and German units at Caporetto convinced 
many officers in both armies of the desirability of further Austro-German military collaboration. 
Although Hindenburg and Ludendorff continued to hold the capabilities of the k.u.k. Armee in 
low regard, several German troop commanders noted the battle-worthiness of certain k.u.k. units 
and advocated for their use on the Western Front. Konrad Krafft von Dellmensingen, the 
commander of the elite German mountain troops (the Alpenkorps), noted that a portion of the 
Austro-Hungarian Army, namely the Austrian-German divisions, was quite capable and could be 
useful in the West.80 Likewise, many AOK staff officers, particularly those who had attended 
German training courses in France, vigorously supported a greater Austro-Hungarian role in the 
West. These officers saw close cooperation with the Germans in the West as an ideal situation in 
which the k.u.k. Armee, supported by the full might of the Westheer, could prove its combat 
capabilities in favorable conditions and thereby contribute decisively to the conclusion of the 
war.81  Most notably, Arz himself, enthused by the Austro-German success and grateful for 
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German assistance, indicated to Cramon in October that he was willing to send all disposable 
k.u.k. forces to aid the Germans on the Western Front.82  
Yet, in many ways, the results of the Austro-German offensive in Italy did not bode well 
for the future prospects of the Habsburg Monarchy or its military. Although Habsburg troops 
constituted a majority of the attacking forces, the achievements at Caporetto stemmed mostly 
from the influence of German tactics and leadership, not to mention the participation of seven 
crack German divisions.83 Thus, in light of previous Habsburg failures in Italy, the Battle of 
Caporetto demonstrated the overwhelming reliance of the k.u.k. Armee on German tactics, 
supplies, and troops to achieve significant offensive gains. Moreover, the reconstitution of the 
Italian frontlines on the Piave, a far more secure and defensible position, significantly reduced 
the chances of success for a renewed offensive against the Italians, much less one undertaken by 
Austria-Hungary alone.84 Even more ominously, the military success of Caporetto had been 
achieved at the expense of the Austro-Hungarian hinterland. The logistical demands of the 
Austro-German offensive had overtaxed the Austro-Hungarian railway network, resulting in the 
near total collapse of food provisioning in the Monarchy. In some areas, particularly in Bohemia, 
the population was reduced to near-starvation. This marked deterioration of the food situation 
deeply and abidingly alienated large segments of the population, especially the Czechs.85  
Hence, the victory at Caporetto proved to be largely transient for the Habsburg 
Monarchy, instead sowing the seeds for further internal disintegration and external reliance. At 
the same time, the Austro-German success in Italy in November and the armistice with Soviet 
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Russia one month later represented a favorable shift in the strategic situation of the Central 
Powers. The essential conclusion of hostilities in the East and the stabilization of the Italian 
Front presented a final window of opportunity for the Central Powers to conclude the war in their 
favor. The ever-increasing numerical and material superiority of the enemy coalition, particularly 
the inevitable large-scale military intervention of the United States, as well as the deterioration of 
domestic political and economic conditions in Germany and Austria-Hungary made a decisive 
campaign in early 1918 imperative.86 Thus, in late 1917, the OHL began to prepare for a large-
scale offensive on the Western Front, intending to concentrate all available German offensive 
strength there, preempt an American intervention, achieve an annihilating blow against the 
Anglo-French armies, and compel the enemy coalition to sue for peace.87 While still capable of 
offensive action, growing concerns of morale and manpower meant that the German Army had 
passed the peak of its effectiveness. Unable to pursue offensives on multiple fronts, the Germans 
therefore scaled down their commitments on other fronts in favor of the West, withdrawing forty 
divisions from Russia and eight from Venetia. Likewise, given the fleeting favorability and 
overwhelming gravity of the strategic situation, the OHL now expected that Austria-Hungary 
would directly contribute to the decisive battle in the West.88  
Strategic considerations seemingly justified and, indeed, necessitated such concentration 
and coordination. Indeed, in a December 15th note to the AOK, Ludendorff asserted that “the 
outcome of this battle will determine the fate of Germany and Austria-Hungary.”89 However, 
complex alliance politics and major disagreements between Austro-Hungarian and German 
military and political figures ultimately precluded the participation of Austro-Hungarian 
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divisions in the German Spring Offensive. Initially, discussions of such a deployment were 
informal.  In the first week of November 1917, Ludendorff met with Generalmajor Alfred von 
Waldstätten, the Chief of the Operations Department of the AOK, and informed him of the 
OHL’s plans for a major offensive in the spring, noting that the participation of k.u.k. units, 
above all artillery, would be welcome.90 One month later, in a speech to representatives of the 
Hungarian government, Czernin proclaimed the Habsburg commitment to the German alliance, 
notably asserting that Austria-Hungary would defend Alsace-Lorraine just as Germany had 
defended Galicia and Trieste; although mostly a sentimental expression of unity, this statement 
indubitably connoted Austro-Hungarian involvement on the Western Front.91 Sure enough, in a 
message to the AOK on December 23rd, Ludendorff reminded Arz of his earlier promise of 
support and on his own part, reiterated his willingness to gladly accept Austro-Hungarian 
assistance on the Western Front, especially in the form of heavy artillery. Now that the 
Generalquartiermeister of the German Army had more or less requested Habsburg support on 
the Western Front, the Austro-Hungarians were obliged to respond.92  
Surprisingly, Emperor Karl promptly consented to Ludendorff’s request on December 
26th and two days later, Arz conveyed the Austro-Hungarian acquiescence to Hindenburg. In his 
message, Arz assured the German Chief of Staff that the Austro-Hungarian military would 
readily participate in the battle on the Western Front and that the size of the Habsburg contingent 
would depend on the outcome of the ongoing peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk. He likewise 
requested that the OHL communicate its specific desires regarding the employment of k.u.k. 
troops in the West.93 On December 30th, Ludendorff responded with his sincere thanks, 
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expressing satisfaction in the apparent strategic consensus between the OHL and the AOK. 
However, other than stating that the OHL would accept any available battle-worthy k.u.k. 
divisions and heavy artillery, he refused to commit himself to any concrete stipulations.94 Thus, 
by the beginning of 1918, the question of greater Austro-Hungarian participation on the Western 
Front was seemingly resolved. Yet, it soon became apparent that these promises were without 
any real substance. In mid-January, at the instruction of the OHL, Cramon asked Arz how many 
divisions the AOK could spare for the West. Arz was evasive, claiming that the situation in the 
East had not been sufficiently resolved and thus he could not offer any particulars. However, 
Cramon was suspicious and upon further questioning, Arz revealed to him in confidence the real 
impediment to a definitive Austro-Hungarian commitment to the Western Front: the opposition 
of the Emperor himself.95 
Indeed, despite his nominal consent in December to the employment of Habsburg troops 
in the West, Karl remained extremely reluctant to provide the Germans with concrete support. 
There were many reasons behind Karl’s aversion to sending Habsburg troops to France. In 
addition to his own personal anti-German sentiments, the Empress Zita was known to be 
wholeheartedly opposed to Austro-Hungarians fighting in France; Cramon himself attributed 
much of the Austro-Hungarian unwillingness to commit to the pernicious influence of the 
Bourbon Empress.96 In military terms, Karl also dreaded exposing his poorly supplied, war-
weary troops to the material and numerical superiority of the Entente. He feared not only the loss 
of prestige that would accompany an Austro-Hungarian failure on the Western Front, but also the 
risk of a renewed Italian offensive in Venetia upon a westward redeployment of k.u.k. forces.  
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Domestic political concerns also militated against Austro-Hungarian involvement in the West. 
The non-German peoples of the Monarchy, as well as the Social Democrats, vocally opposed any 
unnecessary sacrifices to German interests.97 Indeed, by 1918, many of the peoples of the 
Habsburg Monarchy, particularly the Czechs, not only felt threatened by the prospect of German 
hegemony in central Europe, but also deeply resented the Germans for supposedly prolonging 
the conflict in pursuit of aggressive war aims.98 Subsequent negotiations revealed the clear fault 
lines between the German and Austro-Hungarian positions on the matter of the deployment. 
When Cramon, under orders from the OHL, urged a more definitive Austro-Hungarian 
agreement for assistance in the West, Arz retorted that before the conclusion of peace with 
Russia and Romania, nothing other than artillery units would be available. Moreover, for reasons 
of prestige, the AOK requested that any Austro-Hungarian divisions sent to the West should be 
deployed as a unified, coherent formation under Habsburg command. The Germans, unwilling to 
risk assigning a large section of the Western Front to an army whose capabilities they 
fundamentally doubted, flatly refused, which in turn only aggravated Austro-Hungarian 
reluctance.99 
As previously mentioned, not all Austro-Hungarian officers were so averse to close 
cooperation with the Germans in the West. Waldstätten in particular disagreed with the position 
of the Emperor. In discussions with Cramon and other German liaison officers, the Operations 
Chief of the AOK lamented the baneful impact of the Empress and other courtiers on the 
Emperor, opining that such interference seriously impeded the planning and decisions of the 
AOK.100 To some extent, the views of Waldstätten and other like-minded Habsburg staff officers 
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exemplified the growth of German influence over the AOK. While the experience of training 
under and collaborating with German officers did produce pro-German sentiments among many 
officers, Karl’s restructuring of the AOK in 1917 and the appointment of new, less experienced 
officers like Arz and Waldstätten had in itself accentuated the AOK’s reliance on German 
decision-making.101 Urged by Waldstätten to insist on concrete Austro-Hungarian assistance in 
the West, Cramon, with the agreement of the OHL, officially requested later in January that the 
AOK dispatch three reliable, battleworthy divisions to France. Arz recapitulated the Austro-
Hungarian objections, additionally noting concerns about the condition of the Austro-Hungarian 
troops and the necessity of concentrating Habsburg forces in Italy. Most importantly, Arz finally 
explicitly stated that the employment of Austro-Hungarian forces in the West was unacceptable 
to the crown.102 Thus, by the beginning of February, the AOK had definitively ruled out the 
participation of Austro-Hungarian divisions in the Spring Offensive. For their part, the Germans 
accepted the Austro-Hungarian refusal and concentrated on securing Austro-Hungarian artillery 
support; by February 5th, Waldstätten had indicated to Ludendorff that both the Emperor and the 
AOK approved of such a measure.103   
 Unlike Hindenburg and Ludendorff, Cramon did not take the Austro-Hungarian refusal 
so lightly and blamed himself for not asserting the German position more forcefully. In his mind, 
the temporary alienation of the Austro-Hungarian Emperor would have been offset by the value 
of k.u.k. divisions as a reserve for the offensive in the West, a circumstance which could have 
freed up more German units for the attack.104 Yet, the German requests for Austro-Hungarian 
divisions for the Spring Offensive lacked vigor and ultimately failed because the German 
                                                          
101 Rauchensteiner, The First World War and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 688-689.  
102 Polatschek, “Österreichisch-ungarische Truppen an der Westfront,” 41-42. 
103 Ibid., 42.  
104 Ibid., 45.  
Jones 39 
 
considerations were largely political rather than military in nature. Ludendorff’s nonchalance 
regarding specific Austro-Hungarian troop commitments and the Germans’ clear disdain for 
Habsburg fighting capabilities demonstrated that the OHL saw an Austro-Hungarian deployment 
to the West primarily as an instrument with which to bind the Habsburg Monarchy more tightly 
to the Dual Alliance. Thanks to the armistice in the East, the Germans already possessed a 
numerical advantage in the West and did not really require k.u.k. divisions there. Therefore, the 
large-scale deployment of Habsburg troops to the Western Front would principally serve to 
ensure the continued involvement of Austria-Hungary in the war.105 In military terms, the OHL 
was far more concerned with securing Habsburg auxiliary support in the West in the form of 
k.u.k. heavy artillery and labor forces.106 Furthermore, the Austro-Hungarian offensive in Italy 
planned for spring 1918 not only aligned with Austria-Hungary’s immediate interests, but also 
served German purposes as well. As outlined by Hindenburg in a March 15th telegram to Arz, a 
renewed Habsburg offensive in Italy would invariably divert Entente and American forces away 
from the Western Front and thereby relieve pressure on the German Army.107             
The Decision to Deploy k.u.k. Divisions to France, April – June 1918 
 Rather than commit large infantry formations to the fighting in France for the Spring 
Offensive, Austria-Hungary provided only artillery units and labor forces to the Western Front 
while indirectly aiding the German operations with its own offensive in Italy.108 In the minds of 
both Austro-Hungarian and German decision-makers, this arrangement was more efficacious in 
addressing the Central Powers’ strategic dilemma. Up to this point, Habsburg opposition to 
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greater involvement on the Western Front and German confidence in their own forces rendered 
the employment of k.u.k. divisions in France counterproductive for the health of the alliance and 
militarily superfluous. Likewise, although the armistice in the East permitted the AOK to devote 
the majority of its forces elsewhere, the average manpower and materiel allotment of Austro-
Hungarian divisions was low; a simultaneous large-scale commitment on two fronts was 
impractical.109 However, contrary to appearances, the issue of Austro-Hungarian participation on 
the Western Front was not in fact resolved. Indeed, beginning in April 1918, rapid changes in the 
diplomatic, economic, and military situation of the Habsburg Monarchy, coupled with the 
deteriorating German position on the Western Front, wrought a fundamental shift in this regard. 
Specifically, the political fallout from the Sixtus Affair, the desperate economic situation in the 
Habsburg Monarchy, the failure of the Austro-Hungarian June Offensive in Venetia, and the 
defeat of the German Army in the Spring Offensive not only rekindled the German desire for 
k.u.k. divisions, but also made it impossible for Emperor Karl to continue to refuse this demand. 
 In his book The First World War and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, the Austrian 
historian Manfried Rauchensteiner characterized the Sixtus Affair of April 1918 as “small cause, 
big effect.”110 Indeed, while Karl’s indirect negotiations with the French in the spring of 1917 
had accomplished nothing at the time, the exposure of the Emperor’s clandestine peace overtures 
one year later had immediate and profound ramifications for the international standing of 
Austria-Hungary. On April 2nd, Czernin gave a speech to the Viennese municipal council in 
which he castigated the Entente powers for their unwillingness to negotiate a peace settlement; in 
particular, he singled out France and its obstinacy over the Alsace-Lorraine issue as an obstacle 
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to peace. Infuriated, the French prime minister Georges Clemenceau promptly publicized Karl’s 
letter of March 24th, 1917 in which the Emperor expressed his support for France’s “just” claim 
to Alsace-Lorraine.111 Although Karl strongly denied penning the letter, the ensuing scandal 
further eroded the Emperor’s tenuous position both within Austria-Hungary and in the context of 
the Dual Alliance. In the domestic sphere, many Habsburg officials, particularly military 
officers, were outraged by Karl’s supposed perfidy and saw the Sixtus Affair as further evidence 
of the Emperor’s basic incompetence; in a conversation with Cramon, even Arz expressed 
dismay at the Emperor’s duplicity. Thus, the scandal greatly contributed to the continuing 
erosion of the legitimacy of the Habsburg Monarchy not only in the eyes of the wider populace, 
but also in those of its ruling circles.112  
 The consequences of the Sixtus Affair for the Austro-German alliance were even more 
severe. After the scandal broke out, Karl’s initial reply to the insinuations of disloyalty to the 
Dual Alliance was “Our further response are My cannons in the West,” an allusion to the k.u.k. 
heavy artillery fighting in the Spring Offensive.113 The Germans, long harboring suspicions 
regarding the reliability of the Habsburg Monarchy, were not convinced. Influential German 
political and military circles were infuriated by their ally’s posited treachery and demanded that 
the Reich government take a hard line against Austria-Hungary. Notably, the German outrage 
brought about a particularly uncomfortable situation for the k.u.k. artillery personnel in France, 
who now had to confront the constant inquiries and recriminations of their German comrades.114 
For the OHL, the Sixtus Affair presented a perfect opportunity to justify the further subjugation 
of Austria-Hungary to the Reich. Indeed, in an April 14th letter to Hindenburg, Cramon proposed 
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that Karl travel to the German general headquarters (großes Hauptquartier or GHQ) at Spa to 
personally apologize to Kaiser Wilhelm and “place all measures of political and military nature 
under German control.” The altered nature of the Austro-German relationship in the wake of the 
Sixtus Affair is best summarized by Cramon’s subsequent assertion that “one can no longer have 
trust, and we must therefore demand guarantees.”115 
 Faced with little alternative, Karl duly journeyed to Spa and on May 13th, signed an 
agreement that entailed the closest military, political, and economic cooperation between 
Germany and Austria-Hungary, including the proposed integration of the Austro-Hungarian 
economy and military with that of Germany. To be sure, much of the agreement was provisional 
and, consequently, not immediately binding.116 However, the convention did in effect abrogate 
much of the independence of the Habsburg Monarchy in military and diplomatic affairs. In 
addition to tying major foreign policy decisions to the approval of the German Kaiser, the 
agreement at Spa also involved Hindenburg and Arz signing a military convention (Waffenbund). 
Although Habsburg and German military officials did discuss Austro-Hungarian participation on 
the Western Front (or lack thereof) at Spa, they concluded no specific arrangements as the OHL 
still believed that the planned Habsburg offensive in Venetia would be of greater utility. 
Nevertheless, the basic principles of the Waffenbund, in which the Habsburg military was subject 
to a “joint” command dominated by the OHL, left an Austro-Hungarian deployment to the West 
a distinct possibility.117  
 The Sixtus Affair also had repercussions outside of Austria-Hungary and the Dual 
Alliance. For one, the bad blood between Austria-Hungary and France prompted by Czernin’s 
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speech and Clemenceau’s subsequent revelation proved that the Monarchy had nothing more to 
hope for in negotiations with the French.118 Moreover, the damage dealt to the prestige of the 
Emperor and the ensuing submission of the Monarchy to Germany greatly contributed to the 
hardening of the Allied position towards Austria-Hungary. Previous Allied statements on 
postwar Europe, while not exactly beneficial to Habsburg interests, had left open the possibility 
of the Monarchy’s continued existence. In his initial proclamation of the Fourteen Points in 
January 1918, US President Woodrow Wilson had essentially proposed a federal Austria-
Hungary in which all of the peoples of the Monarchy would be free to pursue “autonomous 
development.”119 However, one month after the meeting at Spa, the Allied powers shifted their 
position and now advocated that self-determination necessarily entailed full independence. The 
subsequent recognition of Czechoslovakia as an Allied co-belligerent by Britain, France, and the 
United States confirmed that the enemy coalition now unequivocally sought the destruction of 
the Habsburg Monarchy as a war aim.120 Thus, if Austria-Hungary still possessed some degree of 
autonomy in military and foreign affairs prior to the Sixtus Affair, this had now evaporated.  
Ironically, contrary to Karl’s original intention of securing a negotiated settlement, the fate of 
Austria-Hungary was now completely contingent on a German “peace through victory.”121 
The internal conditions of Austria-Hungary were no more auspicious than the 
Monarchy’s diplomatic situation. Indeed, by the summer of 1918, the Habsburg Monarchy was 
in a state of impending collapse. Only the existence of a relatively coherent Austro-Hungarian 
Army and the hope of a German victory in the West continued to stave off total dissolution; in 
this way, the existence of the Habsburg Monarchy was inextricably tied to international 
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events.122 Again, the increasingly severe shortages of most resources, above all food, were 
perhaps the most fundamental cause of the immense political and social upheaval in Austria-
Hungary. The so-called “Bread Peace” at Brest-Litovsk in March, which the Austro-Hungarian 
authorities hoped would ensure the steady flow of Ukrainian grain into the Monarchy, totally 
failed to address the shortages wrought by falling agricultural production, the Allied blockade, 
and the demands of total mobilization.123  
The pervasive lack of essential goods and soaring inflation shattered the multi-ethnic 
society of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1918. Throughout the Empire, the ubiquity of strikes, 
protests, increasingly violent inter-ethnic conflict, and banditry signaled social and political 
disintegration at every level, both in major cities like Vienna and Prague as well as in rural areas 
like Galicia and Croatia-Slavonia. The task of governing the disparate Habsburg lands, while 
never easy or straightforward, became increasingly impossible. 124 In January, a massive wave of 
industrial strikes erupted throughout Austria-Hungary; on January 19th, there were 600,000 
strikers in the Austrian half of the Empire alone. The strikes were initially prompted by 
deprivation and adverse working conditions, in particular the reduction of rations in Austria 
earlier that month, but the strikes were intensified by both nationalist and Bolshevik agitation.125 
Even after the strikers were ameliorated by government and Social Democratic representatives, 
food shortages and concomitant unrest, above all protests for peace, continued into the summer. 
The climax of the Monarchy’s desperate food situation in the spring of 1918 occurred when mass 
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starvation in the imperial capital itself was averted only by the seizure of German grain 
transports travelling up the Danube.126  
As the Austro-Hungarian home front disintegrated, the Habsburg military launched its 
final and largest offensive of the war in June 1918. Although the Austro-Hungarian offensive on 
the Piave appears decidedly ill-advised in retrospect, several considerations impelled the AOK to 
undertake such an operation. For one, the AOK had already promised its German ally to go on 
the offensive in Italy and relieve pressure from the German Western Front; at the Spa meeting in 
May, as German operations in the West languished, the OHL naturally insisted that Karl renew 
and solidify this pledge.127 At the same time, Arz and the AOK believed that a successful 
offensive operation à la Caporetto would counteract the deteriorating condition of the army and 
allow the Monarchy to continue the war effort.128 However, given the significant defensive 
advantages of the Italian position, the numerical and material superiority of the Italian, British, 
and French forces, the sorry condition of Habsburg logistics, the inability of the AOK to execute 
a unified plan, and the utter lack of surprise generated by repeated delays, the Austro-Hungarian 
offensive on the Piave was doomed from the beginning.129 Launched on June 15th, the Habsburg 
June Offensive witnessed little territorial gains and massive Austro-Hungarian losses – 115,000 
men in ten days – and on June 20th, Karl ordered a general withdrawal across the Piave. 
Although the army retreated in good order and remained more or less intact, the failure of the 
June Offensive dealt a decisive blow to the manpower, materiel, and morale of the Habsburg 
Army and rendered it incapable of any further offensive action.130 
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Thus, the predictable Austro-Hungarian failure in Italy vindicated Ludendorff’s assertion 
that the decisive battle for the fate of the Central Powers would be in the West. However, despite 
impressive gains in the initial phase of the German attack, the Spring Offensive had failed to live 
up to the grandiose expectations of the OHL. By the conclusion of Operation Michael on April 
5th, the Germans had gained 12,000 square miles of territory and 90,000 prisoners, shattering the 
British Fifth Army in the process.131 Yet, these victories were largely illusory. The Germans had 
lost nearly 240,000 men in the assault, many of whom were experienced, irreplaceable officers 
and troops of the elite assault formations (Sturmbataillone). Likewise, most of the territory 
gained was worthless, devastated countryside.132  Subsequent German operations in Flanders, on 
the Marne, and in Champagne stretched the manpower and logistical capacity of the German 
Army - not to mention the physical and psychological endurance of German troops - to the 
breaking point, while Allied forces could readily replace their losses in men and materiel. 
Moreover, the German operations lacked concrete operational goals and real coordination; 
Ludendorff essentially dispersed and exhausted the offensive strength of the Westheer without 
achieving any strategic objectives.133 On July 18th, after halting the final German operation of the 
Spring Offensive, the French launched the first Allied counter-offensive of 1918 near Soissons, 
which marked the beginning of the end for the German Army in the West.134 
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The German Spring Offensive, 1918.135 
A renewed German request for Austro-Hungarian divisions for the Western Front largely 
coincided with Austria-Hungary’s definitive fiasco on the Italian Front and the impending failure 
of the German Spring Offensive. In mid-June, as the Austro-Hungarian offensive on the Piave 
foundered, the concurrent German drive on Rheims and Compiègne had similarly ground to a 
halt. Though facing the evident failure of the German operations in the West, Ludendorff refused 
to give up the offensive and planned for another assault on Rheims for July.136 On June 16th, 
                                                          
135 Department of History, USMA at West Point, “Western Front 1918 German,” Wikimedia Commons, accessed   
March 15th, 2019, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Western_front_1918_german.jpg.  
136 Polatschek, “Österreichisch-ungarische Truppen an der Westfront,” 65-66.  
Jones 48 
 
Feldmarschalleutnant Alois Klepsch-Kloth von Roden, the Austro-Hungarian plenipotentiary at 
the OHL, sent an encrypted message to Arz in which he reported that Ludendorff would soon 
request six Austro-Hungarian divisions for assistance in the West. Furthermore, Klepsch 
indicated that the OHL believed that these divisions should be under the control of German staff 
officers, as only they could be trusted to command competently on the Western Front. That same 
day, Ludendorff informed Cramon that, given the clear failure of the Piave Offensive and the 
growing presence of American forces in France, he should discuss with the AOK the possible 
deployment of five or six reliable k.u.k. divisions to the Western Front.137 Initially, Arz was once 
again equivocal on the issue, claiming that such a measure depended on the Emperor’s approval 
and that the situation in Italy was as yet unresolved. Even after Cramon repeated his demands on 
June 17th, Arz persisted in his prevarication.138  
 Yet, unlike in earlier negotiations on the subject, the Germans were not prepared to give 
up so easily. On June 19th, Ludendorff wrote directly to Arz, repeating his concerns regarding the 
Americans and the long-term inadequacy of German forces to hold the Western Front alone. He 
duly requested five or six Austro-Hungarian divisions – explicitly specifying that no Czech 
troops be dispatched – as well as additional artillery and labor units. In order to maximize the 
utility of these divisions in the West, Ludendorff planned to train them for the local combat 
conditions and rearm the Austro-Hungarian batteries with German equipment to avoid logistical 
difficulties.139 One day later, Arz replied that the outcome of the operations in Italy would 
determine the Austro-Hungarian response. Of course, by that point, the failure of the June 
Offensive had been clear for days; on June 20th, Feldmarschall Svetozar Boroević, commander 
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of one of the Habsburg Heeresgruppen in Italy, convinced Karl to halt the offensive. 140 On June 
21st, Hindenburg presented Arz with an official request by the OHL for an Austro-Hungarian 
deployment to the Western Front. In his message, Hindenburg reiterated the longstanding 
German argument in favor of utilizing k.u.k. divisions in the West, though now he invoked the 
authority of the Supreme War Command, recognized by the Austro-Hungarians at Spa, to lend 
weight to his request.  
The precipitation of an overall decision against an enemy that is continuously being reinforced in 
France means that we also must bring together everything that can possibly be spared 
elsewhere…From the perspective of the Supreme War Command, I therefore express my opinion 
that the Austro-Hungarian army should halt its attacks in Italy and, as a result, bring all forces 
that are made available to the Western theater of the war.141 
 
Arz and Waldstätten recognized the truth of Hindenburg’s statement; much like the 
Strafexpedition two years earlier, Austro-Hungarian military failure critically undermined the 
AOK’s ability to justify its independent operations. Still, the Emperor continued to vacillate just 
as he had half a year earlier. In a June 23rd report to the OHL, Cramon lamented the Emperor’s 
indecision, once again attributing his prevarication to the influence of the Empress Zita. And yet, 
two days later on June 25th, Karl finally gave his consent for the deployment of Austro-
Hungarian infantry divisions to the Western Front.142  
 Consequently, two years after the issue had first arisen, the question of greater Austro-
Hungarian participation in the West had finally been resolved. The immediate causes of the 
renewed German requests and ultimate Austro-Hungarian acquiescence were practical military 
and economic concerns. On the German side, the intensified desire for k.u.k. divisions on the 
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Western Front stemmed largely from the rapidly deteriorating manpower situation of the German 
Army. From the beginning of the Spring Offensive on March 21st to the end of June, the German 
Army in the West suffered around 800,000 casualties, including more than 100,000 fatalities. 
The total strength of the German Army declined from 5.1 million in March to 4.2 million in July, 
only 3.6 million of which were stationed in the West. Personnel shortages were pervasive, 
especially among infantry formations; by July, many German infantry divisions had an average 
battalion strength of only 600 men.143 Thus, the German motivations for a greater Austro-
Hungarian involvement on the Western Front had evolved from alliance-political concerns, 
namely attempting to guarantee continued Habsburg allegiance to the Dual Alliance, to an issue 
of pure military necessity; the OHL needed as many men as possible to buttress the 
hemorrhaging German front and slow the looming Allied juggernaut.144  
 For the Austro-Hungarians, the pressing practical matter in June 1918 was the food 
situation. By the middle of June, the food supply of the Habsburg Monarchy was once again on 
the brink of collapse, in large part thanks to the logistical demands of the June Offensive.145 On 
June 21st, the Common Food Minister, Prinz Ludwig Windisch-Grätz, informed the Emperor that 
the Hungarian summer harvest would not provide any significant quantity of food to the Austrian 
half of the Monarchy for several weeks. As a last resort, Windisch-Grätz and an Austro-
Hungarian delegation travelled to Spa to discuss the crisis with Kaiser Wilhelm, who predicated 
any German alimentary assistance on an Austro-Hungarian commitment to the Western Front. 
Indeed, one day after Karl acquiesced to sending k.u.k. divisions to France, the Germans agreed 
to dispatch a bulk shipment of flour to Austria-Hungary.146   To be sure, there was certainly an 
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element of reciprocity in Karl’s eventual acquiescence to sending his divisions to the West. After 
all, given the considerable military support provided by Germany to Austria-Hungary on 
multiple occasions throughout the war, the German request for assistance in the West was hardly 
unfair, especially since the k.u.k. Armee had failed in its own operations in Italy.147    
 Still, the fact that German blackmail exploiting the food crisis in Austria-Hungary was 
probably the key factor in Karl’s submission to German demands exemplifies the larger trend at 
work, namely the overwhelming subordination of Austria-Hungary to Germany by the summer 
of 1918. The full extent of the Austria-Hungary’s relegation to near-satellite status vis-à-vis 
Germany is best illustrated when one considers that by June 1918, almost all of the Habsburg 
Monarchy’s fundamental war aims had been fulfilled; Serbia, Romania, and Russia had been 
conquered and Italy had been driven back into its own territory.148 The Austro-Hungarian 
submission to and dependence on Germany, while most obvious in the area of resource 
asymmetry, was ultimately far more profound. In the realm of diplomacy, as the Allies had 
resolved on a partition of Austria-Hungary by mid-1918, Emperor Karl was forced to pin the 
survival of his realm on a “peace through victory.” Yet, in the military sphere, the Austro-
Hungarian Army was incapable of achieving a decisive result on the Italian Front; given the 
secondary status of that theater, decisive victory could only come about on the Western Front 
anyways. Correspondingly, Karl had no real choice other than submission to a closer alliance 
with Germany in the aftermath of the Sixtus Affair, as his country’s fate was now inextricably 
tied to that of the Reich. Therefore, while the issue of food was the immediate catalyst for the 
deployment of Austro-Hungarian divisions to the Western Front in 1918, larger structural forces 
                                                          
147 Etschmann, “Österreich-Ungarn zwischen Engagement und Zurückhaltung,” 99.  
148 Hughes and DiNardo, Imperial Germany and War, 316.  
Jones 52 
 
in Austria-Hungary’s strategic and political situation strongly militated in favor of such an 
action. Unfortunately for the thousands of Habsburg troops arriving in France in July 1918, the 
interests of their disintegrating state compelled them to fight a distant battle whose unfavorable 
outcome was already decided.  
IV. The Austro-Hungarian Divisions in France, July – November 1918 
 Just as the history of the Habsburg Monarchy in the last two years of the First World War 
can be described as a period of progressive political and social dissolution, the chronicle of 
operations on the Western Front after midsummer 1918 was essentially the protracted collapse of 
the German Army. Although nearly four months of bitter fighting elapsed between the beginning 
of the Allied counter-offensive on July 18th and the conclusion of the armistice on November 
11th, the final battles of the Great War constituted the aftermath of the Allied defensive victory 
earlier that year. In this period of denouement, the victorious Allied armies, possessing decisive 
advantages in manpower, materiel, and tactics, gradually but effectively finished off a German 
Army critically weakened and demoralized by its previous losses.149 Hence, despite previous 
aspirations for a decisive concentration of Austro-German forces in the West, the four Austro-
Hungarian infantry divisions sent to France in July and September 1918 had absolutely no 
impact on the course of the war. Two of the Austro-Hungarian formations – the 35th and 1st 
Infantry Divisions – participated in combat actions as more or less coherent formations. In 
contrast, only individual units of the 106th Infantry Division took part in any fighting and the 37th 
Honvéd Division remained in reserve for the entire period. The k.u.k. units on the Western Front 
experienced the same prevailing phenomena in the waning months of the war as their German 
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comrades: highly unfavorable combat conditions, overwhelming enemy superiority, and heavy 
casualties. Despite local, temporary tactical successes and the not insignificant losses inflicted 
upon the enemy, the bravery and tenacity of individual units could not compensate for the total 
bankruptcy of the German strategic position.  
The Deployment of k.u.k. Divisions to France, July 1918 
On June 26th and 27th, a major of the German General Staff met with the AOK to discuss 
the particulars of an Austro-Hungarian deployment to the Western Front. The AOK agreed to 
deploy a total of six divisions to the West, starting with two divisions as the beginning of July; 
likewise, the Austro-Hungarians pledged to dispatch a further forty-eight batteries of heavy 
artillery with the requisite ammunition. For their part, the Germans promised to initially employ 
the divisions in a quiet sector for a four-week training period, intending to acclimatize the 
Habsburg forces to the conditions of the Western Front before sending them to the primary 
sectors.150 In subsequent correspondence between Arz and Hindenburg in late June/early July, 
the Habsburg Chief of Staff promised that Austria-Hungary would contribute as much as 
possible to the Western Front, noting that the AOK would send only battle-tested, combat 
capable divisions to the West. Hindenburg thanked the Arz for the assistance in the West, 
expressing the quixotic hope that the k.u.k. divisions would be able to participate in the decisive 
battle on the Western Front. Naturally, the German Chief of Staff also expressed his desire for 
the soonest possible deployment of the remaining four divisions and the dispatch of additional 
formations.151  
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The AOK faced a dilemma in selecting the first two divisions to send to France. On one 
hand, the Austro-Hungarians wanted to deploy competent troops who would do honor to the 
reputation of the k.u.k. Armee and, through their actions, repudiate the typical German contempt 
for the Habsburg military. Yet, at the same time, the AOK did not want to denude the 
increasingly tenuous Italian Front of battleworthy formations; for that same reason, the AOK was 
reluctant to make any concrete commitments beyond the two divisions promised for July.152 
Eventually, the AOK decided to send the 1st and 35th Infantry Divisions, both of which had made 
a favorable impression in Italy, as well as a corps command, the XVIII. Korpskommando under 
FML Ludwig Goiginger.153 The two infantry divisions and the XVIII. Korps staff entrained for 
France in mid-July and arrived there between July 19th and July 21st, just as the Allied 
counteroffensive at the Soissons definitively turned the tide of the fighting in the West.154 
The k.u.k. 35th Infantry Division155 
 The 35th Infantry Division (k.u.k. 35. Infanteriedivision) was a battle-tested formation that 
had experienced extensive combat in the year and a half prior to its arrival in France. After 
transferring to the Isonzo from the Eastern Front in May 1917, the division had participated in 
the Tenth Battle of the Isonzo (May-June 1917), during which three of the division’s infantry 
regiments had distinguished themselves and suffered significant losses in heavy fighting on 
Mount Hermada. The division had also fought during the Eleventh Battle of the Isonzo (July-
August 1917) and took part in the breakthrough near Tolmein during the Battle of Caporetto. 
More recently, the division had served as army reserve for the k.u.k. 6. Armee during the Piave 
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Offensive, although only the divisional artillery, technical troops, and infantry pioneers took part 
in the fighting at Montello. Thus, by the time the division departed for France, the infantry 
strength of the division was fairly low, with many of the infantry companies mustering 
approximately one hundred men.156 Likewise, the heavy fighting of the previous year had cost 
the division some of its best and most experienced officers and NCO’s, a loss that could not be 
compensated for at this point in the war.157  
 Nevertheless, according to the postwar account of Alfred Schilanek, a former chief of 
staff of the division, the formation remained a cohesive and competent fighting force. The two 
infantry brigades and most of the infantry regiments remained under the command of long-
serving officers and the divisional command considered the infantry capable of handling the 
most difficult tasks. Likewise, the division had hitherto demonstrated no signs of serious war 
weariness; according Schilanek’s account, desertion was unheard-of and military censors had not 
detected any significant indications of discontent in the period immediately preceding the 
deployment to France.158 As of its arrival in the West, the 35th Infantry Division, under the 
command of FML Eugen von Podhoránsky, possessed approximately 10,500 men organized into 
two infantry brigades (69. and 70. Infanteriebrigaden), each of which consisted of two infantry 
regiments (Infanterieregimenter 62, 64, 51, and 63); in total, the division possessed twelve line 
battalions. Likewise, the division also possessed a field artillery brigade (35. 
Feldartilleriebrigade), an observation balloon company (Ballonkompanie 27), a divisional 
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cavalry squadron (6th Squadron, Husarenregiment 4), and a divisional assault battalion 
(Sturmbataillon 35).159 In terms of ethnicity, the personnel of the 35th Infantry Division consisted 
of Romanians, Siebenbürger Saxons (German-speakers), and Hungarians. While most of the 
officers and NCO’s were Germans and Hungarians, the majority of the rank-and-file were 
Romanians save IR 62, which was predominately Hungarian. The regimental mustering areas 
(Ergänzungsbezirke) were located in Hungarian Transylvania, specifically in Klaussenburg (IR 
51), Marosvásárhely (IR 62), Besztercze (IR 63), and Szaszváros (IR 64). According to 
Schilanek, the “willingness and frugality” of the Romanian troops made them particularly good 
soldier material.160  
 Interestingly, the AOK had ordered the strictest secrecy for the deployment of k.u.k. 
troops to France. Correspondingly, as the division assembled around Cordignano in the first 
week of July for transportation to the Western Front, no one in the division – even the divisional 
commander and his chief of staff – knew the exact details of the deployment.161 By July 26th, the 
majority of the division had arrived in the area around Conflans in Lorraine, although the 
divisional artillery remained in Italy until August.162 Upon arrival in France, the division was 
designated as army reserve and subordinated to Gruppe Combres (the German V. Armeekorps) 
of Armee-Abteilung C, under the overall authority of Heeresgruppe Gallwitz.163 Commanded by 
the experienced General der Artillerie Max von Gallwitz, this army group incorporated the 5. 
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Armee and Armee-Abteilung C and covered the German front from the Argonne Forest to Metz, 
including the area around Verdun. This portion of the German front was relatively quiet until the 
beginning of September and witnessed a constant shifting of the formations that were 
temporarily stationed there. Thus, Heeresgruppe Gallwitz organized the area into provisional 
groups (Gruppen) in which local corps commands oversaw two to three divisions that were 
regularly rotated between the various Gruppen.164 Starting in the northwest, the six Gruppen 
were designated “Maas-West,” “Maas-Ost,” “Ornes,” “Combres,” “Mihiel,” and “Gorz,” the last 
three of which belonged to Armee-Abteilung C.165  
The front of Armee-Abteilung C from the area east of Verdun to the Mosel encompassed 
the St. Mihiel salient, a conspicuous, 520 square-kilometer protrusion in the German lines that 
was a remnant of the German offensive at Verdun. From late 1916 to September 1918, the salient 
was one of the quietest, least active areas on the Western Front as the Allies had neglected to 
undertake any major operations there. Troops stationed on the frontline of the salient often did 
not hear enemy gunfire for days on end. Hence, the area was known as the “sanatorium of the 
West” as the Germans normally stationed depleted and exhausted divisions there for 
recuperation.166  At the same time, the tactical situation of the St. Mihiel salient was extremely 
unfavorable for the German forces stationed in it. In addition to the risk of encirclement in the 
case of an enemy thrust on the flanks of the salient,  Allied artillery could easily bombard any 
point in the interior of the salient from three directions.167 Likewise, as most of the divisions of 
Armee-Abteilung C were already worn out from intensive fighting elsewhere, the manpower of 
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the formations in the salient was extremely low; many infantry companies possessed less than 
fifty men and artillery regiments often only had two guns per battery. Thus, the German 
formations in the salient were obliged to station the vast majority of their forces on the frontline, 
leaving no considerable reserves for Armee-Abteilung C. At the same time, as the infantry units 
were understrength, the frontline itself was sparsely occupied. Indeed, the sectors of the frontline 
divisions were seriously overextended; most of the depleted front battalions occupied sectors two 
to three kilometers long and one kilometer deep.168  For example, the northern area of Gruppe 
Combres in the Fresnes plain, a line of twenty-five kilometers adjacent to the eventual posting of 
the 35th Infantry Division, possessed a garrison of only small, weak observation detachments.169  
The local terrain in the St. Mihiel salient, including both the natural topography and the 
manmade fortifications, also entailed difficulties for the defenders. The prominent Côtes 
Lorraines ridgeline, running parallel to the Maas in a northwest-southeast direction in the middle 
of the salient, formed a notable natural obstacle with numerous ridges and dense forests. The 
area east of the Côtes Lorraines similarly possessed rough terrain with many topographical 
undulations and copious patches of thick forest and shrubbery.170 Likewise, given the long period 
of time in which the Germans had occupied the area, the local fortifications exhibited a curious 
mix of older and newer defensive implements. The result was a cluttered mess of trenches, 
dugouts, wire obstacles, and blockhouses that generated much confusion and greatly hindered 
communication and coordination among the defending formations.171  Still, since the enemy had 
previously made no attempts to take the salient, the Germans had not withdrawn to a more 
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secure, cohesive position.172 Nevertheless, Armee-Abteilung C did draw up plans for a voluntary 
evacuation of the salient to the Michelstellung, a well-designed line of reinforced fortifications in 
the Woëvre. The plans called for six days of evacuation, in which the frontline divisions would 
remain in position while equipment was removed to the Michelstellung, and three days of retreat, 
during which the divisions would gradually withdraw by sector and thoroughly destroy 
settlements and infrastructure in the salient.173 
 After a cursory training period of only two to three weeks, Armee-Abteilung C transferred 
the 35th Infantry Division to the direct command of Gruppe Combres in early August, which 
promptly inserted the division into the frontline in an area of the Côtes Lorraines near the village 
of Vigneulles.174 The nine-kilometer long frontline was divided into three uniform regimental 
sectors – IR 62 remained for a time at Woël as army reserve – and consisted of  a main line of 
resistance (Hauptwiderstandslinie) that was coherent but often hastily constructed; in many 
areas, the HWL comprised no more than weak wire obstacles and concrete dugouts. In each 
regimental sector, one battalion (two in the southernmost sector) held the foremost position, one 
battalion held the artillery positions, and the remaining battalion was stationed six to ten 
kilometers behind the front as a rest battalion.175 Dominated by thick forests with small camps, 
depots, and field railways scattered everywhere, the terrain of the divisional area – ninety square 
kilometers between the frontlines and the divisional headquarters outside of Vigneulles – was 
extremely confusing and frustrated proper positioning and orientation.176 Indeed, the difficult 
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landscape of the area exerted a major effect on the activities of the division even before the 
commencement of large-scale combat. Patrol activity by the front battalions of the 35th and the 
adjacent German 13. Landwehr-Division yielded very limited contact with the French 2nd 
Cuirassier Division opposite them, as the forward positions of both sides were quite fragmented 
and porous. Similarly, on August 24th, several men of the frontline battalion of IR 63 disappeared 
without a trace, likely after becoming lost in the forest.177 Correspondingly, the Austro-
Hungarian troops were not enthusiastic about their unfavorable positions and the regular patrol 
activities mandated by the German authorities, exhibiting notable signs of anxiety and paranoia. 
One platoon leader informed the divisional chief of staff that the men of the forward battalions 
believed that the enemy opposite them possessed a mirror with which they could perfectly detect 
all movements on the Austro-Hungarian side. Likewise, departing German soldiers had informed 
their Austro-Hungarian comrades that African colonial soldiers were cannibals, a rumor that the 
Transylvanians of the 35th Infantry Division, the majority of whom likely hailed from rustic 
backgrounds, seemed to take seriously.178 
 At the end of August, after intense negotiations between the Supreme Allied Commander 
Ferdinand Foch and the commander of the AEF, John J. Pershing, the Allies decided that the 
AEF would undertake a major two-stage offensive in northeastern France. The first part of this 
American contribution to the Allied Hundred Days Offensives was the elimination of the St. 
Mihiel salient, a preliminary step to a major American thrust in the Meuse-Argonne region.179 By 
the beginning of September, the Germans had noticed the marked increase in enemy movement 
around the salient and shifted the reserves of Armee-Abteilung C forward in anticipation of an 
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enemy assault. At the same time, Ludendorff was concerned above all with protecting the 
valuable industrial areas behind the salient, particularly the iron mines of Briey-Longwy. Thus, 
on September 8th, the OHL ordered the evacuation of the St. Mihiel salient.180 The evacuation 
was still underway when the Allied offensive began four days later on September 12th. Over 
500,000 American and 110,000 French troops, extensively supported by artillery, aircraft, and 
armor, attacked disorganized, withdrawing German forces that possessed less than a tenth of 
their strength. Although the largely inexperienced US First Army encountered difficulties in 
logistics, communication, and coordination, the Battle of Saint Mihiel was a great success for the 
Allies. The offensive lasted only four days and the Franco-American forces captured 13,000 
German prisoners and hundreds of artillery pieces and machine guns, while the Allies themselves 
suffered less than 9000 casualties.181 The two primary thrusts of the offensive struck both sides 
of the salient, aiming to cut off the German forces in the southeast; one thrust pushed northward 
between the Côtes Lorraines and the Mosel, while another advanced southwards in the area 
around Combres.182 Thus, on September 12th, the k.u.k. 35th Infantry Division found itself 
immediately adjacent to one of the main axes of the St. Mihiel Offensive.   
 When the Allied attack began on the morning of September 12th, four battalions held the 
forward positions of the 35th Infantry Division (I and II/IR 62, II/IR 51, and II/IR 63), two were 
stationed in the artillery positions (I/IR 51 and III/IR 62), and the remaining six battalions, some 
of which were positioned far behind the HWL, were utilized as army reserve under the direct 
control of Armee-Abteilung C.183 Interestingly, the division was under the temporary command 
of Generalmajor Gustav Funk, the commander of the 70th Infantry Brigade, as FML von 
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Podhoránsky was on vacation at the time of the battle.184  Beginning at 2 AM, vigorous artillery 
fire pummeled the entire divisional front, with the heaviest fire concentrated on the forward 
positions; alarmingly, the divisional flash-ranging section reported that at least fifteen enemy 
batteries were positioned opposite the divisional sector alone. By 3 AM, it was clear that the 
enemy artillery fire was primarily focused on the right flank of the divisional sector where the 
35th bordered the 13. Landwehr-Division, whose sector was the primary target of the Allied 
attack in the north.  Although the divisional command was convinced that the enemy activity was 
indicative of a large-scale offensive, it neglected to order increased combat readiness until 7:50 
AM, mostly on account of the intensive evacuation efforts still in progress. 185 
Between 7:40 and 11 AM, systematic enemy artillery fire began to target the rear areas of 
the division, crippling the Austro-Hungarian efforts to evacuate equipment and supplies. 
Simultaneously, the troops of the US V Corps struck the southernmost regimental sector (DIII), 
where the frontline detachment repulsed two enemy battalions, and in the northernmost sector 
(DI), where the enemy assault penetrated the HWL.186 By the early afternoon, the divisional 
command had received alarming reports from the neighboring German divisions. The 13. 
Landwehr-Division reported significant enemy breakthroughs in its sector, which seriously 
threatened the right flank of the 35th Infantry-Division. Correspondingly, the divisional command 
ordered the 69th Infantry Brigade, which was commanding the infantry forces assembled around 
sector DI, to form a refused flank facing north from the artillery positions. Likewise, the 192. 
Infanterie-Division, positioned to the south of the 35th Infantry Division, communicated its 
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intention to withdraw around 1:30 PM, which in turn exposed the southern flank of the division. 
Notably, around 2:15 PM, as the 35th divisional command attempted to relay its situation to the 
192nd, the German radio operator abruptly ended the conversation with the jarring remark, 
“pardon me, I must interrupt; there are tanks here.” In the meantime, French troops had 
reportedly advanced further in the sector DI, threatening the artillery positions there. Thus, the 
divisional command ordered the reserves in sector DI to conduct a fighting withdrawal with the 
aim of covering the retreating remnants of the frontline battalions.187  
 As exemplified by the patchy, incomplete nature of the division’s after-action report, the 
fighting in the sector of the 35th Infantry Division was incredibly chaotic. The difficult terrain, 
the intensity of the Allied assault, the shortcomings of field communications, and the inherent 
confusion of the interrupted evacuation wrought havoc on Austro-Hungarian command and 
control. The divisional command received inconsistent, incomplete reports from its subordinate 
units and thus obtained an accurate view of the tactical situation very slowly. 188 Notably, for 
some time during the afternoon of the 12th, communications between sectors DII and DIII had 
broken down completely, leaving both the divisional and brigade commands in the dark 
regarding developments in those sectors.189  On a lower level, local Austro-Hungarian 
counterattacks to regain lost ground in sector DI became dispersed in the thick woods of the 
Côtes Lorraines and subsequently fell victim to Allied ambushes. Likewise, the thick vegetation 
and deficient communications seriously impeded close coordination between Austro-Hungarian 
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infantry and artillery; the k.u.k. artillery could only offer unobserved scatter fire rather than 
accurate, directed bombardment.190  
By the late afternoon, the Austro-Hungarian center in sector DII had suffered 
breakthroughs in both of its flanks, forcing the troops there to slowly withdraw. The 69th Infantry 
Brigade command had assembled two reserve battalions to conduct a counterattack on the 
embattled right flank, but the divisional command was more concerned with reconstituting a 
defensive position behind the original frontline. As the division did not possess sufficient 
reserves to undertake both of these tasks, Generalmajor Funk cancelled the prospective 
counterattack and ordered the remaining battalions to conduct a fighting withdrawal to the new, 
temporary positions of the Schröterstellung.191 The Austro-Hungarian infantry were thus able to 
maintain sufficient cohesion and control over the deteriorating situation to permit the withdrawal 
of the detachments engaged in combat.192 Beginning around 5 PM, the Austro-Hungarian units in 
the southern part of the divisional sector began to withdraw and at 6:30, the divisional command 
finally received the order from Gruppe Combres to retreat to the Michelstellung.193 
 After 6:50 PM, the divisional and brigade headquarters withdrew to Jonville on the 
Michelstellung in coordination with the 13. Landwehr-Division. Funk ordered IR 64, which had 
mostly remained in reserve during the fighting, to occupy the positions in front of and on the new 
HWL and subordinated the artillery that had arrived there to the regimental command. The 
divisional command also designated areas behind the HWL to serve as regimental assembly 
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zones for the retreating detachments. On September 13th, the divisional command transferred its 
headquarters to Conflans and worked tirelessly throughout the day to reform the shattered 
division and reestablish connections with the neighboring German divisions. Fortunately for the 
Austro-Hungarians, the enemy did not interfere in the disengagement and reassembly of the 
k.u.k. troops, save for constant, vigorous enemy air attacks.194 To be sure, the reformation of the 
division was a herculean task, given the heavy casualties suffered by the k.u.k. units and the 
sheer number of stragglers scattered in the dense forests during the hectic, though controlled 
withdrawal. Correspondingly, the division had to temporarily reconstitute IR 51 and IR 62 as 
single-battalion regiments until September 18th.195 The new position of the division extended for 
four and a half kilometers from Jonville northwards to Harville; initially, the outpost zone196 of 
the division was quite large, encompassing the area Woël – Doncourt – St. Hilaire.197  
 From September 14-16, the 35th Infantry Division conducted numerous small-scale 
offensive and defensive operations around the HWL and in the outpost zone of the divisional 
sector. Although the steady Allied advance had at one point driven the Austro-Hungarian outpost 
detachments back to the HWL, subsequent counterattacks with artillery support and in close 
cooperation with the 13. Landwehr-Division eventually reestablished an outpost zone of two 
kilometers beyond the HWL.198 After this period, as they had accomplished their objective of 
eliminating the St. Mihiel Salient, the Allies halted their advance. Thus, the first and final major 
battle of the 35th Infantry Division on the Western Front was over. Subsequent fighting in the 
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area of Armee-Abteilung C was limited to patrol skirmishes and reciprocal artillery 
bombardment; the position of the frontlines there remained unchanged until the armistice in 
November.199 Although the 35th Infantry Division, like its German counterparts, had avoided 
total annihilation during the Battle of Saint Mihiel, the division had suffered heavy losses in both 
men and materiel during its fighting withdrawal. As of September 19th, the division had lost 99 
officers and 3268 other ranks killed, wounded, missing, and captured, thus losing almost one 
third of the division’s strength over the course of a single week.200 Likewise, the division also 
lost 102 machine guns (including 22 Lewis guns), five infantry cannons, sixteen mortars 
(Minenwerfer), seventeen grenade launchers (Granatenwerfer) 201, six German-made howitzers, 
two German-made field cannons, three Austrian-made field cannons, and thirteen Austrian-made 
howitzers. Tellingly, most of the machine guns and artillery had been blown up in the bitter, 
chaotic hand-to-hand combat that characterized the fighting in the divisional sector.202  Similarly, 
the fact that the majority of the division’s casualties fell into the category of “missing” 
exemplified the prevailing confusion and disorder of the battle. 
 By September 23rd, the division had largely reconstituted itself in its new position. The 
arrival of fourteen officers and 620 other ranks as reinforcements from the XXXIX. and XL. 
Marschbataillone203, combined with the return of numerous stragglers, significantly improved 
the manpower situation of the division, permitting the reestablishment of four three-battalion 
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infantry regiments. Nevertheless, the actions of the previous week had noticeably reduced the 
combat strength of the division, which at this point possessed a combat strength of 293 officers 
and 6688 other ranks (including personnel on leave). Likewise, the division had at its disposal 
144 machine guns, three infantry cannons, thirty mortars, four usable mountain cannons, 
nineteen usable field cannons, twenty-seven usable howitzers, fifteen usable heavy howitzers, 
and eight German light howitzers.204 During this period of relative calm, several notable figures 
visited the area of Armee-Abteilung C. On September 21st, Kaiser Wilhelm himself visited the 
Armee-Abteilung headquarters, accompanied by FML Klepsch-Kloth. The Kaiser greeted 
Habsburg officers at the HQ and some Austro-Hungarian casualties at local hospitals and 
expressed appreciation for the contributions of k.u.k. units.205 Otherwise, although the 35th 
Infantry Division continued to suffer from perennial shortages of men and materiel, combat 
losses from the stalemate were low and the chronicle of the division up to its withdrawal from 
the frontline at the beginning of November was uneventful.206 
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The 35th Infantry Division and the St. Mihiel Salient, September 1918.207 
 
                                                          




The German Western Front, July – November 1918.208 
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A wider view of the St. Mihiel Salient, September 1918.209 
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The k.u.k. 1st Infantry Division 
 Like the 35th Infantry Division, the 1st Infantry Division (k.u.k. 1. Infanteriedivision) had 
participated in many battles on the Italian Front prior to its transfer to the West. Since 1915, the 
division had proven its worth in practically every area of the Italian Front, from Tirol and 
Carinthia to the upper Isonzo; during the recent June Offensive, the division had fought in the 
Tonale Pass. Notably, the commander of the division, FML Josef Metzger, was a former head of 
the Operations Department of the AOK. Unusually for a Habsburg officer, the Germans held him 
in fairly high esteem, both because of his military abilities and because of his frequent 
conciliation of disputes between the OHL and the AOK during the era of Conrad.210 Even after 
his tenure at the AOK, Metzger proved himself to be a capable troop commander, earning the 
Knight’s Cross of the Military Order of Maria Theresia for his leadership of the 1st Infantry 
Division during the Battle of Caporetto.211  
At the time of its arrival in France between July 21st and August 1st, the 1st Infantry 
Division numbered approximately 8,400 men in two infantry brigades (1. and 2. 
Infanteriebrigaden), which comprised three infantry regiments (IR 5, IR 61, and IR 112) and 
three light infantry (Feldjäger) battalions (FJB 17, FJB 25, and FJB 31); in total, the division 
commanded twelve line battalions, including the Feldjäger. Likewise, the division also included 
a cavalry squadron (2nd Squadron, Honvédhusarenregiment 10), a field artillery brigade (1. 
Feldartilleriebrigade), a division assault battalion (Sturmbataillon 1), a sapper battalion 
(Sappeurbataillon 1), and an observation balloon company (Ballonkompanie 13).212 The ethnic 
composition of the 1st Infantry Division was quite diverse as the constituent units hailed from a 
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variety of locales in Bohemia and Hungary. IR 5, with the mustering area of Szatmárnémeti in 
Transylvania, consisted of Hungarians and Romanians. The troops of IR 61, drawn from 
Temesvár (contemporary Timișoara) in the Banat, were predominately Germans and 
Romanians, though the regiment also had Hungarian and Serb members. IR 112 recruited from 
the Trentschin and Preßburg (modern-day Bratislava) areas, incorporating Germans, Hungarians, 
and Slovaks. The personnel of FJB 17 and 25, both of which recruited from the area around 
Brünn (Brno) in Moravia, were mostly Czech with some German elements; in contrast, FJB 31 
recruited from the Agram district (modern-day Zagreb) and thus comprised Croats and Serbs. As 
was customary in the Austro-Hungarian Army, the divisional Sturmbataillon did not recruit from 
a specific area and was composed of select troops from all of the division’s constituent units.213   
 After arriving in France, the 1st Infantry Division initially assembled in the area around 
Montmedy to undergo training for the combat conditions on the Western Front and to receive 
additional equipment. Around the middle of August, the OHL ordered the division to replace the 
worn-out 232. Infanterie-Division on the frontlines adjacent to the Maas.214 Thus, the OHL 
assigned the division to the Gruppe Maas-Ost (V. Reserve-Korps) of the 5. Armee under General 
der Kavallerie Georg von der Marwitz, which was also subordinated to Heeresgruppe Gallwitz. 
The division promptly occupied a seven-kilometer section of the front on the eastern bank of the 
Maas denoted as the subsector “Brabant,” which ran from positions on the river near Sivry to the 
area west of Beaumont.215 Fortunately for the Austro-Hungarians and Germans positioned there, 
the Meuse-Argonne region offered excellent defensive terrain. The river Maas itself was 
unfordable, thereby providing a key natural obstacle for an Allied offensive. Likewise, the 
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topography of the region was very uneven, characterized by numerous hills, ravines, and small 
streams; notably, the areas behind the frontline, largely untouched by the fighting, were 
dominated by thick forest and foliage. East of the river and behind the 1st Infantry Division’s 
sector stood the Heights of the Maas, a major north-south ridgeline on which the Germans had 
concentrated artillery to command almost the entire battlefield.216  
The German defenses in the region were well-established, as the Germans had occupied 
most of the area since 1914. The Germans had constructed an extensive network of interlocking 
trenches, wire obstacles, pillboxes, redoubts, and other defensive implements, all of which 
formed a coherent system of killing zones. Three main defensive lines ran through the multiple 
sectors of the region, namely the Eztel-Stellung, the Kriemhild-Stellung, and finally, the Freya-
Stellung. Although the German fortifications were mostly quite strong and well-supported by 
significant artillery forces and ubiquitous machine-gun nests, certain segments of the German 
defensive lines were poorly constructed or even virtually nonexistent when the Allies attacked in 
late September during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.217 This primarily American operation, the 
largest battle in the history of the US Army, aimed to break through the German defenses in 
northeastern France and sever the German Army’s north-south axis of communications on the 
Western Front, thereby compelling the Westheer to withdraw into Germany.218  
 The natural and artificial defensive advantages of the region formed a key aspect of the 
German strategy, as otherwise the forces of Heeresgruppe Gallwitz were badly outmatched. 5. 
Armee had at its disposal approximately forty-four divisions at one time or another during the 
battle, but the majority of the German formations were operating at one-third or less of their 
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proscribed strength. 219 In contrast, a total of twenty-two American divisions220 – over 1.2 
million men – participated in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, supported by 2775 artillery pieces, 
821 aircraft, and almost 400 tanks. In addition to providing crews for many of the Allied artillery 
pieces and aircraft, the French army also offered significant infantry support for the assault. In 
the initial attack, American infantry forces outnumbered the German frontline divisions by more 
than three to one.221 The subsequent actions of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive from September 
26th to the end of the war on November 11th witnessed extensive and bloody fighting. Overall, 
the operations were a clear Allied victory. In forty-seven days, the Franco-American forces had 
achieved all of their objectives, advancing to Mézières, Sedan, and the upper Maas as well as 
capturing 26,000 prisoners, 874 artillery pieces, and 3000 machine guns. Likewise, the offensive 
had decimated the forces of Heeresgruppe Gallwitz, which suffered 100,000 dead and wounded 
in addition to the prisoners. At the same time, the Allied advance had been neither easy nor 
straight-forward. The German forces, despite the desperate circumstances, conducted a skilled 
and tenacious defense, with well-placed and coordinated artillery and machine guns inflicting 
heavy casualties on the Allies. Simultaneously, the inexperience and outdated frontal-assault 
tactics of the American troops magnified US losses during the offensive; the Meuse-Argonne 
Offensive was the deadliest battle in American military history, with US forces suffering 
122,000 casualties, including 26,277 killed.222 
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 Prior to the beginning of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, the 1st Infantry Division had 
over a month to acquaint itself to its sector of the front and prepare for the inevitable enemy 
assault. The terrain from the eastern bank of the Maas to the divisional HWL was thousands of 
meters of open fields and slopes, while the area behind the frontlines was characterized by 
densely wooded ravines and hills; a single road running from the town of Consenvoye northeast 
to Etraye and Damvillers bisected the woods there.223 By September 23rd, the division had 
received nine march companies from the XLI – XLIII. Marschbataillone224 and correspondingly 
possessed a strength of 335 officers and 8644 other ranks on October 1st. At the same time, the 
division had suffered only thirty-four combat casualties from September 10-20, as the combat 
activity in the sector Brabant consisted only of reciprocal exploratory patrols and intermittent 
artillery disruptive fire.225  
After the Franco-American offensive began three days later, fighting in the divisional 
sector intensified, but the main impetus of the Allied assault was initially concentrated 
elsewhere. The powerful artillery bombardment preceding the Allied assault began in the early 
morning on September 26th and pulverized the German and Austro-Hungarian positions along 
the entire front of 5. Armee. At 7 AM, a major American attack on the German positions west of 
the Maas commenced while French battalions, including Senegalese troops of the 2nd Colonial 
Corps, undertook forceful but localized pushes against the center (sector B of IR 112) and left 
flank (sector C of IR 61) of the divisional sector. These attacks, as well as a later assault against 
the right flank of the division (sector A of IR 5) managed to overrun the forward posts, but the 
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Austro-Hungarian defenders halted the French at the HWL and subsequently pushed the enemy 
back into no man’s land.226  
 Although the 1st Infantry Division had managed to hold its positions, the primary 
American assault west of the river had forced the German 7. Reserve-Division to retreat. 
Consequently, on the night of September 26-27, the division withdrew its right flank to the 
northwest, establishing a new defensive line from Sivry to the area east of Vilosnes with 
Sturmbataillon 1. Sustained American attacks on the positions of Gruppe Maas-West up to 
September 30th continued to threaten the right flank of the division; while the Allied infantry 
attacks temporarily neglected the divisional sector itself, varying degrees of artillery 
bombardment, including the extensive use of poison gas, saturated the rear areas of the division. 
In order to lessen the risk of another frontal assault on the divisional sector, Gruppe Maas-Ost 
had ordered the destruction of the bridges across the Maas at Consenvoye, Sivry, and Vilosnes, 
but deficient ammunition prevented the divisional artillery from accomplishing this mission. 
Instead, the divisional sapper battalion assumed the hazardous task of infiltrating no man’s land 
to destroy the bridges with explosive charges, a mission which they accomplished over the 
course of three nights. Though the first week of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive had largely 
spared the 1st Infantry Division from major combat action, the intensified fighting had exacted a 
not insignificant toll on the division’s manpower; by October 3rd, the division had suffered 503 
casualties, more than half of which were injuries from gas.227  
 The division was in a state of constant combat readiness from October 1st to October 7th, 
although no notable infantry combat occurred in the divisional sector during this period. 
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However, the Allies persisted in their constant, vigorous bombardment of the depots and billets 
in the rear areas of the divisional sector with both high explosive and gas shells. Notably, on the 
night of October 3rd, an assault patrol of FJB 25228 in the outpost zone of the neighboring 15. 
Infanterie-Division resulted in the capture of several soldiers of the French 18th Division. Upon 
interrogation, the prisoners indicated the presence of two American divisions opposite the 
divisional sector. Although neither subsequent observation nor further reconnaissance reports 
gave a clear indication of an imminent major attack, the divisional command certainly had cause 
for alarm. The defenses in sector A, the area of the divisional area closest to the heavy fighting 
west of the Maas, were extremely overextended as twelve understrength companies of IR 5 had 
to occupy almost five kilometers of the frontline. The total length of the divisional frontline, 
defended by a mere ten battalions, was 10.2 kilometers. Moreover, the withdrawal of the forces 
of Gruppe Maas-West to the heights north of Brieulles exposed the right wing of the division to 
strong flanking fire from Allied artillery west of the river.229 
 On October 8th, the relative peace that had prevailed in the sector of the 1st Infantry 
Division since September 27th came to an abrupt and violent end with the beginning of the 
Franco-American assault east of the Maas. The French XVII Corps, composed of the US 29th and 
33rd Divisions, the French 18th and 26th Divisions, and several Senegalese battalions aimed to 
complement the initial Allied thrust in the lower Argonne and increase the pressure on 5. Armee. 
The French forces would advance towards the town of Flabas in the east while the US divisions 
further to the west formed the main thrust; the 29th Division would attack northwards from 
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Samogneux through the Consenvoye Woods to Molleville Farm, while the 33rd Division was 
tasked with crossing the Maas near Brabant, seizing the village of Consenvoye, and advancing 
through the forest onto the main ridge of the Maas Heights.230   
At 6 AM, intensive Allied artillery fire opened up all along the front of Gruppen Maas-
Ost and Ornes, with French large-caliber artillery pulverizing the command posts and rear 
positions of the sectors. The enemy infantry attack began at 7:30 under the cover of artificial fog, 
quickly pushing the Austro-Hungarian forward posts back to the HWL; by 10 AM, US infantry 
and armor had penetrated the defensive positions of sector B in front of Brabant. Although IR 5 
in sector A and IR 61 in sector C repulsed several enemy assaults from the HWL, the Americans 
pressed their attack east of the Malbrouck Hill in sector B and achieved a mass breakthrough 
there in the early afternoon after heavy fighting and considerable losses. By this point, the 1st 
Infantry Division had committed all of its regimental reserves in counterattacks to recapture the 
HWL at the Malbrouck and Haumont Hills. Likewise, Sturmbataillon 1 had also counterattacked 
to reconstitute the Austro-Hungarian position in sector C. Like their comrades at St. Mihiel, the 
troops of the 1st Infantry Division experienced bitter, often close-quarters combat in difficult, 
confusing terrain. The division lost many of its anti-tank guns and close support artillery in hand-
to-hand combat with attacking American troops, while the regimental command of IR 61 had to 
free itself from encirclement in an intense grenade duel with a French colonial battalion. 231 
 Shortly after noon, elements of the 33rd Division crossed the Maas near Consenvoye and 
after three failed assaults, finally succeeded in penetrating the HWL of IR 5 in sector A.  
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Subsequently, the simultaneous Allied thrusts north and south of Malbrouck Hill enveloped 
elements of IR 112 holding out on the hill.  Conversely, IR 61 and the divisional Sturmbataillon 
continued to repulse enemy attacks in sector C into the late afternoon. Generalmajor von 
Hellebronth, the commander of 2. Infanteriebrigade, played a critical role in salvaging the 
Austro-German position in the Brabant sector. Displaying notable equanimity under pressure, he 
maintained the brigade headquarters a mere 200 paces from the advancing enemy and continued 
to issue orders to the beleaguered Austro-Hungarian regiments. Hellebronth combined the 
division’s final reserves with German reinforcements and established a secondary defensive line 
along the Eztel-Stellung, which finally managed to halt the enemy advance and prevent a deeper 
penetration of divisional sector. Gruppe Maas-Ost subsequently ordered that the German and 
k.u.k. units subordinated to the 1st Infantry Division execute a counterattack to recapture the 
former divisional HWL in sectors B and C. Beginning at 5:30 AM on October 9th, the Austro-
German drive was confused, disjointed, and severely disrupted by enemy artillery fire; 
correspondingly, the counterattack yielded no permanent gains. Again at the insistence of Maas-
Ost, the 1st Infantry Division commenced another counterattack that afternoon north of the 
Consenvoye-Etraye road, aiming to throw the Americans back across the Maas. This effort 
similarly produced negligible results. Even with German reinforcements, the division simply did 
not possess the strength for such an offensive effort, and Maas-Ost would not provide any further 
reinforcements.232 Although Franco-American forces attacking on October 8-9 had suffered 
significant losses and had not achieved their intended goals, the assault had managed to exhaust 
the last real reserves of 5. Armee.233 
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 In addition to the failed Austro-German counterattacks, perhaps the most prominent 
combat action of Austro-Hungarian infantry on the Western Front also occurred on October 9th. 
In the early morning, a renewed American attack in sector A broke through the HWL of IR 5 
southeast of Sivry. The remnants of IR 5, along with elements of IR 112 and a few companies of 
the German Füsilier-Regiment 35 and Infanterie-Regiment 103 retreated to Hill 371, which the 
Americans promptly enveloped. This ad hoc group of Austro-Hungarian and German soldiers, 
under the leadership of Oberstleutnant Rudolf Popelka, the commander of IR 5, held off repeated 
American attacks on their position from three sides for over a day before withdrawing to a more 
secure position.234 Indeed, a German Army report of October 11th, in addition to hailing the 
valiant defense of Brandenburger, Saxon, Rhenish, and Austro-Hungarian troops east of the 
Maas, singled out IR 5 and its commander for special praise. Kaiser Wilhelm himself 
subsequently decorated Oberstleutnant Popelka with the Pour le Mérite, the highest military 
order of merit in Prussia; notably, Popelka was the only Austro-Hungarian troop officer in 
history to receive this award.235 Still, despite the best efforts of Popelka, Hellebronth, Metzger, 
and other Austro-Hungarian officers, two days of bitter fighting had gravely weakened the 1st 
Infantry Division and the American assault had not abated. On October 9th, at around 5 PM, 125 
Allied bombers pounded the depots, approaches, and supply lines in the rear areas of the 
division; vigorous enemy artillery fire likewise bombarded the same targets that night.236  
By that point, the combat strength of the division had been almost completely exhausted. 
The divisional command transferred control of the sector Brabant to the German 228. Infanterie-
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Division at 1 PM on October 10th and withdrew to the area Remoiville-Jametz for 
rehabilitation.237 Although Maas-Ost had removed the 1st Infantry Division from the frontline on 
October 10th, the desperate situation at the front precluded a straightforward disengagement of 
the Austro-Hungarian units still in combat. Military necessity demanded that elements of all 
three regiments, particularly those of “Gruppe Popelka,” as well as the Jägerregiment remain 
under the tactical control of the German 228, 32, and 15. Infanterie-Divsionen. Correspondingly, 
the last detachments of the k.u.k. infantry regiments did not regroup with the rest of the division 
until the evening of October 12th, while the Jägerregiment remained under German command 
until October 14th. Similarly, the majority of the artillery remained in service at the front past 
October 10th, leaving only a few batteries at the immediate disposal of the division for several 
days.238  
Though the division had largely accorded itself well in the fighting east of the Maas, the 
Austro-Hungarians had suffered heavy casualties in combat with the Franco-American forces. 
On October 13th, after its removal from the frontlines, the 1st Infantry Division numbered 138 
officers and 3592 other ranks (not including the Feldjägerbataillone), a mere forty percent of its 
strength on October 1st.239 The combat actions of October 8-10 were similarly costly in terms of 
materiel. The division had lost twenty-eight of its thirty-two light (7.58cm) Minenwerfer, most of 
which were either destroyed by direct hits from enemy artillery or left behind when the 
Americans overran the HWL.240 Likewise, on October 18th, even after some reinforcement, the 1. 
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Feldartilleriebrigade possessed a total of sixty-four artillery pieces of all types, twenty-two less 
than it had on September 13th.241 
 In the forest encampments of Remoiville-Jametz, the divisional command frantically 
attempted to return the division to some semblance of combat capability, provisionally 
reconstituting each regiment with two half-battalions. However, the critical state of the German 
forces in the Meuse-Argonne did not allow any extended period of rest; already on October 14th. 
Maas-Ost ordered the division to replace the 117. Infanterie-Division on the frontline in the 
sector “Vilosnes.” Maas-Ost also removed IR 112 and FJB 17 from divisional control and 
subordinated this “Gruppe Sivry” to the 228. Infanterie-Division, whereupon these k.u.k. units 
returned the front in the old divisional sector. On October 18th, the 1st Infantry Division, now also 
incorporating Landsturm-Infanterie-Regiment 25 and Sturmbataillon 106 of the k.u.k. 106th 
Infantry Division, took over the sector northwest of Vilosnes, a 1.6 kilometer section of the 
frontline directly on the Maas. The defensive situation in the new divisional sector was quite 
precarious. For one, the fortifications in the area were extremely underdeveloped, as that section 
of the Kriemhild-Stellung really only existed on paper. Consequently, the division placed the 
HWL directly on the Maas to utilize the natural obstacle and ordered the frontline battalions to 
hurriedly construct additional wire obstacles and makeshift machine-gun nests. On October 22nd, 
the embattled 7. Reserve-Division on the right wing of the division withdrew in the face of the 
American onslaught, which compelled the division to further extend its already overstretched 
lines to Liny in the northwest.242  
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 The 1st Infantry Division remained in a constant state of combat readiness on the 
frontlines in the Vilosnes sector until its withdrawal at the beginning of November. Fortunately 
for the exhausted, poorly-supplied, and understrength Austro-Hungarians, only localized infantry 
combat developed in the sector in the final weeks of the war, as the majority of the heavy 
fighting occurred west of the division and in the former divisional sector of Samogneux-
Brabant.243 Yet, despite being spared from large-scale enemy attacks, the everyday difficulties of 
life on the Western Front still took a heavy toll on the manpower and materiel of the division. 
Constant artillery fire directed on frontline and rear areas of the division, especially 
bombardment with mustard gas, resulted in near-catastrophic losses, despite the best efforts of 
the divisional leadership to ensure proper gas protection measures. Over the course of three days 
from October 21st to October 23rd, the division suffered approximately 382 casualties from 
gassing alone; at this time, the division possessed a total combat strength of only 2700 men. The 
single worst incident occurred on October 23rd when gas bombardment inflicted 109 casualties, 
including the entire headquarters staff of both Lst.IR 25 and Sturmbataillon 106.244  
 Indeed, much to the chagrin of FML Metzger, the incessant artillery bombardment and 
small-scale infantry combat consistently eroded the combat capability of the division during the 
last few weeks of the war. Yet, aside from sending sharp protests to the German authorities and 
the AOK, Metzger could do little to avert the gradual annihilation of his division through 
attrition. The 1st and the 35th Infantry Divisions thus comprised the first and most significant 
stage of the Austro-Hungarian deployment of infantry to the Western Front. They participated in 
the fighting as coherent formations and suffered high casualties in the face of major Allied 
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offensives. Yet, the fact that these divisions, neither of which participated in large-scale combat 
for more than a few days, constitute the most significant contribution of the k.u.k. infantry in the 
West demonstrates the overwhelming futility of Austria-Hungary’s participation on the Western 
Front. Successful defensive or counteroffensive actions by Austro-Hungarian troops were 
temporary at best and were in any case unsustainable given the overwhelming superiority of the 
enemy. Thus, the total impact of these Austro-Hungarian divisions was measured at the tactical 
or sub-tactical level in military terms, in meters or a few kilometers in spatial terms, and in hours 
in temporal terms. The second stage of the Austro-Hungarian intervention in the West, beginning 
in September, was even less significant in the course of the final battles in northeastern France.  
 
The 1st Infantry Division on the Maas Front, October 1918.245 
                                                          




The eastern Meuse-Argonne, October 1918.246 
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The k.u.k. 106th Infantry Division 
 Unsurprisingly, even after the initial deployment of k.u.k. divisions to France in July, the 
OHL was still unsatisfied with the Austro-Hungarian contribution on the Western Front. As 
Germany’s strategic position deteriorated further, particularly after the “Black Day of the 
German Army” at St. Quentin on August 8th, the German requests for further k.u.k. divisions 
intensified. In an August 14th meeting at Spa between Emperor Karl, Arz, and the OHL, the 
allies initially agreed that the timing of a further Austro-Hungarian deployment to the West 
would be determined by the AOK, as the Habsburg Monarchy faced its own crises on the home 
front and in Italy.248  
However, just as in June, the increasingly desperate manpower shortages of the Westheer, 
coupled with the escalation of the Allied offensives in France, compelled the Germans to renege 
on this consensus. On August 29th, the same day that the OHL withdrew German forces back to 
the Siegfried Line, Hindenburg sent a dispatch to Baden249 in which he highlighted the heavy 
losses of the German Army on the Western Front. Correspondingly, Hindenburg asserted that, 
“in the interest of the common cause,” Austria-Hungary should adopt a completely defensive 
posture in Italy and deploy all forces not needed there to the West.250 Interestingly, the highest-
ranking Habsburg officers on the Western Front, FML Klepsch-Kloth and FML Goiginger, 
vocally supported the deployment of further divisions in France. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
AOK relented and after consultation with Feldmarschall Boroević, decided to send the 106th and 
37th Honvéd Infantry Divisions along with the IX. Korpskommando to France.251 Although the 
                                                          
248 Polatschek, “Österreichisch-ungarische Truppen an der Westfront,” 80-81.  
249 The headquarters of the AOK were located just outside of Vienna in Baden bei Wien from 1916 to 1918.  
250 Glaise-Horstenau (ed.), ÖULK, vol. 7, 484.  
251 Polatschek, “Österreichisch-ungarische Truppen an der Westfront,” 83-84.  
Jones 88 
 
AOK informed Ludendorff on September 1st that no further divisions could be diverted to the 
West, the OHL continued to press in for additional Austro-Hungarian divisions until October 
16th, by which point the political and military collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy had rendered 
such requests completely delusional.252  
 The 106th Infantry Division (k.u.k. 106. Infanteriedivision), under the command of FML 
Karl Kratky, arrived in Montmedy in mid-September.253 The division was composed entirely of 
members of the Landsturm, the third-line reserve/militia of the Austro-Hungarian military. Older 
territorials between the ages of thirty-four and fifty-five (terms of service were naturally 
extended during the war254) comprised the Landsturm, which was originally intended to provide 
replacements for first and second-line units and perform home defense duties. However, in 
reality, the Landsturm also formed field units and fought at the frontlines during the war.255 
Indeed, the 106th Infantry Division had previously participated in combat on the Eastern Front 
and in Italy. According to an October 12th, 1918 AEF intelligence report concerning the division, 
the division had suffered extremely heavy casualties fighting between Asiago and the Brenta in 
December 1917 and January 1918, during which the divisional Sturmbataillon had been 
practically annihilated.256 After being reconstituted at Bozen in April, the division had not seen 
further action at the front and was instead deployed to Lublin in Austrian-occupied Poland, 
where it assisted with the harvest during the summer of 1918. The division comprised 
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approximately 10,200 troops in twelve line battalions, which in turn formed four regiments in 
two brigades; the 210. Landsturm-Infanteriebrigade included Landsturm-Infanterieregimenter 
31 and 32 while the 211. Landsturm-Infanteriebrigade contained Lst.IR 6 and 25.  The division 
also included R Squadron, Ulanenregiment 1 as divisional cavalry, a field artillery brigade (106. 
Feldartilleriebrigade), a divisional assault battalion (Sturmbataillon 106), and sapper company 
(2nd Company, Sappeurbataillon 16). The mustering districts of the regiments were located in 
Bohemia and Galicia, namely in Teschen in Austrian Silesia (Lst.IR 31), Neusandec and Tarnów 
in Galicia (Lst. IR 32), Eger in Bohemia (Lst.IR 6), and Brünn (Lst.IR 25). Consequently, the 
troops of the division were predominately Polish and Czech with some German elements; Lst.IR 
6 was composed entirely of German-speakers, apparently the only such unit of the k.u.k. Armee 
on the Western Front.257      
 The division’s nature as a Landsturm unit, the duration of its posting in the interior, and 
haste with which the AOK deployed it to France all significantly hampered the division’s combat 
capability. Indeed, in its assessment of the division, the XVIII. Korpskommando highlighted the 
inexperience of its personnel, noting that the division “cannot under any circumstances be 
employed as a counterattack division.” 258 The materiel complement of the division was 
especially poor. Unlike the k.u.k. divisions that had preceded it, the 106th Infantry Division did 
not possess a full complement of artillery; the divisional field artillery brigade comprised only 
two batteries upon its arrival in France. On September 14th, the OHL allocated the division to 
Maas-Ost to serve as group reserve in the area of Damvillers – Delut – Brandeville. Maas-Ost 
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divided up the division and deployed the individual regiments to various German formations, 
where they provided labor and security services in rear areas.259 However, on September 19th, 5. 
Armee reformed the division and transferred it southwards to the command of Gruppe Ornes (the 
k.u.k. XVIII. Korpskommando), where the Group promptly re-divided the formation. Gruppe 
Ornes deployed three of the regiments (Lst.IR 6, 31, and 32) to the sectors Azannes, Damloup, 
and Maucourt to act as security detachments in the rear positions of the Volker- and Kriemhild-
Stellungen, thereby freeing up elements of the Group’s German units for frontline service. The 
fourth regiment (Lst.IR 25), the Sturmbataillon, and the field cannon batteries remained under 
the 211. Lst.Infanteriebrigade as group reserve in forest encampments south of Loison.260  
 In the meantime, the divisional command attempted to train the novice Landsturm 
regiments in the combat methods of the Western Front, but constant combat readiness and 
fortification construction seriously impeded the progress of the three deployed regiments. Lst.IR 
25 and the Sturmbataillon had better opportunities to train as group reserve, but the Meuse-
Argonne Offensive rudely interrupted their instruction on September 29th, when 5. Armee 
reassigned both of these units to the 7. Reserve-Division of Gruppe Maas-West. The units 
promptly redeployed to the area around Sivry to fill in the gaps of the frontline there.261 These 
two units were thus the only units of the division to witness heavy combat when they participated 
in the defense of the sector Vilosnes-Liny on October 8-9.262 As previously mentioned, these 
units came under the command of the k.u.k. 1st Infantry Division after it took over the Vilosnes 
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sector on October 16th and participated with their countrymen in the skirmishes there until the 
beginning of November. The three other regiments of the division remained as labor and security 
detachments for Gruppe Ornes and witnessed no combat.263 On October 28th, upon German 
insistence, Gruppe Ornes positioned Lst.IR 6 and 32 on the frontlines of the German 32. and 37. 
Infanterie-Divisionen; initially, the Group planned to deploy the 106th Infantry Division on 
November 1st as “Division Maucourt” with control over the aforementioned regiments.264 
However, the imminent Austro-Hungarian armistice eventually nullified these plans and the 
division withdrew without ever deploying to the front as a whole.265 
 
Austro-Hungarian troops on the Western Front: march through a French village.266 
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Austro-Hungarian troops on the Western Front: speech of a commander upon arrival in 
France.267 
 
The k.u. 37th Honvéd Infantry Division268 
 The 37th Honvéd Infantry Division (k.u. 37. Honvédinfanteriedivision) was unique among 
the Austro-Hungarian formations deployed to France in several respects.269 In contrast to the 
other three divisions, which were either formations of the Common Army or the Landsturm, this 
division was a formation of the Hungarian Honvéd. After the Compromise of 1867 (Ausgleich) 
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that created the Dual Monarchy, the Austro-Hungarian Armed Forces (k.u.k. Wehrmacht) 
consisted of three organizations. The largest and primary element was the Common Army (k.u.k. 
Armee), which conscripted from both halves of the monarchy and was one of the few common 
institutions in Austria-Hungary.270 The Austrian and Hungarian halves of the monarchy both 
possessed their own defense ministries and semi-autonomous armies that are variously described 
as national guards or territorial armies.271 While the Austrian k.k. Landwehr and the Hungarian 
Honvédség were originally conceived as reserve and territorial defense units, they were integral 
parts of the Austro-Hungarian field army by 1914.272 Indeed, the 37th Honvéd Division was a 
fully-fledged infantry division completely on par with. the formations of the k.u.k. Armee. As of 
its arrival in France, the division, under the command of FML Háber, comprised approximately 
488 officers and 15,000 men with a combat strength of around 11,000. The division possessed 
twelve line battalions in four infantry regiments, specifically Honvédinfanterieregimenter 13 and 
18 in the 73. Honvédinfanteriebrigade and HIR 14 and 15 in the 74. Honvédinfanteriebrigade. 
The 37th Honvéd Division also incorporated the 37. Honvédfeldartilleriebrigade, the 5th 
Squadron, Husarenregiment 4 as divisional cavalry, the Sturmbataillon 37, and 1st Company, 
Sappeurbataillon 37. The division’s personnel, drawn from the Preßburg Honvéd district, were 
primarily a mix of Hungarians and Slovaks with some German-speaking elements.273 
 The 37th Honvéd Infantry Division had previously fought on the Eastern Front in Poland, 
Galicia, and in the Carpathians. From mid-August to early September 1918, the division was 
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stationed on the Italian Front, though as it had served as a reserve for the k.u.k. 6. Armee, the 
division had not suffered major losses.  The division arrived on the Western Front between 
September 22nd and 25th and unlike the other Austro-Hungarian divisions in the West, was not 
assigned to Heeresgruppe Gallwitz. Instead, the division was subordinated to Armee-Abteilung A 
of the Heeresgruppe Herzog Albrecht von Württemberg and positioned southwest of Straßburg. 
Under the nominal command of the k.u.k. IX. Korpskommando, the division underwent training 
and received German officers and NCO’s as instructors; at the same time, the divisional artillery 
completely rearmed with German equipment. Later in October, the division moved closer to the 
frontline in the area around Saarburg. Notably, unlike the other k.u.k. divisions in the West, none 
of the Honvéd infantrymen saw combat in France, as the Germans primarily utilized the 
regiments of the 37th Honvéd Division for the construction of field fortifications. Only some of 
the reconnaissance and artillery liaison personnel entered the frontline. The division remained 
under German control in France for a few days longer than the other Austro-Hungarian 
formations, only ceasing its construction work on November 6th.274  
Other Austro-Hungarian Formations and Organizations on the Western Front 
 In July 1918, concomitant with the deployment of the k.u.k. 1st and 35th Infantry 
Divisions, the AOK sent heavy artillery units to the Western Front for the fourth time. Similar to 
the situation in March, the OHL prioritized haste over preparation and insisted on the earliest 
possible arrival of the artillery support. Hence, once again, the k.u.k. artillery destined for France 
did not receive a full period or replenishment. In the last week of July, four heavy field artillery 
regiments departed for France (schwere Feldartillerieregimenter 11. 54, 59, and 72), each 
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consisting of three heavy howitzer batteries and a heavy cannon battery. Four additional batteries 
of heavy howitzers and two observation balloon companies also accompanied these regiments. In 
September, as the 37th Honvéd and 106th Infantry Divisions deployed to the West, the AOK also 
dispatched additional artillery units, specifically one mountain artillery regiment (Gebirgs-
Artillerieregiment 8) and five heavy artillery batteries.275  In total, the AOK deployed forty-eight 
artillery pieces276 to the Western Front in the latter half of 1918, all of which entered the service 
of the 17. Armee of Heeresgruppe Kronprinz Rupprecht. However, this final chapter of the k.u.k. 
heavy artillery in the West was a far cry from the heady days of 1914. Ammunition and 
equipment shortages, incessant breakdowns and lack of repair materials, and insufficient, poorly-
trained crews significantly reduced the combat effectiveness of the Austro-Hungarian artillery 
units. The k.u.k. artillery deployed in July entered combat on August 15th and by August 26th, 
lack of ammunition had compelled all of the batteries to withdraw from the front. Indeed, in the 
remaining months, the Germans could only utilize the k.u.k. artillery for increasingly short 
periods of time before lack of ammunition or the breakdown of the guns mandated their 
replacement. Thus, rather than provide auxiliary firepower for the Germans, the once-vaunted 
Austro-Hungarian artillery could only operate by consuming additional German material. Indeed, 
according to the Austro-Hungarian liaison officer with the 17. Armee, the German authorities 
considered the k.u.k. artillery to be “no reinforcement to the defense, but only a further burden 
for the army.”277 
 As mentioned previously, the AOK dispatched the XVIII. Korpskommando under FML 
Goiginger along with the 1st and 35th Infantry Divisions in July. Goiginger was perhaps one of 
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the ablest Austro-Hungarian field commanders of the entire war and had experienced notable 
success in Italy during the previous year. In June 1917, Goiginger had led the successful 
counterattack that captured Mount Ortigara, during which Austro-Hungarian storm troops seized 
the summit of the mountain from numerically-superior Italian forces.278 Likewise, one year later, 
he had also overseen the Austro-Hungarian capture of the Montello during the Piave 
Offensive.279 Goiginger and his staff arrived in France on July 21st, concurrent with the arrival of 
the 1st and 35th Infantry Divisions. While the AOK may have sent Goiginger and his corps to 
command the k.u.k. divisions deployed to France, the OHL evidently had no intention of 
conceding such a degree of control to the k.u.k. Armee. In fact, the XVIII. Korpskommando 
lacked any tactical or logistical control over the Austro-Hungarian divisions in the West, which 
were subordinate to Goiginger’s corps only in matters of training. Even in this regard, the 
Korpskommando’s authority was short-lived; after August 24th, the divisional training groups 
(Divisionsausbildungsgruppen or DAG) of the 1st and 35th Divisions fell under the direct control 
of 5. Armee and redeployed to the frontline divisions. 280 
 Instead, on August 24th, the XVIII. Korps took over command of the Gruppe Ornes, 
moving its headquarters to Sorbey and receiving control over three German divisions, namely the 
Prussian 33. Infanterie-Division, the Saxon 32. Infanterie-Division, and the Badener 28. Reserve-
Division. Thus, for the most part, the Austro-Hungarian corps in the west commanded German 
rather than Austro-Hungarian troops; only the 106th Infantry Division was subordinate to the 
XVIII. Korps and this control was intermittent in duration and limited in scope. The IX. 
Korpskommando under FML Edler von Manns-Au, dispatched with the 37th Honvéd and 106th 
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Infantry Divisions in September, had even less authority. Stationed in Straßburg, this corps 
possessed a skeleton staff and never even received an area of command. Nevertheless, this corps 
command did play a role in the orderly withdrawal of the nearby and similarly inactive 37th 
Honvéd Division from the Western Front in November.281 
 In addition to sending corps commands to the Western Front, the AOK also established 
several organizations to oversee the logistical affairs of the Austro-Hungarian formations in 
France. In July, the AOK created the k.u.k. Etappenstelle West282 (EstW) to manage the supply of 
the k.u.k. units in the West. In theory, the EstW was in charge of the transportation and 
provisioning of all materiel from the Habsburg Monarchy to its troops in France. This entailed 
the establishment of a headquarters in the West with attendant depots and a main field post 
office, as well as the assignment of an Austro-Hungarian staff officer as a liaison to the German 
quartermaster general. Likewise, the EstW also had control over the personnel matters of the 
Austro-Hungarian units in the West.283 Under the command of Oberquartiermeister Oberst 
Edmund Ritter von Marnegg and headquartered in Sedan, the EstW was also responsible for 
reporting the material condition and requirements of Austro-Hungarian troops to the AOK.284 
Later, the EstW also established an office in Bieberich bei Mainz in Germany.  Interestingly, in 
order to keep the presence of Austro-Hungarian units in France secret from the Allies, Austro-
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Hungarian and German logistical personnel omitted the “k.u.k.” prefix in all official 
communications regarding the EstW.285  
 In addition, the AOK established two offices to manage the allocation of personnel to the 
formations in the West. The Personnel Collection Station West (Personalsammelstelle West or 
PsstW) in Sedan (later Mainz) worked with personnel detachments in the k.u.k. divisions to 
assign and remove personnel; interestingly enough, the office often had to remove Austro-
Hungarian personnel who, for whatever reason, arrived in the West without authorization. 
Similarly, in early September, the AOK erected the Personnel Control Station West 
(Personaldirigierungsstelle West) at the Salzburg railway station to prevent unauthorized 
personnel of the k.u.k. Armee from travelling to the Western Front; eventually, only individuals 
assigned to the units on the Western Front were permitted to travel to Germany.286 Finally, in late 
July, the AOK created an Artillery Replacement Group West (Artillerieersatzgruppe West) of 
approximately 1000 men to manage the training and allocation of replacement artillery personnel 
for the Austro-Hungarian units in France. Under the control of the EstW, the Group established 
its headquarters in Arlon near Sedan and erected training facilities there287 
 According to the last order of battle for the Austro-Hungarian formations on the Western 
Front, published on October 15th, 1918, the total disposition of k.u.k. troops in France was as 
follows: forty-five and ¾ battalions, four cavalry squadrons (400 cavalrymen in total), ninety-six 
artillery batteries (around 360 guns), eight technical formations, and two observation balloon 
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companies. In total, in mid-October, the k.u.k. forces in the West amounted to an effective 
combat strength of approximately 18,000.288 
The Withdrawal of Austro-Hungarian Forces from the Western Front 
 In October 1918, as the soldiers of the k.u.k. 1st and 106th Infantry Divisions faced the 
Franco-American onslaught in the Meuse-Argonne, the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy 
entered its terminal phase. The military debacles in France and Italy during the summer had 
transformed the specter of military defeat into an increasingly-apparent reality. As the position of 
the Austro-Hungarian Army deteriorated into utter hopelessness on all fronts, the last pillar 
maintaining the Habsburg Monarchy gradually collapsed. Given the powerlessness of the k.u.k. 
Armee to achieve a decisive military outcome, the defeat of Germany in the West sealed the fate 
of Austria-Hungary. On September 14th, the Austro-Hungarian government dispatched a peace 
note to the Allies, which they ignored; similarly, an October 3rd appeal for an armistice based on 
the Fourteen Points did not receive a favorable response.289  
Desperate to salvage his fragmenting realm, Emperor Karl issued a “Peoples’ Manifesto” 
on October 16th that reorganized the monarchy into a federal state with complete self-
determination for each nationality.290 However, this concession was years, if not decades, too 
late. By this point, years of war, deprivation, and a curious mix of oppression and incompetence 
on the part of the Habsburg government had completely alienated the peoples of the Monarchy. 
The Czechs and Slovaks, Poles, and South Slavs, all of whom had formed national committees or 
governments by early October, rejected the manifesto outright. Similarly, the Hungarian 
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government refused to concede any autonomy to non-Magyars in Hungary and threatened to cut 
off food shipments to Austria unless the Emperor excluded the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen 
from the manifesto.291 Rather than saving Austria-Hungary, the Peoples’ Manifesto served as its 
death warrant. By officially sanctioning the division of Habsburg Monarchy into national groups, 
the manifesto shattered the already-disintegrating civil service and destroyed any remaining 
legitimacy of the central government. Although Karl attempted to reassert the special bond 
between the army and the crown, the soldiers of the k.u.k. Armee now legally owed their 
allegiance not to the central government, but to their respective nationalities; indeed, on October 
31st, Karl even permitted officers of the army to swear oaths to the new national governments 
springing up throughout the former monarchy.292 Wilson’s October 20th response to the earlier 
peace note, in which he explicitly rejected a peace with anything short of full sovereignty for the 
peoples of Austria-Hungary, was the final nail in the coffin of the Habsburg Monarchy.293  
Thereafter, the long-predicted dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy proceeded at a 
dizzying pace. On October 21st, the German Austrian political parties formed a national 
committee and began to seize control of the government in Austria. In Hungary, the government 
had already unilaterally abrogated the Compromise of 1867 on October 16th. However, on 
October 24th, a Hungarian national committee formed by the radical Mihály Károlyi instigated a 
nationalist revolution in Budapest. After several days of mass demonstrations and clashes with 
security forces, Károlyi seized control of the government, definitively ended the Austro-
Hungarian Compromise, and declared an independent Hungarian republic. Similarly, national 
committees in the other regions of the monarchy, namely in Bohemia, Poland, and the South 
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Slavic lands, also seized power in the last week of October, effecting the de facto dissolution of 
the Habsburg Monarchy. Notably, the Emperor refused to intervene, declaring that “enough 
blood had been spilt.”294 At the same time, the Italians had launched their final offensive at 
Vittorio Veneto on October 24th. After two days of brave resistance, the exhausted, heavily 
outnumbered k.u.k. Armee disintegrated. Troops of every nationality refused to fight and began 
to desert the frontline in droves.295 On October 29th, Alexander von Krobatin, the commander of 
Heeresgruppe Tirol, informed the AOK of the urgent necessity of an unconditional surrender. 
Two days later, an Austro-Hungarian delegation arrived at the Italian headquarters at Villa 
Giusti, where they received the Allied terms of surrender on November 2nd. After much debate, 
confusion, and Karl’s characteristic equivocation, the Austro-Hungarian military signed the 
armistice on November 3rd.296  
On October 29th, after Arz had informed Hindenburg of the collapse of the k.u.k. Armee 
in Italy, the OHL ordered the withdrawal of all Austro-Hungarian units on the Western Front 
from the frontlines. The local German authorities, rather than the AOK, promulgated and 
executed the order and correspondingly began to plan for the transport of the k.u.k. units back to 
the defunct monarchy. Compelled by growing disorder among the Austro-Hungarian personnel, 
the OHL instructed the German railway authorities on October 31st to quickly arrange the 
transport of the k.u.k. troops back to Austria-Hungary.297 However, at the beginning of 
November, a political dispute threatened to quite literally derail the homeward transportation of 
the k.u.k. personnel in the West. The Hungarian government, anxious of Yugoslav and Romanian 
invasions of their territory and resentful that the Germans were holding so many Hungarian 
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soldiers far from their homeland, refused to provide rail transport for the withdrawal of the 
German Alpenkorps from the Balkans. In retaliation, the OHL postponed the evacuation of k.u.k. 
troops from France and only the personal intervention of Arz resolved this dispute on November 
2nd. By November 4th, all Austro-Hungarian divisions in the West had withdrawn from the 
frontlines, though the Germans kept their artillery units in frontline service for slightly longer.298 
Likewise, on that same day, the XVIII. Korpskommando transferred command of Gruppe Ornes 
to the Prussian XVII. Korps and the corps staff departed Sorbey for Arlon.299 Ironically, in 
contrast to arrangements during the actual fighting, the XVIII. Korps received effective control 
over the 1st, 35th, and 106th Infantry Divisions during the evacuation. As the 37th Honvéd 
Division was isolated from the other k.u.k. divisions in Alsace, this division fell under the control 
of the IX. Korpskommando during the transport back to the former Austria-Hungary.300  
Interestingly, in stark contrast to the total disintegration of the k.u.k. Armee on other 
fronts at the end of the war, the evacuation and homeward transportation of the Austro-
Hungarian formations in the West was comparatively well-organized and orderly.301 The 
prevailing chaos in the German rail system in early November precluded the rail transport of the 
Austro-Hungarian troops west of the Rhine. Consequently, the three divisions under the XVIII. 
Korps marched their troops across Alsace-Lorraine, the Saarland, and the Palatinate over the 
course of November, crossing the Rhine itself at Mannheim and Karlsruhe between November 
18th and 24th. Although the formations remained relatively cohesive during the march through 
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Germany, the revolution on November 9th and the influence of revolutionary German soldiers 
exercised a notable and pernicious influence on the discipline of the troops. Likewise, after the 
armistice of Compiègne on November 11th, many Austro-Hungarian soldiers feared internment 
and consequently deserted; over the course of two weeks, over 1200 men from IR 64 absconded, 
nearly half of the regiment.302After the German authorities once again denied them rail 
transportation, the Austro-Hungarians continued their march through Hessen, Baden, and 
Württemberg. Morale and discipline continued to decline, partially on account of a lack of 
adequate footwear. As the Austro-Hungarians travelled to Heilbronn, where they finally received 
rail transportation, theft and looting among the troops proliferated and desertion continued to 
increase.303 Further south, the 37th Honvéd Division had departed the Western Front on 
November 19th and arrived in Ulm five days later. After extended negotiations with the German 
authorities, the division departed in echelons for the Hungarian border via Salzburg.304 
Unlike the 37th Honvéd Division, which returned to Hungary as a coherent whole, the 
other k.u.k. divisions had to make practical adjustments for the new political arrangements of 
central and eastern Europe. On November 4th, the AOK had decreed that the personnel of the 1st, 
35th, and 106th Infantry Divisions, after yielding all weapons and ammunition, would form 
transport groups on the basis of ethnicity and subsequently depart for their respective countries. 
The evacuation from Heilbronn began on November 27th and the last elements of the Austro-
Hungarian divisions had left by December 4th. According to Polatschek, most of the particulars 
regarding the transportation back to the former Austria-Hungary and the subsequent 
demobilization cannot be verified by the existing documents in the Austrian State Archives.305 
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However, in his brief 2009 chapter on the subject, Wolfgang Etschmann asserted that the return 
of k.u.k. troops from the Western Front was a political issue in the new Republic of German 
Austria, where the government feared a coup by returning elements of the old army. The 
Austrian government thus forbade the transportation of the troops through the territory of 
German Austria, instead diverting them to the German-speaking parts of Bohemia. Therefore, 
according to Etschmann, the formations were probably disarmed and disbanded by Czechoslovak 
troops before finally their personnel finally returned to their respective homelands.306 
 
The burial of a fallen Austro-Hungarian soldier in France.307 
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V. Analysis of the Conditions and Performance of the k.u.k. Divisions in France  
 While utterly insignificant in a wider military sense, the Austro-Hungarian presence on 
the Western Front in the latter half of 1918 was noteworthy in several regards. This phenomenon 
constituted the largest participation of k.u.k. units in the West; likewise, the k.u.k. forces in 
France in November 1918 were the last formations of the Habsburg military to fight in the First 
World War. Concurrently, the orderly evacuation and homeward journey of the Austro-
Hungarian divisions in France sharply contrasted with the final days of the k.u.k. Armee in Italy, 
where the Habsburg formations essentially “melted away.”308 Thus, with the possible exception 
of Karl von Pflanzer-Baltin’s army in Albania309, the Austro-Hungarian divisions in the West 
represented the last remnants of the Habsburg Monarchy, which had effectively dissolved even 
while soldiers in France continued to fight and die in its name. However, the Austro-Hungarian 
divisions in France were significant in other ways as well. An examination of these divisions not 
only illuminates the unique experiences of Habsburg troops in a theater of war largely alien to 
the k.u.k. Armee, but also serves as an excellent case study for the late-war Austro-Hungarian 
Army as a whole. In particular, the Austro-Hungarian position on the Western Front exemplifies 
the close, yet complicated Austro-German military relationship, the evolution of the k.u.k. Armee 
into a more modern fighting force, and the ultimately insurmountable difficulties that hamstrung 
its combat effectiveness.   
The Austro-German Military Relationship on the Western Front 
 As previously alluded to, Austro-German military cooperation was certainly nothing 
new; to varying degrees, the Imperial German and k.u.k. Armies had worked together almost 
                                                          
308 Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph, 217. 
309 Ibid., 219.  
Jones 106 
 
since the very beginning of the conflict. As the war escalated and the military strength of the 
Habsburg Monarchy wavered, increasing German intervention in theaters previously dominated 
by Austria-Hungary generated a closer relationship between the two armies. By 1917, many of 
the formations of the Central Powers on the Eastern Front and in the Balkans exhibited a 
surprising degree of integration. Increasing numbers of German officers and NCO’s served in 
k.u.k. units and the OHL often assigned German units to Habsburg formations to strengthen 
important sections of the front. Consequently, many Austro-Hungarian corps and armies on the 
Eastern Front possessed almost as many German as Habsburg troops.310 Thus, the seemingly 
strange position of FML Goiginger and the XVIII. Korps in France was not extremely unusual. 
Likewise, the Austro-Hungarian experience on the Western Front in 1918 typified the 
relationship between the Austro-Hungarian and German militaries in several regards. Indeed, the 
presence of k.u.k. formations under direct German command on a German front is an excellent 
lens for examining an extreme and fairly unique instance of Austro-German military 
cooperation. Specifically, the k.u.k. forces in France in 1918 demonstrated an overwhelming, 
multifaceted dependence on German support and a complicated, ambivalent relationship with 
their German allies. 
 Considering the sorry state of the Austro-Hungarian military, the larger political and 
economic reliance of the Habsburg Monarchy on Germany, and the nature of the Western Front 
as a primarily German affair, it is hardly surprising that the German Army bore much of the 
material cost of maintaining Austro-Hungarian formations in France in 1918. Yet, when 
examining the weekly reports and operations documents of the k.u.k. divisions in the West, the 
                                                          




level of dependence on German supplies and equipment is nevertheless striking. To be sure, the 
AOK and OHL planned on extensive German material support for the k.u.k. divisions from the 
beginning. On July 1st, the two high commands established the basic outlines for the material 
provision of Austro-Hungarian troops in France. As noted previously, these agreements 
established the Etappenstelle West as the Austro-Hungarian logistical apparatus in the West. In 
theory, this organization and the Austro-Hungarian plenipotentiary at the OHL would oversee 
material and personnel matters for the k.u.k. formations in France in cooperation with the 
German authorities. According to the Austro-German arrangements, the EstW was to supply the 
Austro-Hungarian divisions with clothing, footwear, personal equipment for men and horses 
(belts, ammunition pouches, saddles, harnesses, etc.), and specific medical supplies; likewise, the 
EstW was also responsible for the provisioning of special sapper equipment, namely bridging 
material and explosives.311  Moreover, the k.u.k. military postal service (Feldpost) would oversee 
all Austro-Hungarian mail on the Western Front.312 
 Yet, tellingly, the provisions for the supply of the k.u.k. divisions in France stated first 
and foremost that the EstW, and by extension the AOK, would supply items “if possible when 
German stores cannot.” Indeed, even a cursory glance at the document reveals that the Germans 
bore the lion’s share of logistical responsibility. Firstly, while the issue of repayment was still 
unresolved, the July 1st agreements stipulated that Austro-Hungarian troops in the West would 
receive food from German stores at German prices until further notice. Likewise, the Germans 
also were responsible for providing gas masks, firewood, replacement horses, tires and other 
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operating equipment for automobiles, and certain other medical supplies, specifically needles, 
disinfectant, and bandages. In most of these cases, the Austro-Hungarians were not even required 
to reimburse the Germans for the cost of the supplies; moreover the Germans also shouldered the 
cost for the transport and supply of k.u.k units through Germany and German-occupied territory. 
Similarly, the Germans provided workshops for the repair of Austro-Hungarian equipment and 
treated wounded k.u.k. personnel in their hospitals at no cost. However, the burden of logistical 
responsibility also entailed a large degree of German control. According to the aforementioned 
arrangements, much of the materiel supplied remained German property and upon their departure 
from the West, Austro-Hungarian troops would have to surrender that materiel to the German 
authorities. Furthermore, as the k.u.k. Feldpost could not really function on the Western Front 
without the cooperation of German postal and rail authorities, the private correspondence and 
packages of k.u.k personnel were subject to German restrictions; only the so-called 
“Bingesundkarten” 313 and hospital cards were exempt from German moratoria.314 More 
fundamentally, the EstW answered to the German quartermaster general in all matters not 
pertaining exclusively to Austria-Hungary, which of course meant that the EstW was subordinate 
to the Generalquartiermeister in most matters on the German-dominated Western Front.315   
 Although the level of Austro-Hungarian logistical dependence is conspicuous enough in 
these official agreements, the operational histories of the k.u.k. infantry divisions in France 
reveal the true extent of German material support. During the battles of September and October 
1918, all three Austro-Hungarian infantry divisions deployed to the front grew increasingly 
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reliant on German equipment to maintain their combat effectiveness; more specifically, the 
capability of the k.u.k. divisions in modern combat was to a great extent the product of German 
material support. Significantly, each division in the West replaced much of its artillery 
complement with German-made guns. In his September 23rd report to the AOK, FML Metzger 
noted that a total rearmament of the 1. Feldartilleriebrigade with German equipment was 
necessary as the 1st Infantry Division received insufficient ammunition from the EstW. At that 
time, the division had already equipped two batteries with German light howitzers. 316 Two days 
later, the field artillery brigade command provisionally assigned three more batteries to retrain on 
German guns.317 Likewise, after the fighting at St. Mihiel had destroyed or disabled thirty-four of 
its artillery pieces, the 35th Infantry Division reported on September 23rd that efforts were already 
underway to reequip the divisional field artillery regiments with German materiel.318 On October 
3rd, the 106th Infantry Division likewise reported a planned rearmament with German equipment, 
although subsequent events call the success of this rearmament into question.319 The extensive 
rearmament of Austro-Hungarian formations with German artillery was crucial for their 
continued efficacy. By adopting German equipment, the k.u.k. divisions integrated themselves 
further into the German supply chain and ensured that they would receive adequate ammunition 
for their most important weapons. 
 In addition to replacing Austro-Hungarian artillery pieces and thereby partially 
circumventing the inadequate supply system of the k.u.k. Armee, German material support also 
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served to magnify the firepower of the k.u.k. divisions in France. On September 24th, 5. Armee 
ordered the uniform equipment of the k.u.k. division(s) with German Minenwerfer. According to 
this order, each k.u.k. regiment would receive six light Minenwerfer for infantry use and each 
mortar battery would receive eight medium and twelve light Minenwerfer; consequently, each 
Austro-Hungarian regiment would possess as many mortars as its German counterpart. 
Subsequently, by the time it faced the American onslaught on October 8th, the 1st Infantry 
Division possessed no less than thirty-two German light Minenwerfer.320 Similarly, 5. Armee had 
also supplied the 1st Infantry Division with twenty-seven antitank rifles (T-Gewehre) by October 
4th, a measure that was urgently necessary given the great number of tanks utilized by the Allies 
during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.321 Notably, when they first arrived in France, the OHL 
allocated to each division approximately 200 captured British Lewis guns to augment their 
machine-gun complement.322 Considering the fairly low manpower of each division, the supply 
of additional machine guns must have effected quite a significant multiplication of the k.u.k. 
infantry’s firepower. Indeed, after receiving 248 Lewis guns from the German authorities, the 
perennially-understrength 106th Infantry Division reported quixotically that, if the division could 
train enough personnel, it could achieve an establishment of six light MG’s per company, an 
armament level equivalent to a German division.323 
The frequent commandeering of the heavy weapons of departing German formations is 
also indicative of the k.u.k. divisions’ great dependence on German materiel. On several 
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occasions, German units departing Austro-Hungarian divisional sectors left their heavy machine 
guns, mortars, and antitank guns in the frontlines for hours, sometimes even days after the 
Austro-Hungarians took over as to not weaken the local defenses.324 Indeed, on October 8th, one 
of the major problems facing the 1st Infantry Division was an insufficient number of machine 
guns and mortars on parts of the frontlines; contrary to the normal procedure, the departing 
German Füsilier-Regiment 35 had removed its heavy weapons from the positions near 
Brabant.325 Similarly, the prospective use of the 106th Infantry Division on the frontlines near 
Maucourt at the end of October was entirely contingent on use of German materiel left behind in 
the sector.326 In the final weeks of the k.u.k. infantry’s deployment to the West, their reliance on 
German supplies peaked as the Austro-Hungarian logistical apparatus seemingly fell apart. In an 
October 21st report to the AOK concerning the material situation of his division, Metzger noted 
that the 1st Infantry Division was receiving replenishment in uniforms, weapons, and equipment 
mostly from German stocks as “our supply system has broken down.”327 
However, the reliance of the Austro-Hungarian divisions in the West on their German 
allies was not limited to logistical matters. Training was another area in which the k.u.k. units in 
France largely depended on German personnel; this is unsurprising, given that Austro-Hungarian 
infantrymen had no prior experience of fighting on the Western Front. To be sure, German 
influence over training in the k.u.k. Armee long predated the arrival of Austro-Hungarian 
divisions in the West. By 1916, the AOK had recognized the valuable advances made by the 
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Germans in developing new infantry and artillery tactics. Correspondingly, the two armies 
created exchange programs for officers down to company level and erected joint training 
courses; notably, several Habsburg officers attended training programs on the Western Front, 
where they received instruction in German storm-troop tactics.328 Indeed, even as late October 
29th, 1918, the Austro-Hungarian military was still sending officers to the West to familiarize 
themselves with German observation, mapping, and surveying techniques.329 Similarly, the 
revised infantry, artillery, and gas manuals promulgated by the AOK after 1916 were heavily 
reliant on German source material.330  
Still, when the 1st and 35th Infantry Divisions arrived in France in July 1918, the Germans 
considered the k.u.k. units unfit for combat on the Western Front. Therefore, the first two k.u.k. 
divisions received three to four weeks of intensive training at the hands of German instructors in 
German training facilities behind the frontlines. During this period, the exercises focused 
especially on the conditions and tactics particular to the Western Front.331 Likewise, from July to 
September 1918, the k.u.k. divisions in France dispatched around twenty-four artillery officers to 
the German artillery school in Maubeuge to learn the latest German artillery methods.332  
Furthermore, as the field artillery brigades of the Habsburg infantry divisions progressively 
rearmed with German materiel, the k.u.k. artillerymen naturally required German instructors to 
train them in operating the new weapons. Consequently, the Artillerieersatzgruppe West in Arlon 
received one German artillery officer and four to six NCO’s for each of its training batteries.333  
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Notably, even after the initial month-long training period, much of the training of the 
k.u.k. personnel took place in German divisional areas or under German instruction. On August 
28th, Heeresgruppe Gallwitz ordered that the DAG for the 1st and 35th Divisions relocate to the 
area of Gruppe Ornes, where the Austro-Hungarian troops would receive technical training from 
the Group’s German divisions while simultaneously performing construction work.334 Likewise, 
the k.u.k. divisional commands continued to receive tactical guidance from their German 
comrades, which was crucial for combat preparations. For example, the 1st Infantry Division’s 
initial defensive guidelines from September 13th explicitly reference the combat experience of 
neighboring German divisions.335 Similarly, the division’s specific plans for the defense of the 
sector Brabant336, which entailed a vigorous elastic defense concentrated on the HWL, are nearly 
identical to the defensive guidelines of the neighboring 15. Infanterie-Division.337 The 106th 
Infantry Division predictably demonstrated particular reliance on German personnel to instruct 
its largely untrained and inexperienced Landsturm troops. On September 22nd, shortly after the 
division’s arrival in France, 5. Armee ordered the transfer of officers and NCO’s from the 
division to German frontline formations for instruction; simultaneously, the army command also 
established a training course in Florenville for using the Lewis gun.338 In his weekly report of 
September 26th, FML Kratky noted the large number of divisional personnel attending a variety 
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of German training programs. As of that date, seventy-five commissioned and noncommissioned 
officers and 475 other ranks were in German courses covering machine gun and mortar use, 
infantry infiltration tactics, and the use of carrier pigeons and message dogs. Two weeks later, on 
October 10th, around 800 men from the division were attending training of one sort or another, 
including the divisional MG course, the German courses at Sedan, and training assignments with 
German frontline divisions.339  
Perhaps even more fundamentally, the Austro-Hungarian divisions in France relied 
heavily on German formations for tactical support. Just like at the army and corps level on the 
Eastern Front, German units often served as vital auxiliaries to shore up the strength of the k.u.k. 
formations in the West. Thus, in addition to fighting alongside formations of the German Army, 
all of the Austro-Hungarian divisions possessed subordinate German units at one time or another. 
After the heavy losses of St. Mihiel, the 35th Infantry Division received seven German machine-
gun companies as reinforcements in late September.340 Furthermore, during the first week of 
October, the 35th Infantry Division received tactical control over IR 365 of the German 94. 
Infanterie-Division and utilized this German unit to replace its own IR 64 on the frontline. At the 
time, this supplement to divisional strength was likely quite necessary. The division had 
temporarily yielded IR 51, which had left the divisional sector for the neighboring 107. 
Infanterie-Division; likewise, as it was the only regiment largely spared during the St. Mihiel 
Offensive, IR 64 had experienced extensive use in both offensive and defensive actions since 
September 13th and was probably exhausted.341 The 1st Infantry Division also received extensive 
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support from German units during its frontline use. On September 14th, Maas-Ost dispatched a 
German Minenwerfer company to Etraye to reinforce the division. The 1. Infanteriebrigade 
received the medium and heavy mortar batteries to strengthen its artillery allocation and for the 
training of Austro-Hungarian mortar personnel, while the light mortars went to the divisional 
command as a mobile anti-tank reserve.342 Similarly, two weeks later, after the divisional 
command had expressed some doubts regarding the artillery strength of the division, Maas-Ost 
subordinated two battalions of the Bavarian Reserve-Feldartillerieregiment 10 as well as three 
15cm howitzer batteries of Fußartillerie-Abteilung 55 to the divisional artillery brigade.343  
Indeed, during the combat actions of October 8-9, a sizeable and tactically-significant 
proportion of the 1st Infantry Division’s forces consisted of German units. Between 7 and 8:30 
AM on October 8th, just as the Allies attacked the divisional sector, Maas-Ost placed III/Füsilier-
Regiment 35 and IR 102 at the disposal of the divisional command. These units formed a major 
element of the divisional reserve during the early part of the battle and were crucial in GM von 
Hellebronth’s efforts to reestablish a viable defensive line. Likewise, during the counterattacks 
on October 9th, the division command received tactical control over the Saxon 32. Infanterie-
Division and its two regiments. Many of the troops under the command of Oberstleutnant 
Popelka during his heroic stand on Hill 371 were Germans, as were most of the forces involved 
in the counterattack that stabilized the division’s right flank.344 When the battered, depleted 1st 
Infantry Division returned to the frontlines on October 18th, it now incorporated several 
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companies of the German Maschinengewher-Scharfschützen-Abteilung 69345 (Machine gun 
marksman detachment), a significant addition to the firepower of the division.346 Given its great 
deficiencies in equipment, the 106th Infantry Division would have also required significant 
reinforcement with German units if it had deployed to the frontlines. In light of its imminent 
deployment, the division asked Gruppe Ornes on October 22nd for the assignment of additional 
artillery units and repeated this request with even greater urgency two days later. Subsequently, 
Gruppe Ornes allocated five batteries to the division, four of which were German. Nevertheless, 
as the division’s intended deployment to the front approached, the artillery strength of the 
division was still so weak that Gruppe Ornes ordered the artillery of its adjacent German 
divisions to cover large parts of the Maucourt sector.347 
 Hence, given the constant interaction of German and Austro-Hungarian personnel in the 
West on so many levels, the phenomenon of the k.u.k. divisions in France serves as good window 
for viewing the professional relationship between the two armies.  FML von Podhoránsky of the 
35th Infantry Division probably provided the best summary of the situation, noting that “the 
relationship with the German troops and commands is not an easy one, although tact is exercised 
on both sides.”348 Much like the wider chronicle of the Dual Alliance in the First World War, 
Austro-German relations on the Western Front were close yet profoundly ambivalent. In 
analyzing the relationship between the Austro-Hungarian and German armies in France, one 
must firstly distinguish between lower and higher-level relations. In general, relations between 
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the Habsburg and German soldiery deteriorated from initial amicability to palpable resentment, 
with interactions noticeably worsening in the last few weeks of the war.349 To be sure, both 
armies made efforts to achieve harmonious and efficient cooperation between the troops. 
Schilanek noted that the authorities of Armee-Abteilung C circulated makeshift pamphlets 
explaining Austro-Hungarian and German rank insignia to facilitate communication between the 
personnel of the two armies. Likewise, both Habsburg and German authorities strictly enforced 
the reciprocal obligation to salute properly.350 Yet, the futility of Austro-German resistance 
against the Allies by the autumn of 1918 was well-known among German troops; many German 
soldiers, exhausted by months of heavy fighting and desperate for peace, unsurprisingly did not 
view the Austro-Hungarian intervention in the West positively. In an October 23rd statement to 
the 1. Infanteriebrigade, the commander of FJB 25 reported the outright hostility of some 
German troops towards the Feldjäger. These German soldiers expressed frustration and 
bewilderment at the presence of Austro-Hungarian troops in the West, asking the Czech 
infantrymen “why are you here?” and “why are you prolonging the war?”351 For their part, many 
Austro-Hungarian soldiers, particularly Hungarians, seem to have shared this exact sentiment, 
resenting their exile “in servitude to a foreign power.”352 
 Relations between Austro-Hungarian and German command authorities, while better-
documented, are similarly complicated. On one hand, many of the interactions between 
Habsburg and German officers exhibited a significant degree of cordiality, mutual respect, and 
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productivity. Given the direct subordination of k.u.k. units to the German Army in the West, 
harmonious relations between the two officer corps were of practical necessity, particularly since 
both the command staffs and the troop bodies of the k.u.k. formations contained a large number 
of German personnel. For example, the XVIII. Korpskommando under Goiginger not only 
commanded mostly German units, but also possessed a fair number of German staff officers; 
eight of the officers on Goiginger’s corps staff were Germans.353  
One of these German officers, the Prussian Oberleutnant von Proeck, made such a positive 
impression on the Korpskommando that upon his departure, Goiginger issued a formal farewell 
on behalf of the entire Austro-Hungarian corps staff. Hailing the departing ordnance officer as a 
“dutiful coworker, tactful liaison, and a beloved comrade,” Goiginger asserted that the Habsburg 
officers “would maintain a lasting, hearty, and comradely sentiment…for this young and 
promising officer.”354 Schilanek also described positive relations between the staff of the 35th 
Infantry Division and its German counterparts. Upon the arrival of the 35th Infantry Division in 
France, the chief of staff of Armee-Abteilung C took great interest in the organization, armament, 
and material condition of the k.u.k. troops, asserting the vital necessity of a good understanding 
between German and Austro-Hungarian troops. Similarly, Schilanek described the German 
liaison officer for the division, the Bavarian general staff officer Major Graf Berchem, as a 
“loyal and valued advisor” who advocated for the division’s interests to the German authorities. 
                                                          
353 Anlage 432, Folder III: 18th Austrian Corps (Ornes) Annexes to War Diary, Box 2, Austro-Hungarian Military 
Records Relating to World War I. 
354 Anlage 560, 1.11.1918, Folder III: 18th Austrian Corps (Ornes) Annexes to War Diary, Box 2, Austro-Hungarian 
Military Records Relating to World War I. 
Jones 119 
 
Moreover, Berchem went far beyond his responsibilities as a liaison when he personally 
performed staff work for the division at the front.355 
 Certain Austro-Hungarian officers likewise endeared themselves to the Germans while on 
the Western Front. Goiginger in particular seems to have earned the esteem of the German 
authorities in the West. On November 5th, after the XVIII. Korpskommando transferred 
command over Gruppe Ornes, Goiginger met with Gallwitz at his headquarters before departing 
France. According to Gallwitz’s memoirs, the Austrian expressed deep regret and distress over 
Austria-Hungary’s “abandonment” of its ally. In turn, Gallwitz wrote in his diary that “one must 
have a special sympathy for this brave old Austrian officer.”356 The Germans did occasionally 
praise the bravery and martial spirit of the Austro-Hungarian troops in the West and commend 
their combat actions in France, as shown by the German reports of September 13th and October 
10-11.357 Hindenburg, after the arrival of the 1st and 35th Infantry Divisions in July, noted the 
unsuitability of the k.u.k. formations for frontline service and felt that the poor quality of these 
divisions reflected the sorry state of the k.u.k. Armee as a whole; nevertheless, Hindenburg 
asserted that the Habsburg officers and soldiers were as a whole willing, hardworking, and fairly 
capable.358 Eduard von Below, the commander of V. Korps (Gruppe Combres), described the 
troops of the 35th Infantry Division to be “sturdy” upon his inspection of the formation.359 
Similarly, Gallwitz was impressed by the infantrymen and staff officers of the 1st Infantry 
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Division after visiting the Austro-Hungarian units at the front; furthermore, German reports after 
the combat actions of October 8-10 praised the leadership of Metzger and Hellebronth.360 
 Yet, a fair degree of antipathy and condescension remained in the attitude of the German 
officer corps towards its Austro-Hungarian counterparts on the Western Front. The German 
reports on the actions of the 1st Infantry Division strongly criticized the Austro-Hungarian 
artillery as “too slow and clumsy” while simultaneously maintaining that the junior officers and 
NCO’s of the division had “utterly failed.”361  Understandably, the German authorities in the 
West universally denigrated the quality of the 106th Infantry Division, which Gallwitz 
characterized as “quite untrained” and “virtually sans-culottes in their clothing.”  For his part, 
Hindenburg seriously doubted that the Landsturm infantry would fight at all.362 Unsurprisingly, 
perhaps the harshest criticism of the Austro-Hungarian troops on the Western Front came from 
Ludendorff. In his memoir, he described the 35th Infantry Division as “a k.u.k. division on the 
Combres Heights that should have performed better,” a remark that reportedly infuriated FML 
von Podhoránsky.363 The Austro-Hungarian leadership in France also expressed a degree of 
resentment towards their German allies. German disdain for the combat capabilities of the 
Habsburg military did not go unnoticed. In late October, Podhoránsky reported that some of the 
35th Infantry Division’s officers were unhappy about the Germans’ use of the division as rear-
line labor, which was likely interpreted as a slight by the honor-conscious Habsburg officer 
corps.364 Indeed, when the German authorities removed the k.u.k. divisions to rear areas at the 
beginning of November and proposed their use in constructing field fortifications, the officers of 
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IR 63 submitted a written petition to the XVIII. Korpskommando, decrying such a utilization as  
“prisoner work” (Gefangenenarbeiten). 365 
 Nevertheless, it was the seemingly cavalier manner in which the German command 
authorities utilized the k.u.k. units that created the greatest tension between Austro-Hungarian 
and German leadership on the Western Front. The constant state of emergency in the German 
Army during the desperate fighting of the final weeks of the First World War resulted in many 
units, both German and Austro-Hungarian, remaining in near-continuous use on the frontlines. 
Likewise, German commanders often had to shuffle individual units around the front to plug 
gaps in the lines or reinforce especially tenuous sectors. Thus, on several occasions, k.u.k. units 
found themselves separated from their parent formations and dispatched to a neighboring 
German division, where they would fight continuously until they became too depleted to offer 
effective resistance.  
Examples of this phenomenon litter the chronicles of the k.u.k. divisions in France. One 
notable instance occurred with the Feldjägerbataillone of the 1st Infantry Division. The 
Feldjäger constituted some of the division’s best infantry and had made a favorable impression 
on Gallwitz during his inspection; consequently, the Germans combined the Feldjägerbataillone 
into an ad-hoc regiment under Oberstleutnant Marschan and removed them from the control of 
the division. Maas-Ost subordinated the “Jägerregiment Marschan” to the badly-depleted 
German 15. Infanterie-Division in a neighboring sector, where the Feldjäger remained until 
several days after the 1st Infantry Division had withdrawn from the frontlines. The removal such 
a significant part of the division’s infantry forces and its subsequent mauling while under 
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German command enraged Metzger, who complained bitterly to Gallwitz.366 Later, the 
circumstances surrounding the withdrawal of Gruppe Maas-West on the division’s right flank 
also seemingly indicated German highhandedness in their dealings with their Habsburg allies. 
On October 18th, the German liaison officer to the divisional command informed Metzger that 
Maas-West intended to withdraw north of Brieulles without fighting in the case of a renewed 
American attack. As shown in the divisional report of October 21st, Metzger was dumbfounded 
that the German authorities had hitherto failed to inform him of this plan, given that this 
withdrawal would affect the position of the 1st Infantry Division considerably.367 If the divisions 
of Maas-West withdrew, the frontline of the already-overstretched division would double to 
nearly eleven kilometers and both flanks of the divisional sector would be exposed to enemy 
attack. As he had just submitted reports to Maas-Ost detailing the weak combat strength of the 
division, Metzger was particularly vexed by the German failure to communicate.368  
The case of Sturmbataillon 106 is another prime example of the tensions regarding the 
German treatment of k.u.k. units. As previously mentioned, StBaon 106 and Lst.IR 25 were 
transferred to the 7. Reserve-Division of Gruppe Maas-Ost on September 29th and inserted onto 
the frontlines between Sivry and Brieulles. Initially, the continued command of these units by the 
211. Landsturm-Infanteriebrigade made this transfer slightly more palatable for the command of 
the 106th Infantry Division. However, on September 30th, Maas-West removed the Landsturm 
brigade command and subordinated the k.u.k. regiments to a newly-arrived German brigade; in 
its report of October 3rd, the divisional command noted resentfully that this “unoriented” German 
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brigade now had command over four Austro-Hungarian battalions.369 Apparently, the precedents 
of the 1st Infantry Division’s Feldjägerbataillone and the 106th Infantry Division’s Lst.IR 25 and 
StBaon 106 were not lost on the Austro-Hungarian authorities in the West. In a memorandum of 
October 10th, FML Goiginger elected to keep the other three Landsturm regiments as rear-line 
security and labor detachments, fearing that the total withdrawal of the regiments would induce 
the Germans to shunt them off to a different sector of the front.370 
 On October 19th, 5. Armee ordered Gruppe Ornes to deploy the 106th Infantry Division to 
the frontlines. The division was still extremely understrength at the time. Only two of the 
division’s three regiments were considered combat ready (only after a further eight to twelve 
days and even then, only on a quiet sector of the front); moreover, the division lacked adequate 
artillery and had not yet received German Minenwerfer. Thus, on October 20th, the XVIII. 
Korpskommando indicated to 5. Armee that a return of StBaon 106 and Lst.IR 25 would be 
desirable for the prospective deployment. 5. Armee’s response, transmitted that same day, was 
ambiguous. While the army seemingly approved Gruppe Ornes’ request, the Germans asserted 
that the immediate redeployment of StBaon 106 was impossible, as it was an indispensable 
element supporting the “hardly battleworthy” troops of the 1st Infantry Division. 5. Armee would 
thus do nothing other than order the 1st Infantry Division to only employ StBaon 106 as a 
reserve.371 Five days later, Gruppe Ornes relayed the renewed request of the 106th Infantry 
Division for the return of StBaon 106. The divisional command reported the heavy losses 
suffered by the Sturmbataillon during its near-continuous combat use, noting the incapacitation 
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of the entire battalion staff by gas on October 23rd and that the Sturmbataillon had already lost 
half of its strength by October 10th; correspondingly, the division feared the complete destruction 
of its best combat troops. Notably, the division informed the German authorities that “the 
permanent retention of the battalion at the front is not permissible under k.u.k. regulations” and 
thereby requested the removal of the battalion as soon as possible. Gruppe Ornes naturally 
concurred with the division and recommended the soonest possible reunion of StBaon 106 with 
its parent division. Interestingly, 5. Armee had already ordered Maas-Ost to return the 
Sturmbataillon, but the Group ignored the order.372 In the end, Maas-Ost did not order the 
replacement of StBaon 106 until November 1st and even then, the Group planned to withhold the 
battalion as a reserve for the 1st Infantry Division until November 4th.373 
The Combat Effectiveness of the Austro-Hungarian Divisions in France 
 Like the armies of the other belligerents, the Austro-Hungarian Army evolved 
considerably over the course of the First World War. The experience of modern warfare on 
multiple fronts wrought sweeping changes in the organization, equipment, and tactics of the 
k.u.k. Armee; likewise, the massive demands of total war on the manpower and resources of 
Austria-Hungary profoundly altered the size, composition, and effectiveness of the Habsburg 
military. The Austro-Hungarian divisions on the Western Front exemplified the wartime 
transformation of the k.u.k. Armee from a small, poorly-equipped, tactically-backward army of 
professional soldiers into a large conscript force with vastly-increased firepower and modern 
infantry and artillery tactics. However, the experience of the k.u.k. troops in France also revealed 
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the major weaknesses of the late-war Habsburg military, particularly the pervasive shortages of 
men and materiel. Hence, combat against vastly-superior French and American forces on the 
Western Front, a theater of war for which the k.u.k. infantry were fundamentally unprepared, 
mercilessly exposed the shortcomings of the Austro-Hungarian Army in 1918.  
 One obvious way in which the k.u.k. divisions in the West demonstrated the 
modernization of the Austro-Hungarian military was in their organization and equipment. In 
terms of structure, all of the divisions in the West reflected the final organizational reforms of the 
k.u.k. Armee, which had begun in October 1917. The new regulations stipulated infantry 
divisions of four infantry regiments; a regiment now consisted of three battalions (I-III), each of 
which contained four companies374. The reduction of infantry regiments from four battalions to 
three served to facilitate easier command and control and permit the formation of new units with 
the extraneous battalions; IR 112 of the 1st Infantry Division was one of these “new” regiments, 
comprising former battalions of IR 71 and IR 72.375 Each infantry company numbered around 
250 men, and thus each infantry regiment totaled about 3000 men of all ranks. A 
Feldjägerbataillon consisted of 1100 men of all ranks in four companies.376 In addition to the 
reorganization of the line infantry, the reforms also stipulated the expansion of specialist infantry 
units within k.u.k. infantry divisions, which reflected the army’s growing emphasis on modern, 
small-unit infiltration tactics. As of 1918, each division was to possess a dedicated sapper 
battalion and a Sturmbataillon originally comprised of the handpicked assault companies of each 
infantry regiment. An Austro-Hungarian Sturmbataillon consisted of four infantry companies, 
one machine-gun company, a close-support artillery company, a mortar company, and a 
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flamethrower company; totaling 800-1000 men, the Sturmbataillon not only formed the elite 
assault infantry of a division, but also served to train the rest of the infantry in modern infiltration 
and close-combat tactics.377 In total, an Austro-Hungarian infantry division in 1918 had an 
authorized rifle strength378of 11,567.379  
 The organization of the k.u.k. divisions in the West corresponded to the realities of the 
Austro-Hungarian military in late 1918. On one hand, they largely reflected the results of the 
modernizing reforms of 1917-1918. As previously seen, each division possessed four infantry 
regiments of three battalions each (the 1st Infantry Division had three Feldjägerbataillone in 
place of a fourth infantry regiment). All of the divisions likewise had a divisional Sturmbataillon 
and included a number of special technical formations, from sapper and flamethrower units to 
communications (mostly field telephone and telegraph) and searchlight sections. However, at the 
same time, the composition of the Austro-Hungarian formations in France also demonstrated the 
immense manpower shortages facing the Monarchy by late 1918. Despite the influx of millions 
of former POW’s after the Peace of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 and the reduction of 
exemptions from conscription, the replacement apparatus of the k.u.k. Armee was already in 
critical condition at the beginning of the year. By January 1918, seventy percent of all men 
eligible for the draft in Austria-Hungary had already been drafted.380 The political and economic 
situation of the Monarchy also sapped the strength of the field army. The AOK had to keep well 
over a million troops in the interior of the Monarchy both to man vital war industries and to 
maintain security in the face of growing anarchy; by October 1918, an estimated 1.7 million 
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soldiers (out of a total of 4,269,000) were stationed in the interior. Likewise, shortages of horses 
constrained the size of artillery and logistical units.381 Correspondingly, the actual strength of 
k.u.k. formations declined and deviated significantly from the authorized number. In 1918, the 
proscribed ration and rifle strengths of an infantry battalion were 1275 and 832 respectively; 
when fully equipped with light machine guns, these numbers decreased to 1207 and 628. Despite 
the proscribed divisional rifle strength of 11,600, most divisions possessed only 8000, 6000, or 
even 5000 riflemen.382 For example, on September 10th, even before the division experienced 
combat, the 1st Infantry Division was well below the official establishment.383 The average 
overall strength of the infantry regiments was only 2088 men and 101 officers; the largest 
individual battalion (III/IR 61) possessed only 541 men and 22 officers. The average strength of 
the three Feldjägerbataillone was 640 men and 83 officers, while StBaon 1 had only 500 men 
and 19 officers.384 
 Consequently, the Austro-Hungarian divisions in the West demonstrated the attempt by 
the Habsburg military to compensate for reduced manpower with increased firepower. This trend 
was common to all of the armies of the Great War but was particularly significant for the k.u.k. 
Armee. One of the most striking features of this magnification of divisional firepower was the 
tremendous increase in the quantity of artillery allocated to each division. In 1914, the k.u.k. 
Armee possessed an average of only forty-two artillery pieces per infantry division, one of the 
lowest among the armies of the major powers. In contrast, the average artillery strength of an 
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Austro-Hungarian division in 1918 was seventy-six.385 Not only had the proscribed artillery 
strength of a division risen substantially, but the composition of the divisional artillery brigade 
had changed, now comprising a larger variety of more modern artillery pieces. In 1918, an 
Austro-Hungarian artillery brigade consisted of three artillery regiments: two field artillery 
regiments, both of which now included howitzers, cannons, antiaircraft guns, and mortars, and 
one heavy field artillery regiment. In total, the field artillery brigade comprised on paper around 
100 guns, including field cannons, howitzers, heavy howitzers, heavy cannons, mountain guns, 
antiaircraft guns, and mortars.386  
Indeed, while understrength according to the official proscription, the 1. 
Feldartillerbrigade of the 1st Infantry Division possessed a formidable array of artillery pieces 
upon its arrival in the West. On September 13th, the division had an overall artillery strength of 
eighty-eight guns, specifically sixteen field cannons, twenty-eight field howitzers, eight 
mountain cannons, four mountain howitzers, twenty heavy howitzers, and twelve additional 
heavy guns387 of the German Landwehr-Artillerie Regiment 68.388 Though possessing few 
dedicated antitank implements, the k.u.k. divisions in France increasingly utilized Austro-
Hungarian artillery pieces as close-support and antitank weapons after rearming with German 
materiel.389 Similarly, late-war k.u.k divisions also incorporated a far greater number and variety 
of infantry weapons. In addition to increased numbers of mortars and infantry support guns, 
Habsburg divisions possessed four times as many machine guns in 1918 as they had in 1914, 
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including both heavy390 and light machine guns.391 The k.u.k. divisions in France had fairly large 
numbers of machine guns at their disposal, particularly considering their low manpower; on 
October 23rd, even after the heavy losses of the previous weeks, the 1st Infantry Division still 
possessed ninety-three machine guns of all types for approximately 2300 combat troops.392  
 Although the Austro-Hungarian Army of 1918 had adapted significantly to the demands 
of modern warfare in terms of organization, equipment, and tactics, several weaknesses critically 
undermined the performance of the k.u.k. divisions in France. First and foremost, the Austro-
Hungarian forces simply did not possess sufficient men and materiel to face the Allied 
juggernaut in the West. In its defensive preparations for sector Brabant, the command of the 1st 
Infantry Division noted that the division did not possess enough artillery to provide adequate 
support for the eight-kilometer HWL. Unlike in Italy, where the terrain often significantly 
restricted the avenues of attack, the Allied forces in the Meuse-Argonne could and did attack 
along the entire divisional frontline. With only eighty-eight guns available, of which four 
batteries had to remain in reserve, the division could not achieve the minimum desired 
concentration of one gun per 100 meters; one gun for every 125 meters of front was the absolute 
best case scenario. Even in this best case scenario, a mere eight guns would remain for tank 
defense and the mobile support of counterattacks, which were vital tasks for Western Front 
combat in 1918.393 The division similarly possessed insufficient manpower for a proper defense-
in-depth of their sector. While Metzger and his staff planned for defensive operations by the 
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forward companies in the outpost zone, they acknowledged that the low levels of manpower and 
training among the division’s units precluded an active, elastic defense. Consequently, the 
divisional command forbade a prolonged forward defense, instead emphasizing that all units 
should prioritize holding the HWL at all costs. Thus, rather than creating a system of multiple 
echelons and defeating an enemy attack in front of the key defensive position, the 1st Infantry 
Division ordered its forward units to hold the machine gun nests immediately in front of the 
frontline and delay the enemy advance long enough for the division to place all of its reserves in 
the HWL.394 While this plan may have made the most of adverse circumstances, it was 
nevertheless wholly inadequate to stave off the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. The Americans 
possessed a three to one advantage in infantry and had concentrated 156 artillery pieces for every 
mile of the front (around ninety-seven per kilometer); the sheer weight of men and firepower was 
enough to overwhelm the Austro-German forces.395 
 The reliance of the Austro-Hungarian formations in France on German logistical and 
tactical support stemmed from the inability of the AOK to provide its divisions with sufficient 
supplies or reinforcements. Consequently, despite German assistance, the 1st and 35th Infantry 
Divisions could not fully restore their combat strength after the initial battles; likewise, the 106th 
Infantry Division could not constitute battleworthy units from the majority of its personnel. On 
October 12th, after the heavy losses of the preceding days, the 1st Infantry Division requested the 
allocation of additional reinforcements. However, the DAG 1 could only provide 200 
replacements (to replace total losses of approximately 5779 dead, wounded, and missing396 for 1-
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10 October)397 and informed Metzger that no further trained replacements would be available 
until mid-November. Moreover, the AOK indicated to Metzger on that same day that there were 
no reinforcements available for the division at all.398 Significantly, losses among specialist 
personnel were almost irreplaceable. When the field telephone platoon attached to the 
Jägerregiment Marschan requested replacements for the thirty-nine telephonists and signals 
troops lost during the actions of October 8-13, the divisional command replied that such a 
replacement was impossible.  
The k.u.k. divisions in the West also suffered from a chronic lack of Austro-Hungarian 
weapons and equipment, which German assistance could not entirely ameliorate. On October 
14th, the 1st Infantry Division reported severe shortages in ammunition and equipment for 
Austrian-made small arms and machine guns; two days later, the division informed Maas-Ost 
that a total lack of belted ammunition had rendered all of their Schwarzlose heavy machine guns 
inoperable. Although the division faced less serious shortages in Lewis ammunition, a deficiency 
in magazines for this weapon similarly exercised a baneful effect.399 Moreover, even though the 
hundreds of Lewis guns supplied to the k.u.k. units by the OHL formed a significant proportion 
of the divisions’ machine gun complement, the utility of these weapons for the Austro-Hungarian 
troops was limited. The soldiers of the 1st Infantry division complained of reliability issues, the 
limited capacity of the magazines, and deficient training in the use of the Lewis gun and 
consequently had little confidence in the weapons.400 Humorously, the Americans of the 33rd 
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Division, themselves lacking confidence in the French-supplied Chauchat, happily relieved 
captured k.u.k. troops of their Lewis guns upon the seizure of Consenvoye on October 8th.401  
 The particular conditions in the West also constrained the combat effectiveness of the 
Austro-Hungarian formations there. For one, the necessity of performing non-combat duties 
exacerbated the already-strained manpower situation of the k.u.k. divisions. The low strength of 
the Austro-Hungarian units made adequate fortifications all the more important, but construction 
work simultaneously further compromised the frontline strength of the combat units. On October 
3rd, as the division hurriedly prepared to meet the imminent Franco-American assault, the 2. 
Infanteriebrigade reported not only that the units assigned to fortification work were insufficient, 
but also that the German removal of k.u.k. units for construction behind the HWL critically 
undermined the brigade’s defensive preparations at the frontline. The brigade command noted 
that not a single man could be spared for construction work behind the lines, as all forces were 
needed to both improve and defend the frontline.402  
Removal of troops for training also reduced the effective frontline strength of the 
divisions. After highlighting the great number of men from the division attending German 
training courses, FML Kratky asserted that such departures caused the combat strength of the 
106th Infantry Division to sink substantially below authorized levels.403 Yet, at the same time, the 
k.u.k. troops in France did not receive adequate training in the combat methods of the Western 
Front. According to Schilanek, the majority of the troops of the 35th Infantry Division did not 
master the latest German small-unit tactics; the brevity of the initial training period and the 
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contrast with the methods usually employed by the k.u.k. Armee in Italy resulted in a superficial 
grasp of the German tactics. Accustomed to holding defensive lines in dense concentrations 
under the close supervision of officers, most of  the Austro-Hungarian rank-and-file were not 
well-suited to mobile, decentralized infiltration tactics.404 Likewise, IR 5 of the 1st Infantry 
Division reported that the majority of its replacements had received only eight to twelve weeks 
of training and consequently had very limited knowledge of infantry combat techniques; one 
third of the replacements had never even thrown a hand grenade.405 Moreover, the constant state 
of emergency on the frontlines impeded the adequate training of Austro-Hungarian personnel. 
The rearmament of the k.u.k. artillery formations with German equipment was difficult to 
execute, as the divisions often could spare neither the personnel nor the guns from frontline duty; 
the 1. Feldartillerbrigade experienced this at the beginning of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, 
when the division had to remove its batteries from training and reposition them at the front.406 
Similarly, the Lst.IR 6, 31, and 32 of the 106th Infantry Division experienced repeated 
interruptions of their training exercises when they were stationed as rear-line security and labor 
units. Up to October 10th, multiple march alerts, the detachment of large elements for labor 
duties, and inspections resulted in the average completion of only one day of training (out of 
twelve possible days) by each battalion.407  
 Thus, the majority of the Austro-Hungarian troops on the Western Front, especially the 
replacements that arrived at the divisional training centers, were not particularly adept in 
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advanced infantry tactics. Most of the line infantry were sufficient for manning static defense 
lines and performing security and labor duties but were unable to succeed in complicated small-
unit actions such as patrols in the outpost zone or counterattacks. Indeed, the Austro-Hungarian 
experience in France exemplifies the prevailing differentiation among the k.u.k. infantry in the 
final years of the Great War. By 1917, Austro-Hungarian formations consisted of two main 
groups: younger, physically-fit, and better-trained shock troops and generally older, less fit 
soldiers in defensive and support roles.408 Hence, the k.u.k. units in the West that experienced the 
most intense combat and had the most success were the Sturmbataillone, inherently the best-
trained and equipped troops of the divisions, the similarly well-equipped and specially-trained 
sappers, and the younger, more experienced soldiers of the infantry regiments. For example, the 
troops of Oberstleutnant Popelka’s IR 5, notable for their adept defense of Hill 371, were 
overwhelmingly young; eighty percent of the regiment’s troops were younger than twenty, while 
the remaining twenty percent were mostly under thirty. After the heavy fighting of early October, 
eighty-five percent of the regiment were undernourished, poorly-trained new recruits; however, 
Popelka described the veteran fifteen percent as experienced, well-trained, physically-strong, and 
highly-motivated.409  
 As previously recounted, these small, elite elements of the k.u.k. infantry performed the 
most dangerous and demanding tasks of the battles of September and October. Nevertheless, 
although the “shock” detachments were successful in many small-unit actions, a few successful 
patrols, a temporarily successful counterattack, or the infliction of heavy losses on the enemy 
could not achieve any significant, long-term success. Correspondingly, the patrol operations of 
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the 1st Infantry Division in late September highlight not only the most modern aspects of the 
k.u.k. Armee, but also its major shortcomings in the West. On September 17th, Maas-Ost ordered 
the division to undertake major patrol operations in front of sector Brabant for the purpose of 
acquiring enemy prisoners; anticipating a major enemy attack, the German authorities wanted to 
ascertain the Allied position and intentions in the sector.410 Consequently, all of the frontline 
battalions executed assault patrols of varying scope from September 22nd until the beginning of 
the major Allied attack on the divisional sector. The stormtroop operation of September 22nd was 
one of the more successful operations, even though it did not actually yield any prisoners. 
Beginning at 4:30 AM, a small group of handpicked volunteers from IR 5 conducted a 
reconnaissance-in-force in the outpost zone of the regimental subsector. Fifty-five infantrymen 
advanced on an enemy-occupied trench, supported by eight pioneers, three batteries of artillery, 
and auxiliary labor and medical troops. The artillery provided a creeping barrage (Feuerwalze) to 
cover the advance of the assault patrols, subsequently switching to a box barrage to isolate the 
enemy position during the attack of the regimental Sturmtruppen. The Austro-Hungarian assault 
troops infiltrated the position, destroyed the enemy shelters with grenades, and retreated under 
the cover of smoke.411  
 On one hand, this operation demonstrated the proficiency of certain k.u.k. units in modern 
artillery and small-unit tactics. The action of September 22nd involved close combined-arms 
coordination, complex artillery and infiltration techniques, and the use of specialized equipment, 
namely different types of grenades, obstacle-clearing implements, searchlights, field telephones, 
and light signals. Likewise, the operation showed that a portion of the Austro-Hungarian infantry 
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in the West were skilled and motivated enough to undertake some degree of offensive action; 
Oberstleutnant Popelka remarked that these line infantrymen had shown themselves to be the 
equivalent of the Sturmbataillon. A subsequent assault patrol by two storm platoons of 
Feldjägerbataillone 17 and 25 on the evening of October 2nd was even more successful. The 
Feldjäger enveloped a French position and stormed the trench with grenades, killing fifteen 
French soldiers and capturing three Frenchmen and a cache of French wine.412   
However, at the same time, the September 22nd operation and subsequent stormtroop 
actions also showed that the division did not really possess the capability for large-scale, 
sustained operations. The artillery allocated for the operation was insufficient in quantity and 
failed to achieve a sufficient degree of coordination with the infantry assault; most importantly, 
the cordoning barrage was too late to prevent the withdrawal of enemy troops from the targeted 
position. Moreover, enemy troops reoccupied the position immediately after the Austro-
Hungarians returned to their lines.413 The next day, after the regimental commanders had 
proposed a major stormtroop operation, the artillery brigade commander pointed out that the 
artillery lacked the guns and the ammunition for any large-scale penetration of the enemy 
frontline.414 Subsequent operations were limited in scale and mixed in results. Two patrol 
operations of IR 61 on October 4th were spectacular and costly failures; even if their tactics were 
relatively advanced, the Austro-Hungarian assault troops lacked the numbers and firepower to 
overcome significant enemy resistance.415  
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The Material Conditions and Discipline of the k.u.k. Troops in the West 
 Just like all of the other belligerents, the Austro-Hungarian formations in France 
experienced fairly heavy losses during the last two months of the First World War. According to 
the official statistics, the 1st, 35th, and 106th Infantry Divisions suffered a total of 19,295 
casualties on the Western Front, including 779 dead, 2139 wounded, 10,974 sick416, and 5403 
missing and captured.417 According to Polatschek, the largest number of casualties stemmed 
from either gassing or capture.418 The great number of missing/captured troops, the second 
largest source of losses, is particularly intriguing. Given the contemporary national tensions in 
Austria-Hungary and the pervasiveness of desertion in the Habsburg military in 1918, one might 
conclude that large numbers of Austro-Hungarian soldiers, alienated from the Habsburg cause 
and fighting far away from their homelands, simply deserted to the Allies. While signs of war 
weariness, discontent, and slackening discipline are ubiquitous in the weekly reports and 
operations documents of the k.u.k. divisions in France, there are no indications of widespread 
nationalist discontent among the Austro-Hungarian personnel in the West.419 Instead, these 
documents show that the horrible material conditions on the Western Front, combined with 
exhaustion from incessant combat, were the primary factor behind morale issues among the 
Habsburg troops.  
  In addition to fighting a hopeless battle against the full might of the Allied armies, 
Habsburg soldiers also had to endure severe material deprivation during their time in France. 
Although the material situation of the k.u.k. divisions in the West was initially favorable, 
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particularly in comparison to their recent experiences in Italy, logistical support for these 
formations declined swiftly and significantly over the course of September and October. One 
recurring and particularly serious issue was the inadequate provision of clothing. Weeks of living 
on or near the frontlines, exposed to the elements and enemy fire, naturally took its toll on the 
uniforms of the troops. On October 21st, after extended service on the frontlines (even longer 
than the division itself), the 1. Feldartilleriebrigade noted that the condition of the troops’ 
clothing was terrible, especially the pants and field blouses; allotments from divisional stores 
only partly covered the needs for replacements.420 Likewise, in a materiel report to the AOK on 
that same day, Metzger emphasized the poor condition of and lack of replacements for all types 
of clothing as one of the chief impediments to the combat effectiveness of the division. Coupled 
with the concomitant shortage of tent squares, the inadequacy of the soldiers’ clothing 
exacerbated the pernicious effects of the cold, rainy weather in northeastern France.421  
 However, the EstW was almost entirely incapable of ensuring the timely and sufficient 
provision of clothing and other vital supplies. The logistical difficulties experienced by the k.u.k. 
divisions in the West partly stemmed from their dispersion in eastern France; according to 
Schilanek, the EstW could not easily cope with dispatching supplies to so many different areas of 
the front, especially given the congestion in the German rail system.422 However, the collapse of 
Austro-Hungarian industry was the fundamental impediment. By late 1918, shortages in labor 
and raw materials, particularly coal, had drastically reduced the industrial production and 
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transportation capacity of the Habsburg Monarchy.423 The 106th Infantry Division experienced 
the greatest material hardship of the k.u.k. divisions in the West, as it was a low priority for both 
the Austro-Hungarian and German commands. On September 26th, only a couple weeks after the 
division arrived in France, the divisional command reported a shortage of 6000 pairs of shoes, 
150 pairs of boots, 5500 pairs of pants, 5000 field blouses, 3300 coats, and 9500 pairs of 
underwear. Likewise, the division lacked any cold-weather gear and most train424 material.425  
Indeed, the material condition of the Landsturm troops was so bad that, upon the arrival 
of the division in the Ornes sector, a local German commander provided hundreds of barefooted 
k.u.k. soldiers with boots from his own stores.426 Although possibly the most severe issue,  the 
lack of suitable clothing was not the only element of the Austro-Hungarian divisions’ logistical 
woes. After the beginning of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, food supplies ran perilously low for 
the 1st Infantry Division. The logistical chaos wrought by the Allied attack and the constant 
bombardment of depots and transport routes in the divisional sector precluded the regular and 
sufficient supply of frontline troops from the field kitchens. Consequently, soldiers at the 
frontline had to utilize their iron rations and subsist largely on nonperishables.427 In early 
October, as the situation became more desperate, the divisional command issued detailed 
instructions for the emergency slaughter and processing of horses, paying particular attention to 
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utilizing as much of the carcass as possible; notably, the divisional command even proscribed the 
consumption of horses killed by gunfire or shelling.428 
 Combined with the inclement weather and the great deficiency in suitable 
accommodations at the frontline, the dearth of clothing supplies compounded the misery of the 
overworked, exhausted Austro-Hungarian soldiers. For one, the lack of clothing and shelter 
stimulated and exacerbated the outbreak of disease. A great variety of ailments afflicted the 
Habsburg troops in France, from venereal disease to bowel disorders to the Spanish Flu. 
Although certainly not as deadly as in other areas of Europe, the Austro-Hungarian forces in the 
West did witness a conspicuous rise in flu cases during October, which Metzger largely 
attributed to the poor clothing and quartering conditions.429 Between October 10th and the end of 
the month, approximately twenty-three men from the 35th Infantry Division died from 
pneumonia induced by the flu, although the disease rendered many more unfit for action.430 
However, even as the flu abated, other diseases continued to cause misery among k.u.k. troops. 
On October 4th, the 106th Infantry Division reported that although the number of sick was 
declining, the number of ailing troops was on rise, primarily as a result from skin ailments, lice 
infestations, and other conditions generated by poor living and sanitary conditions.431 The 
pervasive clothing shortages similarly intensified the impact of gas bombardment on the troops 
of the k.u.k. formations. The Allies’ prodigious use of mustard gas to saturate the frontlines and 
rear areas of the divisional sectors already created enough problems for Austro-Hungarian 
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troops, namely by impeding the movements of supplies and reinforcements. The long duration 
with which mustard gas remained on surfaces, when coupled with the clothing shortages, 
resulted not only in more severe gas injuries from lack of protection, but also further depleted the 
troops’ supply of suitable clothing.432 
 The weekly reports of the k.u.k. divisions in the West are conspicuously pithy and vague 
in matters pertaining to the morale and discipline of the troops. For the most part, the divisional 
commanders reported the morale and physical condition of their soldiers as “good” or 
“adequate,” despite all of the aforementioned problems. Thus, accounting for the biases and 
interests of those in command, one cannot really gain a complete, detailed picture of the 
psychological state of Habsburg soldiers in France from reading the weekly reports at face value. 
However, both reading between the lines and analysis of some of the operations documents 
partially illuminates the problems of morale and discipline facing these formations. Firstly, 
although the extant files do not provide explicit statistics concerning desertion, one can confirm 
its occurrence. In his weekly report of September 26th, FML Kratky of the 106th Infantry 
Division noted that ninety-three men from the division deserted during the train journey from 
Poland to France.433 Likewise, at least 189 men had deserted from IR 5 prior to October 7th, 
when the division reported the formation of a labor company composed of deserters from that 
regiment. In its desperation for more manpower, the 1st Infantry Division not only allocated this 
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deserter company for construction duties at the frontline, but also authorized the brigade 
command to reinsert any well-behaved deserters back into the ranks of the regiment.434  
 Nevertheless, no major disciplinary breakdown equivalent to the situation in Italy 
occurred among the Austro-Hungarian formations on the Western Front. In fact, the most 
significant instance of disorder arose far from the frontlines and at the very end of the conflict. 
At the end of October, the men of the divisional training groups in Arlon, influenced by the 
revolutionary sentiments of nearby German soldiers, demanded transportation back to Austria-
Hungary and threatened armed insurrection in the event of a deployment to the front. While this 
threat induced the German authorities to expedite the withdrawal of Austro-Hungarian troops 
from the West, no revolt of any sort ultimately came to pass.435 However, if nothing else, the 
operations documents of the k.u.k. formations in France demonstrate that the Austro-Hungarian 
command authorities were very concerned with preventing the disciplinary and moral collapse of 
their troops. After the desertions during the division’s journey to France, the command of the 
106th Infantry Division requested that the AOK authorize the use of physical restraint to punish 
deserters on the Western Front, a measure which the Emperor Karl had abolished in his 
disciplinary reforms of the previous year. On October 15th, the legal department of the AOK 
replied, refusing the permit such disciplinary measures except in the most urgent 
circumstances.436  
Among the 1st Infantry Division, Metzger repeatedly stressed the responsibility of 
officers for upholding the morale and discipline of the division. On September 12th, after 
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noticing the chaotic distribution of rations, the slackening of march discipline, and a growing 
failure to salute superior officers, Metzger ordered the divisional leadership to ensure the orderly 
and equitable provision of food and the maintenance of disciplinary standards.437 Metzger’s 
particular emphasis on stricter policing of roads and billets to “put a stop to shirking” suggests a 
strong concern for, if not the actual occurrence of, large numbers of k.u.k. soldiers absconding 
from frontline duty.438The leadership of the 1st Infantry Division also feared the pernicious 
influence of domestic politics on the morale and discipline of their ethnically-diverse rank-and-
file, especially after the monumental events of October 1918. On October 26th, Metzger informed 
the officers of the division that they had a special duty to monitor the effect of letters and 
newspapers from Austria-Hungary on their subordinates. Stressing the especially difficult 
position of the Austro-Hungarian forces isolated in the West, Metzger commanded his officers 
immediately inform him of any political discontent in the ranks so that he could prepare adequate 
countermeasures.439  
 Although the divisional reports do not mention widespread, significant insubordination 
and likely downplay discontent in the ranks, the documents from the k.u.k. divisions in France do 
acknowledge specific issues affecting the troops’ morale. While perhaps not as prominent 
Metzger had feared, political concerns did materialize among Habsburg soldiers in the West. On 
October 21st, Metzger indicated to the AOK that many Hungarian soldiers of IR 61, hailing from 
Banat, were anxious of a Serbian invasion of their homeland. These soldiers expressed 
resentment towards fighting for the Germans in a distant country when the war directly 
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threatened their homes and families. Similarly, the armistice negotiations in late October/early 
November sowed confusion among the ranks and further reduced the willingness of the troops to 
continue to fight.440 Somewhat ironically, given the German perception of the unreliability of the 
multiethnic k.u.k. Armee, the Habsburg commanders in France also expressed concerns that the 
growing defeatism among their German comrades exercised a pernicious influence on morale. 
On October 23rd, Metzger directly attributed discord among “a few unruly elements” of the 
division to fraternization with German troops.441  
However, the most consistent themes in the divisional documents concerning troop 
morale were material deprivation and exhaustion from incessant frontline use. In its October 11th 
report to the AOK, the 35th Infantry Division highlighted the lack of suitable clothing as the 
greatest detriment to troop morale, particularly since nearby German troops were well provided 
for in this regard. In contrast, after the arrival of replacement uniforms, the division reported a 
week later that the provision of cold-weather clothing to most of the units noticeably improved 
the attitude of the soldiers. However, on October 23rd, the division observed that despite a month 
of comparative rest, the morale of the troops “who had previously never lost their courage in the 
heaviest fighting” had still not completely recovered. In addition to citing the influence of 
domestic political events and the hope for an armistice, FML von Podhoránsky asserted that the 
inadequacy of accommodations, the lack of a rest period, and continuing material difficulties 
constituted the most significant impediment to repairing the morale of the rank-and-file.442 
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The “mutiny” of FJB 25, perhaps the most prominent instance of insubordination among 
the k.u.k. troops in the West, exemplifies the overwhelming influence of material deficiency and 
combat fatigue on Austro-Hungarian morale. On the night of October 22nd, the 1st Infantry 
Division ordered this Feldjägerbataillon to return to its positions on the frontline. The Czech 
troops of the battalion refused and ignored the repeated demands of their officers, stating that 
they were too exhausted to continue fighting. The Feldjäger notably did not threaten their 
superiors with violence or desert; in fact, the soldiers did not even refuse to continue fighting. 
The Czech soldiers merely requested a few days of rest and replacements for their tattered 
clothing. Upon hearing of this “mutiny,” the battalion commander reproached the noncompliant 
troops, arguing that their “shameful behavior tarnished the good reputation of the unit.” 
Accordingly, the commander demanded that “any decent men should follow him to the 
frontline.” Somewhat surprisingly, this appeal to the men’s honor was effective; all of the 
Feldjäger promptly obeyed their commander and resumed their positions at the front.443 
 The ethnicity of the troops in this particular situation is significant. Of all of the 
ethnicities of Austria-Hungary, the Czechs were the most suspect in the eyes of Habsburg 
political and military authorities during the First World War. Throughout the war, there were 
many instances of mutiny and defection among Czech units; both the AOK and the OHL 
considered the Czechs to be inherently and categorically treasonous, hence Ludendorff’s initial 
request to exclude Czech troops from the k.u.k. formations sent to the West.444 Indeed, Habsburg 
authorities had many reasons to suspect the political reliability of Czech troops in 1918, given 
the size and prominence of the anti-Habsburg Czech Legion and the strenuous activities of the 
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Czechoslovak national committee. Yet, one must note that many thousands of Czech soldiers 
continued to fight for the Habsburg Monarchy until the end of the war, far more than the number 
who deserted to the Czech Legion. Likewise, one cannot uncritically accept the assertions of 
postwar nationalists that all non-German and non-Hungarian k.u.k. soldiers espoused well-
developed nationalist views and deserted because of these nationalist sentiments445. Indeed, even 
after large numbers k.u.k. soldiers began to desert in 1918, particularly after the failure of the 
June Offensive, Allied authorities in Italy reported that “hunger and hopelessness” were the 
primary motivations among Habsburg deserters, not nationalistic fervor.446 Similarly, as 
previously mentioned, Habsburg soldiers of all nationalities, including the supposedly reliable 
Austrian Germans and Hungarians, abandoned their posts en masse at Vittorio Veneto. 
 Correspondingly, the case of FJB 25, nearly concurrent with the collapse of the k.u.k. 
Armee in Italy, illustrates the greater complexity behind the loyalties and motivations of k.u.k. 
soldiers and suggests that difficult fighting conditions, not intrinsic ethnic loyalty or disloyalty, 
lay behind motivations for insubordination. In his report to the division, Hellebronth attested to 
the quality of FJB 25 and its officers, noting its excellent combat record on the Western Front. 
Hellebronth pointed to the horrible conditions among the unit, which was “clad in rags” and 
“completely exposed to the weather, gassing, and shelling.” Likewise, the battalion report 
emphasized the utter exhaustion of the men after almost two months of continuous use at the 
frontlines, during which the unit had suffered nearly eighty-percent casualties. In the end, 
Hellebronth concluded that that such unfavorable conditions “surpassed the limit of human 
capacity.” In his view, only reinforcements and an extensive period of rehabilitation could 
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preserve the unit. The further “forced use of the remnants of the battalion” would not only 
completely destroy the unit, but “would hardly serve the purpose for which the Austro-
Hungarian presence on the Western Front was intended.”447 Hellebronth’s observation 
represented the wider opinion of the Austro-Hungarian leadership on the Western Front. All of 
the divisional commanders repeatedly requested the removal of their units from frontline 
deployment for rehabilitation. Yet, the desperate position of the German Army in the West in the 
final weeks of the conflict did not permit such respite. Metzger underscored the reality of the 
situation when he observed that “the last remnants of the division will be inevitably expended;” 
in his view, only the complete evacuation of the division from the meatgrinder of the Western 
Front would save the k.u.k. troops from utter destruction.448 
 And yet, despite the overwhelmingly unfavorable conditions on the Western Front, the 
Austro-Hungarian divisions there did not disintegrate. To be sure, many of the casualties denoted 
as “missing” indubitably surrendered to Allied forces during the confusion of the St. Mihiel and 
Meuse-Argonne battles. This was certainly not unique to Austro-Hungarian troops; hundreds of 
thousands of German soldiers surrendered to the Allies in the final months of the war, especially 
after the Peace Note of October 3rd.449 Likewise, given the evident concerns of the Austro-
Hungarian leadership with discontent, indiscipline, and shirking, a fair number of k.u.k. soldiers 
in France likely absconded in some way or another. Nevertheless, several factors explain why the 
k.u.k. formations in the West did not share the fate of their counterparts in Italy. One of the most 
obvious explanations is simple geography. While Austro-Hungarian soldiers on the Italian Front 
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or in the Balkans could easily return home upon desertion, the personnel of the four divisions in 
France were separated from their native lands by hundreds of miles. Capture by the Allies in 
France did not guarantee as swift of a homecoming as an official withdrawal, which was already 
a topic of discussion by the end of October.  
 Similarly, unlike the situation in Austria-Hungary, the German army and state had not yet 
collapsed prior to November 9th and conceivably offered a barrier to a complete disintegration. 
Although not in a much better situation themselves, the German formations in the West, by 
providing extensive material and tactical support to their Habsburg allies, likely contributed to 
averting a total Austro-Hungarian collapse in the West. However, the Allies themselves provided 
the most valuable contribution to the survival of the k.u.k. divisions opposing them. Although 
harried by constant bombardment and a deteriorating supply situation, the Habsburg troops in 
northeastern France managed to avoid the brunt of the enemy onslaught after October 11th, 
unlike their compatriots at Vittorio Veneto. Indeed, in his evaluation of the morale situation of 
IR 5, Oberstleutnant Popelka asserted that the regimental leadership could preserve the unit’s 
discipline in the status quo. However, at the same time, Popelka noted that he could not 
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 While overwhelmingly apparent, the military insignificance of the Austro-Hungarian 
divisions in France obscures important aspects of the First World War that the phenomenon 
illustrates. First and foremost, the political and military relationship between Austria-Hungary 
and Germany during the war was multidimensional and complicated. As shown by both the 
political processes leading up to the Austro-Hungarian deployment to France and the experiences 
of the k.u.k. divisions on the Western Front, Austro-German relations not only changed 
significantly over the course of the war but were also deeply ambiguous. Initially, Austria-
Hungary was not merely an obedient thrall of the German Reich, but an autonomous and 
important actor whose relations with its German ally were far from harmonious. The deployment 
of Habsburg infantry to France was a product of the tensions and contradictions in the Dual 
Alliance; therefore, this phenomenon represents the evolution of a strained wartime relationship 
between sovereign states into one of dependence and submission. In this way, Austria-Hungary’s 
involvement on the Western Front encapsulates the many political, economic, and military 
factors behind the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy. Ironically, in the end, the interests of the two 
allies most closely coincided during the extended process of their final defeat.  
 More generally, the Austro-Hungarian Army’s actions on the Western Front provide 
important insights into the functioning of this complicated, troubled organization. In addition to 
illustrating the k.u.k. Armee’s evolution as a fighting force over the course of the Great War, the 
experiences of Austro-Hungarian divisions in France show the many weaknesses that bedeviled 
the Habsburg military throughout the conflict. Likewise, the events on the Western Front in late 
1918 further illuminate the major role played by the German Army in propping up its Habsburg 
counterpart during the final years of the war. Moreover, the topic of Austro-Hungarian forces on 
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the Western Front relates directly to more fundamental questions regarding Austria-Hungary 
during the First World War. How did Austria-Hungary, a state whose collapse so many predicted 
long before 1914, endure four years of total war before finally giving in? More importantly, why 
did so many soldiers of so many different ethnic backgrounds continue to fight and die for the 
supposedly-defunct Habsburg Monarchy? Only further research that deals with Austria-Hungary, 
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